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ABSTRACT
For decades, Paul Romer’s endogenous growth theory has enriched the discussion
regarding human capital in development. Romer posits that human capital is a vital
resource and critical component of macroeconomic growth. With emigration identified
as the leading cause of human capital loss for developing countries, Romer recommends
growth policies focus on accessing knowledge in more developed parts of the world. As
a way to achieve sustained development, institutions like the United Nations have
proposed strategies similarly aligned with Romer’s theory. These institutions suggest
the diaspora, as a source of human capital, can go beyond remittances and serve as
integral actors in development.

While this dissertation agrees there are substantial benefits to incorporating the
diaspora in development initiatives, the entrenchment of host and homeland actors raises
serious questions about the effectiveness of this strategy. These questions are especially
significant in Haiti, where a multitude of host actor organizations has long played a
leading role in Haiti’s development. In order to successfully introduce the Haitian
diaspora, perceptions and attitudes of Haitian development actors were examined through
case study analysis, one-on-one semi-structured interviews, and a self-administered
survey (n=482). Uncovering these perceptions and attitudes is critical to forming policies
that engage, utilize, and retain the Haitian diaspora in a long-term and meaningful way.

Overall, results indicated the Haitian diaspora is broadly receptive and
enthusiastic to the notion of being integral actors. While their perceptions surrounding
ii

the strategy remained positive, the diaspora conveyed considerable barriers to widespread
engagement. Host actors in Haiti exhibited some reservations to the strategy, detecting it
would structurally change the North-South development model. Host actors expressed
they were sensitive to the voice of the Haitian people being further diminished by a new
entrant. Homeland actors were eager and open to the idea of the Haitian diaspora
participating in development initiatives. They recognized the Haitian diaspora’s
contributive impact on the Haitian economy, and acceptance of the diaspora in initiatives
was a reasonable next step. Finally, international actors should focus policies that
provide broad education about Haiti and better inclusion as ways to improve engagement
with the Haitian diaspora.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Haiti’s rich and unique emergence into the global community is in glaring
contrast to the last 75 years of its existence. In its most recent history, Haiti has had over
30 years of authoritarianism, an internationally sanctioned embargo, and a devastating
earthquake that has affected the lives of millions of individuals on the island. All of these
events, which are categorically natural, obligatory, or self-inflicted, have contributed to
the economic stagnation and negligible economic growth of the island (Gibbons and
Garfield 1999; Wucker 2004). An opportunity to achieve sustained economic and social
development rests in the fact that the poorest country in the western hemisphere has a
dormant wealth of human capital only 700 miles away. The United States is home to
over 800,000 individuals with Haitian ancestry (American Community Survey, 2009);
these individuals of the Haitian diaspora have the potential to be critical transnational
members of Haitian development. (Weinar, 2010; United Nations Development
Programme, 2009; Gamlen, 2014; Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006).
As an approach to sustained international development, researchers, including
those from the United Nations, have identified that the diaspora of low developed
countries could potentially serve as integral actors in international development (The
United Nations, 2015; Sinatti and Horst 2015; Espinosa, 2016; Lewaila 2006;). This
strategy is regarded as a unique way to accelerate international programs and encourage
partnerships with private and public actors. Additionally, this strategy is congruent with
some macroeconomic theories that emphasize the value of human capital. In particular,
Paul Romer’s endogenous growth theory suggests that low developed countries, who lose
1

vast amounts of human capital to emigration, focus on growth policy that access human
capital in other parts of the world (Romer, 1994).
One of the questions this dissertation attempts to address is how this strategy is
received by Haiti's traditional and non-traditional development actors. Traditional actors
in this dissertation are considered to be homeland and host actors. Homeland actors
include the Haitian government, ministry leaders, civil society, and community-based
organizations. Host actors are for-profit contractors (FPCs), non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOS). Given the vast and
entrenched development ecosystem it begs the question if such a strategy would be
effective in Haiti (Trouillot, 1990). More specifically, due to the significant shifts in
ideology, resources, and required collaboration, one must ask if traditional Haitian
development actors are prepared for this approach. With such an extensive modification
of Haitian development strategy, failure to achieve a higher understanding and
coordination between the different actors go beyond monetary costs. Failure to adjust
risks impeding or reversing the progress of organizations working to assist millions of
disadvantaged lives, a consequence that Haiti cannot afford (Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde, &
Cold-Ravnkilde, 2016).
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Figure 1. International Development Actor Hierarchy

This dissertation attempts to address these concerns and mitigate the risk by
exploring the perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian diaspora, host, and homeland
actors. This dissertation assumes that the cognitive positioning, namely through positive
perceptions and attitudes of the host, homeland, and Haitian diaspora actors, is imperative
to the Haitian diaspora's influence and success in the homeland country. This dissertation
seeks to contribute to the extant literature in three distinct ways. The first contribution
comes from exploring the conceptual framework of the diasporas as human capital
resources to developing nations. By incorporating the research of other diasporas and
their roles in their homeland development, we can begin to form a meaningful
deliberation of how the Haitian diaspora could impact Haiti in similar development
conditions. Second, contributions will be made by drawing from elite traditional Haitian
development actors regarding their perceptions and attitudes. These elites, from the host
3

and homeland, will consist of former and current leaders of IGOs, academia,
development experts, and officials of Haiti. The researcher will conduct exploratory
interviews that will focus on the current traditional development model and the novel
diaspora inclusion strategies emerging from international organizations. These views
will form a representative position of whether actors in the traditional North-South model
are ready to accept non-traditional actors such as the Haitian diaspora as an equal
development partner. Finally, the dissertation collects substantial primary data on
individuals from the Haitian diaspora utilizing a self-administered survey. Questions
gathered from the survey will not only provide current perceptions and attitudes of the
Haitian diaspora but will also explore the diaspora’s constraints regarding systematic
engagement in Haiti. If successful, the collective insight provided in this dissertation will
help to determine if there is a satisfactory proclivity amongst the three Haitian
development actors to move forward with this international strategy in Haiti.
Purpose of the Study
Haiti has evaded meaningful development despite the multitude of world leaders
and development professionals who have made them a development focus. The 2010
earthquake required a renewed focus on Haiti’s overall development strategy and was
largely seen as both a metaphoric and literal opportunity to start over and rebuild (Ansari,
2010). According to a 2012 report by the Special Envoy for Haiti, during an
International Donors Conference held in New York in 2010, Haiti received just over $12
billion of committed international aid through 2020 (The UN Office of the Sepcial Envoy
for Haiti, 2012). These funds provide Haiti with a substantial source of development aid.
Today, roughly 46.1% of committed aid has already been disbursed, which means that
4

there is roughly $6.5 billion of pledged monies still waiting to be spent. For the
international aid that was disbursed, 99% of aid flows were primarily directed to
unaccountable NGOs and private contractors. This move usurps the Haitian government's
role as a key actor and influencer of its future (Ramachandran and Walt 2015).
The global partnership strategy purported by the United Nations and other IGOs is
one of many strategies that seek to achieve sustained development. By examining the
Haitian diaspora's potential contributive power and the sentiments surrounding this
strategy, this dissertation builds a framework that examines the viability of inviting a
third party to a traditionally bilateral system.

Figure 2. Research Framework
If the Haitian diaspora serves as a third actor, it could provide a more ‘Haitian’
perspective to a development strategy orchestrated by non-Haitian institutions; a notion
presumed to benefit Haiti. In addition, this dissertation’s timeliness presents both the
Haitian government and the United States an opportunity to strategize around the 46,000
5

Haitians as their temporary protected statuses (TPS) expire January 4th of 2021 (The
United States Department of Homeland Security 2017; American Immigration Council
2020). In the nine years since the earthquake, Haitians living under TPS have had either
indirect or direct institutional influences from democratic and economic institutions, a
process called integration or assimilation (Waldinger, 2004). Utilizing the Haitian
diaspora can benefit the host actor by using the diaspora as ambassadors and influential
extensions of diplomatic efforts (Shain & Barth, 2003).
Arguably the most significant benefit of this study will be the valuable primary
data collected on the Haitian diaspora, a potential key actor for sustained Haitian
development. Given Haiti's tumultuous history, programs that seek to engage the Haitian
diaspora will require an understanding of their self-perceptions, needs, and constraints.
The data collected from the Haitian diaspora can assist policymakers and practitioners
move the Haitian diaspora beyond remittances and into direct and active capacity
building, investment, or knowledge and skills transfer.
Research Questions
Chapter 3 - A Comparative Analysis of Diasporas Case Studies – What Worked and
What Didn’t
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Research question 1: What variables allow for successful engagement of a
diaspora
Hypothesis 1: Positive host actor perceptions and attitudes are important to
improved engagement of the diaspora
Hypothesis 2: Positive homeland actor perceptions and attitudes are important to
improved engagement of the diaspora
Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved
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Chapter 4 - Assessing the Perceptions and Attitudes of Traditional Development Actors
Regarding the Haitian Diaspora through Interviews
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Research question 3: What are the perceptions and attitudes of traditional
development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora’s potential as an integral
Haitian development actor
Hypothesis 1: Homeland Actors perceive the Haitian diaspora as an integral actor
to Haitian development
Hypothesis 2: Homeland Actors are willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a seat at
the table
Hypothesis 3: Homeland Actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)
Hypothesis 4: Host country actors perceive the Haitian diaspora as an integral
actor to development
Hypothesis 5: Host country actors are not willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a
seat at the table
Hypothesis 6: Host country actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)
Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved

Chapter 5 - Assessing the Perceptions and Attitudes of Haitian Diaspora through Surveys
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Research question 4: What are the self-perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian
diaspora as integral development actors
Hypothesis 1: The Haitian diaspora has positive self-perceptions and accepts they
are integral development actors.
Hypothesis 2: Positive self-perceptions lead to greater willingness to participate
in systematic programs
Hypothesis 3: There are generational differences between those who perceive
themselves as integral actors to Haitian development
7

•
•
•

Older (65+) – Do not believe they are integral actors
Middle-aged (35 to 64) – Inconclusive belief they are integral actors
Younger (18 to 34) – Do believe they are integral actors

•

Hypothesis 4: Kreyol language proficiency is a determinant of the willingness to
participate in knowledge transfer initiatives

•

Hypothesis 5: Younger and middle-aged diaspora are less likely to participate in
remittance transfer than older diaspora

•

Hypothesis 6: There are variables which help predict levels of engagement
amongst the Haitian diaspora

•

Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved
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CHAPTER II – OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter of the dissertation provides a review of the predominant theories
surrounding the Haitian diaspora, mainly how the diaspora serves as a resource to Haiti.
For historical and cultural considerations, this dissertation examines Haiti's history and
specific characterizations of the Haitian diaspora. These characterizations are essential to
the overarching strategy of suggesting the diaspora is an integral actor in Haiti's
development. For economic considerations, neoclassical growth theories purported by
Robert Solow and the seminal work from Paul Romer are two schools of thought that
frame the Haitian diaspora as vital human capital (Solow 1956; Romer 1994).
History
Haiti is a country located on the island of Hispaniola in the western hemisphere,
sharing a national boundary with the Dominican Republic. During the colonial era, Haiti
became known for its abundant resources and later served as the main center of the Slave
Trade to the Americas. Haiti’s history is unique in that it is the only successful nation
born out of a slave rebellion. The success of the Haitian Revolution came upon the defeat
of the most powerful empire at the time, the French colonial army. Haiti went on to form
an independent republic that had both international stature and South American regional
influence. While few historians give the revolution its appropriate acknowledgment, it
should be noted that the revolution became a movement that helped radicalize the
conflicts and revolutionary wars in South America (Blackburn, 2006). This history has
been an indelible source of pride for generations of Haitians, and this has created a
persona of resilience in the Haitian culture.
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Today, Haiti would not be accurately characterized without highlighting the
dichotomy of its rich cultural history and its current prodigious poverty. The rich cultural
beginnings have been greatly overshadowed by the abject poverty and international focus
that exists today. Moreover, the explanations of the current state of Haiti is often
misplaced by believing that Haiti has historically lacked significant natural resources,
noteworthy endowments, or contributions to global society. What has greater
explanatory potency, interwoven in the fabric of Haiti, is the long history of misguided
dictatorship and poor governance that has led Haiti to experience such a dramatic fall in
stature (Frankema, 2014).
Haitian Authoritarianism and Instability Lead to Emigration
While the election of Dr. Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier in 1957 was not the first
of dictatorships in Haiti, it was, however, the beginning of a defining neo-patrimonial
regime that would be in power for the next 30 years. Neopatrimonialism is defined as a
system of a social hierarchy where patrons use state resources in order to secure the
loyalty of clients in the general population (Definitions.Net, 2020). Papa Doc's regime
was marked by high military institutional autonomy, favorable accommodation to the
black middle class, and violence and oppression of Haiti's citizenry. Through the use of
the Tonton Macutes, a paramilitary brute force organization whose leadership came from
the rural middle class, Papa Doc was able to neutralize counterforces to his rule. This
included army officers who had previously staged coups; the Roman Catholic hierarchy;
and the intellectuals on the island (Snyder, 1992). The intellectual class was viewed as a
particular threat to Papa Doc and other presidents before him. It was President Stenio
Vincent (served 1930-1941) who first started to denigrate the role of the intellectual in
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public service through his refusal to collaborate with any intellectual who would not
succumb to his wishes (Paquin, 1983). However, Papa Doc’s hold on power would
eventually lead him to exile intellectuals during his regime. This marked the beginning
of the first mass exodus of Haiti’s human capital and high-skilled labor force (Nicholls,
1986).
The second mass exodus of Haiti's citizens occurred under Papa Doc’s successor,
his son Jean-Claude Duvalier. Jean-Claude would ultimately resume dictatorship under
slightly different oppression mechanisms. After marrying into a prominent mulatto
family in 1980, Jean-Claude diverted favor from the middle class and other black elites to
the mulatto elites. Jean-Claude’s actions was an unraveling of Papa Doc's strategy,
which used the black middle class to control civil society. Jean-Claude's persona and
lavish lifestyle was characterized as elitist and exacerbated through the use of colorism in
political maneuvers. Similar to his father, Jean-Claude adopted strategies of killing and
jailing opposition leaders. Eventually, support from the military waned, and a group of
malcontents from the previous administration plotted against the less inclined leader.
From 1981 to 1986, Haitian emigrants to the U.S. came from a broader social class
compared to emigrants in the 1950s and 1960s. This second wave of Haitian migration
accounts for nearly three-quarters of Haitians and their descendants living in the U.S.
today (Nicholls, 1986; Haggerty, 1989).
The third wave of Haitian immigrants occurred during the coup of democratically
elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. While in political asylum in the United States,
ousted leader Aristide encouraged the Haitian people to rally and destroy political
enemies. These showings prompted the military to respond with greater force to subdue
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the uprisings. This violence caused thousands of Haitians to flow out of Haiti due to
reported killings and violence by military leader Raoul Cedras (Charles, 1995). To truly
understand the level of violence that occurred in Haiti, which led to mass emigration, one
could look to the response of the international community. On May 24th, 1992, President
George H. W. Bush issued the "Kennebunkport Order," which essentially allowed the
U.S. government the ability to repatriate Haitian migrants intercepted on the high seas.
This order allowed the government to return Haitians to Haiti without any kind of
screening or interviewing process that could have established them as political refugees
(De Matteis, 1993). Concurrently, the United Nations Security Council was working on a
trade and arms embargo as part of an international effort to restore constitutional rule in
Haiti. Acting under Chapter VII of the charter, resolution 841 was passed unanimously
by the Security Council as a strict response to the exceptional nature of the situation in
Haiti (The United Nations, 1993). These measures were so aberrantly severe that
officials stated that these actions should not be constituted as a precedent. James Baker,
then-Secretary of State to the United States, was one of many supporters of such
measures and was quoted years earlier saying, "this junta will be treated as a pariah
throughout this hemisphere, without assistance, without friends and without any future"
(Doyle, 1994). The effects, however, were not isolated to Cedras' regime; instead, the
resolution and the entire crisis had devastating long-term effects on everyone in Haiti.
The embargo affected many factions in Haiti, ranging from businesses and the middle
class to the desolate and extremely poor. Between 1991 and 1993, Haiti's GDP per capita
went from $479 to $249, a 47% decline in two years (The World Bank, 2018).
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The fourth and most recent wave occurred when the devastating earthquake hit
Haiti in January 2010. The latest government released death toll reported 220,000 to
300,000 Haitians as being killed by the January 12th, 2010 earthquake. While it is not
uncommon to have death toll figures such as these exacerbated and highly disputable,
what becomes less dubious is the economic loss and the widespread devastation that the
earthquake caused (Daniell, Khazai, and Wenzel, 2013). The Haitians that were entering
the United States after the earthquake were seeking relief from a destroyed and leveled
island. Approximately 46,000 Haitians were granted Temporary Protected Status, which
gave them the ability to live and work without proper documentation (The United States
Department of Homeland Security, 2017). These disruptions created an exodus of both
highly skilled and low skilled labor that eventually weakened the state. This dissertation
assumes that one of the causes of mediocre growth and the lack of state capacity is
related to the loss of precious human capital, known as the brain drain.
Brain Drain – Emigration’s Effect on Least Developed Countries
The brain drain is a term that designates the international transfer of resources in
the form of human capital from developing to developed countries. This term is
primarily used when describing the migration of relatively highly educated individuals
and the effect it has on the countries that experience the loss (Biene, Docoquier, &
Rapoport, 2008). An alternative definition offered by Kwok and Leland (1982) states that
the brain drain is an expression of British origin commonly used to describe one of the
most sensitive areas in the transfer of technology. These authors add that the brain drain
refers to the skilled professionals that leave their native lands in order to seek more
promising opportunities elsewhere. The brain drain was acknowledged as a possible
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threat to development as early as the 1960s, and since then, it has been a contentious
issue of the global north and south. Grubel and Scott (1966) add that the loss is
considered to be real since, absent migration, the home country would have had a more
skillful workforce, more per capita output, and better national welfare than if the skilled
population had not migrated.
Human Capital and its Role in Aggregate Economic Growth
To fully appreciate the value of human capital, one must understand how such an
asset plays a role in the broader concept of aggregate growth. Solow first developed and
applied the neoclassical model, which highlights that growth is a function of capital,
labor, and technology. Before Solow, economic models had a high focus on capital and
labor factors, demonstrating that an increase in the labor force and capital stock were
respectively dependent on the natural and warranted rate of growth. The natural rate of
growth is the growth rate absent of technological change, and the warranted rate of
growth depends on the savings and investment habits and firms. In the examination of
economic growth performance between countries, Solow attributed the variance to
technological differences (Solow, 1956).
Until the research contributions of Arrow (1962), Lucas (1988), and Romer
(1994), Solow’s technological declarations remained mostly unexplored. These authors
posited that economic growth was primarily endogenous to technology and not due to
external forces. Arrow emphasized that private sector activities contribute more to
technological advancement than public sector funding through research (Arrow, 1962).
Lucas expressed that human capital can enhance the productivity of both labor and
physical capital. Lucas states that in the production of particular goods, human capital
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accumulation is acquired by on the job training or learning-by-doing. Romer argued that
investments in human capital, innovation, and knowledge are significant contributors to
economic growth. The choices of the public and private sector influence the rate of
growth in technology. Romer states that for low-developed countries, the prevailing
question for governmental leadership is figuring out the institutional arrangement for
gaining access to the knowledge that already exists in the rest of the world (Romer,
1994).
Haiti’s Current Economic Resources: Labor, Capital, and Human Capital
Labor
This dissertation establishes that the drivers for economic growth are the
abundance of labor, capital, and technology. In an examination of Haiti’s economic
resource stock, World Bank data indicates that Haiti has one of the most populous
countries in the Caribbean, with an estimated 10.98 million persons. This figure lags
only behind Cuba that has a population of 11.48 million. Based on 2017 estimates,
Haiti’s total workforce of 5.01 million people ranks third in the Caribbean and
seventeenth in all of Latin American (The World Bank, 2018).

Capital
Haiti’s gross capital formation, defined as the outlays on additions to the fixed
assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories, stands at $3.65 billion
of a $1.16 trillion pool in Latin America and the Caribbean. These assets include land
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools,
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offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.
If Haiti had levels closer to full employment, or economically productive assets (as
opposed to socially productive assets like bridges and roads), these factors alone would
lend themselves to produce, at the very least, an average GDP for Haiti. Instead, Haiti’s
historical GDP figures have shown that these endowments have been underutilized and
mismanaged. See Table 2 (The World Bank, 2018):
Table 1 2017 Regional GDP Categories
Regional Categories:
North America
Latin America and the Caribbean
Dominican Republic
Middle-Income Countries
Sub Saharan Africa
Least Developed Countries (classified by the United Nations)
Haiti

2018 GDP Per Capita
$61,117
$9,044
$8,051
$5,486
$1,586
$1,055
$868

(The World Bank, 2018)

Human Capital

The Haitian resource not yet mentioned that is associated with aggregate
economic growth is human capital, a proxy for technology. While the general notion of
human capital has existed for centuries, it remains as an intangible and challenging
attribute to measure. This fact necessitates exploration of the various measures that exist
today. The Barro-Lee measure (Barro & Lee, 2013) estimates the average educational
attainment by age categories and educational levels. This method proves to be common
amongst researchers because of the 146 countries covered in the data set. The PISA and
PIACC are international OECD sponsored measures often used as human capital
indicators. The PISA and PIACC tests assess student knowledge and skills as well as the
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skills and utilization of adults. These measures provide a more detailed test involving
400,000 student participants in over 57 countries. Unfortunately, neither the PISA nor
the PIAC included Haiti as part of the program, and this measure would be unusable for
this study. The World Bank’s measure of human capital, which is a calculation of the
contributions of health and education to worker productivity, is also an alternative metric.
Productivity is estimated as a future worker of a child born today relative to the
benchmark of full health and complete education. This data is then aggregated to
produce an index score by country that ranges from zero to one. The benefit of using this
data is that the statistics are provided at regular intervals in widely distributed
publications (The United Nations Economic Council of Europe, 2016). Given the
constraints of these measures, and for comparisons in this study, the Barro-Lee measure
is the most appropriate source for human capital data. The 2010 Barro-Lee data set
indicates that only 21.9% of Haiti’s population aged 25 or older completed secondary
school, and less than 1% of Haitian people have attained tertiary level education (Barro &
Lee, 2013).
Void in the Literature
What is not known about the Haitian diaspora is how the amalgamation of Haiti’s
unique history, generational oppression, and mistrust of political leadership play in the
psyche of the Haitian diaspora. While there is an agreement with the theoretical position
of the United Nations and other IGOs that the diaspora can benefit the homeland, there is
uncertainty about the realistic execution of this strategy and subsequent sustained
development in Haiti. This dissertation offers some critiques of this strategy; first, the
environment and specifications necessary for this strategy to be effective are unexamined
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or ambiguous at best. Second, it is not known if the Haitian diaspora is willing to adopt
systematic macro-level engagement that goes beyond remittances. Moreover, the
international community does not understand the conditions and mechanisms that are
needed for the Haitian diaspora to reengage with their home country. Does the Haitian
diaspora prefer short-term passive partnerships with NGOs, or do they prefer more
formalized approaches of knowledge transfer and capacity building? Considering that
the international community has not yet developed a broader plan detailing the amount of
resources, needs, and constraints of bringing all actors to the table, the dissertation
believes that any efforts without these considerations are ultimately ineffective. Any
exhaustive study or strategy must include the perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian
diaspora so that large-scale programs can effectively utilize this vital commodity of Haiti.
This dissertation aims to uncover these questions in hopes that host actors who fund
ambitious programs, and the Haitian government, who are recipients of international aid,
can successfully introduce Haitian diaspora to the faction of Haitian development actors.
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CHAPTER III - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIASPORAS CASE STUDIES –
EXAMINING DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT
Overview
This section of the dissertation compares and contrasts several literary works that
examine diaspora engagement and development initiatives around the world. While the
selection of the cases is multi-layered, generally, the selected articles involved the
diaspora in economic, social, or political development in the home country. The
literature offers a wide range of development positions, such as the successes and failures
of diaspora engagement, and the perceptions and attitudes of all the actors involved.
According to Yin (2009), this comparative analysis can only serve to establish parameters
within the greater body of research, and it cannot seek to make generalizations. Instead,
this comparative exercise is used to help describe, understand, and define the range of
occurrences that may be associated with the Haitian diaspora.
•

Research question 1: What variables allow for successful engagement of a
diaspora

•

Hypothesis 1: Positive host actor perceptions and attitudes are important to
improved engagement of the diaspora

•

Hypothesis 2: Positive homeland actor perceptions and attitudes are important to
improved engagement of the diaspora

•

Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved
Literature Review

In a case study of the Somali diaspora, Abdile and Pirkkalanien (2011) identified
that perceptions of the diaspora are critical to the overall success of the engagement. The
19

perceptions in the Somalia case varied amongst the diaspora and largely depended on
how they felt they could best assist their homeland. Perception differences between
actors could create conflict and mistrust between the parties involved. In addition, the
study presented that the recognition or acceptance of the diaspora from the local
population is critically important to fruitful dialogue and positive interaction. Feelings of
acceptance within a diaspora help to secure their engagement as part of the collective
working to develop the homeland and not merely as outsiders.
In another case study of the Suriname diaspora, Bovenkerk (1981) suggested that
diaspora members who recognize that the knowledge transfer process is slow, before
returning to the home country, have a better rate of success. In the Bovenkerk’s
Suriname case study, the diaspora became frustrated at the pace of change, and it became
very easy for them to leave their projects for more lucrative opportunities on the island.
When this occurred, locals often questioned the exact intent of the diaspora. Locals
stated that the true intent was to make money and not participate in greater systematic
change. The article also suggested that upon their return, the Suriname diaspora often
disregarded social norms and did not bring back knowledge that was practical for the
island. The study concluded that “good” diaspora was those that had adequate education
and were willing to make sacrifices. These literary examples succinctly demonstrate that
perceptions matter. Since research limitations prohibit the dissertation from examining
the perceptions of local Haitians, this section seeks to capture sentiments through
research cases of various diaspora groups.
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Methodology & Data
Methodology
The Haitian diaspora has not been satisfactorily researched, at least not to the
extent where there is enough breadth and depth in the public or private domain. The lack
of research exists for two reasons. First, the diaspora as a development solution has not
been raised to the levels of interest that exist today. This study examines the diaspora
and their contributive power as a third integral actor in development and not merely a
solution on the periphery of those in the North-South model. Second, there is even less
known about the self-perceptions of the Haitian diaspora who, after establishing
relatively high educational and economic attainment abroad, can be seen as a plausible
development solution. The cases that were selected are systematically analyzed to
provide the similarities and differences between each case.
This dissertation used the Google Scholar platform to search for cases. Some of
the keywords in the initial search were the following:
Table 2 Search Criteria
The Caribbean Diaspora and International
Development
Case Studies of Diaspora in Development
Including the Diaspora in Development
Capacity building by diaspora
Diaspora assisting home country
Successful development by the diaspora

Economic Development by the Diaspora
Diaspora in Development
The Brain Drain and Brain Gain
Diaspora development strategies
Diaspora and Human Capital
Perception of the Diaspora in Development

A criterion was applied to the initial search results to ensure specific themes
would be present that would help answer the overall research question. The criteria are
shown below:
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Inclusion Criteria
1. The diaspora country of origin must be from a middle-income country or a least
developed country
2. The objective of the diaspora’s engagement must have political, social, or
economic inclinations
3. Host country or homeland country perceptions about the diaspora must be
addressed
The case study search produced an adequate number of articles to use in this
dissertation. Given the need for prioritization, the rank was given to the articles in the
following manner:
1. Economic development by the diaspora
2. Diaspora country of origin is located in Latin America or the Caribbean
3. The country of diaspora origin was set up as an extractive state during
colonization
4. The diaspora country of origin has a history of authoritarianism
A total of seven cases were analyzed with specific objectives in mind. The
objective is to analyze each article using a framework applicable to this study, which
means examining these cases for their engagement objective, perceptions of actors, and
ways to improve engagement. Each case will be compared using the following points:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Objective of engagement
Diaspora perceptions
Perceptions of homeland country
Perceptions of host country
Ways to improve engagement
By adopting this comparative case study method, the dissertation brings forward

ideas, concepts, and connections that substantiate or contradict the thinking of the
international development community regarding the diaspora.
Data
The search results produced seven relevant articles that were incorporated into the
dissertation after applying the inclusion criteria. These articles embodied wide-ranging
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approaches in the field of international development. All seven cases were found using
keywords typed into “Google Scholar.” Details are as follows:
Table 3 Case Study Search Results
Case #
1

2

3

4

5

6
7

Article
Diaspora Engagement for Development in the
Caribbean (Caribbean Engagement Case) (MintoCoy, 2016)
Diaspora and development? Nigerian organizations
in London and the transnational politics of
belonging (Nigerian Diaspora Case) (Lampert,
2009)
The diffusion of diaspora engagement policies: A
Latin American agenda (Latin American Case)
(Délano, 2014)
Formalizing Diaspora–State Relations: Processes
and Tensions in the Jamaican Case (Jamaican
Diaspora Case) (Sives, 2012)
Homeland Perception and Recognition of the
Diaspora Engagement: The Case of the Somali
Diaspora (Somali Diaspora Case) (Abdile &
Pirkkalainen, 2011)
Engaging-the-Haitian-Diaspora (Haitian Diaspora
Case) (Wah, 2013)
Cape Verde: Rethinking Diaspora in Development
Policy (Cape Verdean Case) (Resende-Santos, 2015)

Search Criteria
The Caribbean Diaspora and
International Development
Diaspora and Development

The Caribbean Diaspora and
International Development
Case Studies of Diaspora in
Development
Perception of the Diaspora
in Development

Economic Development by
the diaspora + Haiti
Diaspora in Development

Results & Analysis

Each case was analyzed individually using the framework mentioned above. The
themes that were identified are presented in the manuscript’s conclusion. It is important
to note that the cases in this study varied in content, and the framework used to analyze
the cases was not present in all seven samples.
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Case 1: Diaspora Engagement for Development in the Caribbean
Objective of Engagement
The information presented in this case (Minto-Coy, 2016) centers around the
traditional and emerging approaches that countries are using to engage their diaspora.
While there are many ways to measure the contributions of the diaspora (e.g., social,
political, or economic development), this article primarily focuses on the economic and
human capital contributions of the diasporic communities. This case places additional
focus on the diasporic communities from the Caribbean, which historically have been a
primary resource of skilled and non-skilled labor for the United States, United Kingdom,
and Canada. The case first examines migration from the Caribbean to these developed
regions and how the diaspora has come to grow significantly. The case then examines
the relationships between the homeland and the diaspora and how the rapport has
evolved. Minto-Coymakes a pointed effort to highlight how the relationship has moved
to a more active and formal arrangement geared to tapping into the potential of these
groups. Lastly, the case discusses the perception of the host country and private sector
actors, both of which are important to the facilitation of greater engagement with
homeland country.
Diaspora Perceptions
While the diaspora has typically migrated from homeland country to the host
country for better opportunities, the conditions in the country that they arrive in are not
always improved or ideal. Minto-Coy highlights that the lack of support can adversely
affect the diaspora. In these environments, the diaspora perceives that homeland
countries have a responsibility to provide social support and advocacy for them against
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various forms of migrant abuse (Minto-Coy, 2016). In a recent legal case involving
Haitian diaspora in the Dominican Republic, the Constitutional Court passed a law
allowing for persons of Haitian parentage to be stripped of Dominican Republic
citizenship despite being born in that country (Garcia 2013). While the diaspora has
primarily taken supportive roles for family and friends in the homeland, this is one
example where the diaspora expects advocacy and support from the homeland.
Minto-Coy (2016) makes evident that the long history of remittances that the
diaspora has a healthy self-perception of the contributions they have made to the
homeland, particularly in the area of remittances and social philanthropy. These efforts
come at critical times following natural disasters and can be targeted through more
organized apparatuses such as churches, educational institutions, alumni associations, or
health missions. The diaspora understands that the remittances they send can be used to
meet a range of needs and responsibilities to individuals and groups in their homeland.
In a citation of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the agency “confirms
the view that sending remittances to relatives is seen by emigrants as a moral obligation
which intensifies during periods of hardship rather than a response to economic
investment opportunity” (International Organization for Migration, 2012). The diaspora
also has worked to rebuild the reduced human capital capacities that exist in the
homeland country by participating in knowledge transfer activities. The case highlights
that various diaspora groups helped to introduce efficiencies during the knowledge
transfer process. These techniques and innovations are particularly evident in the health
and education sectors of homeland countries (Ying & Manderson 2013;Minto, 2009).
With an estimated 80% of the total university-educated population emigrating from the
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homeland, the ratios of skilled to unskilled labor are continuing to decline. These
declining rates of skilled labor become more prevalent as more industrialized countries
reform their immigration programs to attract the most skilled and educated from this
region (Minto, 2009). These direct and indirect efforts cannot be understated, especially
for countries that have high cases of poverty.
Perceptions of Homeland Country
Traditionally, the engagement policy of homeland countries toward their diaspora
is best characterized as the “silent partnership.” The silent partnership is the absence of a
formal policy or consistent dialogue with the diaspora, as well as the lack of official
acknowledgment of the role of this group in national and regional development (Minto
2009; Minto-Coy, 2011). Even though countries have adopted the silent partnership
policy, today, there is a shift in how countries assess the benefits of engaging their
diaspora. The case describes that governments realize that greater emphasis on
knowledge networks and other means of strategic engagement with their diaspora are
efforts that can significantly benefit homeland country. Minto-Coy’s research
highlights the importance of a top-down approach of the government to achieve
successful engagement with the diaspora. For example, Jamaica stated that the top goal
is to “expand the involvement of the Jamaican diaspora in national development”
(Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2009). Suriname also created pathways to increase
engagement of their diaspora members by creating a program called IntEnt. IntEnt
served as a means to support diaspora investments, businesses, and provided mentorship
to the diaspora that wished to establish businesses in Suriname (Minto-Coy, 2016).
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These efforts are examples of what countries with large diaspora bases have done to tap
into the human capital living abroad.
While there is a broad acknowledgment of the value of an engaged diaspora, the
sentiment has not always existed. According to the case (Minto-Coy, 2016)., migrants
and diaspora have sometimes been characterized as traitors who defected from their
homelands for highly developed countries. The belief is that the diaspora who have left,
lost the right to be engaged in the happenings of their homeland. This ideology was
common in early cultural or sociological accounts captured in fictional and biographical
accounts of Caribbean authors (Baugh, 2012; Elhayawi, 2013; Lamming, 1953). There
are still remnants of this thinking embedded in the psyche of some citizens that remain on
the island as well as officials governing homeland countries.
Perceptions of Host Country
The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have historically viewed the
Caribbean diaspora as a dependable source of skilled labor. According to Solow’s (1956)
macroeconomic growth theories, labor is a key input to growth, and host actors work to
engage the most skilled to fuel their robust economies. It is no secret that these
countries, who are a part of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), have uniquely benefited from a more globalized world.
Ways to Improve Engagement
One interesting concept that Minto-Coy points out involves the success of
organizations like CARICOM and the promotion of engagement of member countries in
the Caribbean. The case highlights that the recent migration of labor within the Global
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South has benefited poorer countries like Haiti and the Bahamas. This South to South
migration makes it easier for some diaspora groups to engage with the homeland.
States within the Caribbean can no longer afford to rely on the traditional “silent
partnership.” These governments need to develop well thought out strategies to reengage
the critical resources aboard. The article (Minto-Coy, 2016) suggests that the structure of
engagement can lend itself to better outcomes. For example, a diaspora must first engage
with the host country before they begin to discuss options for maintaining connections
with the homeland. Minto-Coy suggests the Orozco model as a framework to get private
sector engagement from the diaspora to the Caribbean. The Orozco model involves the
use of the “Five T’s,” which stands for (Orozco, 2003):
•
•
•
•
•

Telecommunications
Trade
Transfers
Tourism
Transport
It is essential in any engagement initiative that the diaspora retain their ownership

and their ability to direct investment. Lastly, engagement is further supported when dual
citizenship options provide the diaspora with benefits and incentives for living, working,
and investing in the homeland while living abroad.
Case Summary
Minto-Coy (2016) describes that the diversity of the Caribbean and the current
ties to the more developed economies are historically connected to their colonial origins.
While emigration from the Caribbean remains substantial and unlikely to change, given
the global structure, the case highlights the need to focus on South to South migration. If
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the Caribbean invested in better information, communication, and technology
infrastructure, then the diaspora that seeks to return to would be better accommodated.
Most governments in the Caribbean have heavily relied on the traditional
relationship between the diaspora and homeland, referred to as the silent partnership.
Minto-Coy makes an argument that the main reason for increased diaspora engagement is
not a change in diasporic ideology; instead, increased engagement is external to the
diaspora and a result of homeland initiatives.
The primary drivers to increased engagement are driven by the actions of
governments, international development actors, and ideological trends. For better
outcomes with the diaspora and their networks, governments must focus on establishing
better information, communication, and technology (ICT) at home. Tapping into the
diasporic economy offers the Caribbean and developing states a way that they can
creatively and proactively insert themselves into the global economy. This engagement
can be done using the Five T’s approach from Orozco’s private sector engagement
model. The strategies offered in this case offer a template for governments to engage the
diaspora by sharing experiences of the Caribbean diaspora.
Case 2: Diaspora and development? Nigerian organizations in London and the
transnational politics of belonging
Objective of Engagement
Ben Lampert’s (2009) objective in this study was to capture the discourse of
London based diaspora groups regarding the development of their homeland. Lampert
performed a study of six London based Nigerian diaspora groups that were selected from
a pool of 325 organizations. By observing discourses of these London based Nigerian
29

diaspora, Lampert aims to capture the perception of the roles these groups believe they
should play in development.
Diaspora Perceptions
One of the observations Lampert makes of the Nigerian diaspora is that they have
primarily adopted goals from tribal leaders of Nigeria, which is in contrast to adopting
national level targets from the state. The aim of the Nigerian diaspora, in this case, is to
fulfill the needs of local communities. The groups observed had a high affinity for
participating in rituals and respecting the traditions of Nigeria. For the Nigerian diaspora,
this was not out of the ordinary as membership in the Nigerian diaspora was linked to
geo-ethnic identities ranging from village to kingdom. The kingdoms’ traditional
authorities encourage ancestral linkages. These connections are demonstrated in part by
the national anthem where the pledge is to “remember and benefit home even if one
should travel abroad.” Lampert found that despite the fragmented targets brought about
by geo-ethnic divisions, there is an overwhelming aspiration to see a united and
prosperous Nigeria, made in part by the contributions of transnational diaspora.
Perceptions of Homeland Country
Nigeria’s focus on the diaspora was apparent in the early 2000s when newly
elected Olusegun Obasanjo embarked on his goal to reengage the Nigerian diaspora.
Within a year and a half, Obasanjo attended a gathering of 3,700 diasporic Nigerians in
Atlanta, Georgia (Lampert, 2009). In his opening message to the diaspora, Obasanjo
made assertions to the diaspora when he stated:
Here and now, Nigeria is taking the bold first step to enable Nigerians living
outside the country to participate fully in the process of visioning, planning, and pursuing
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the political well-being, economic development and the sound governance of their
country (Obasanjo, 2000).
Obasanjo went on to stress the importance of human capital to development,
signaling that the skills and knowledge of the diaspora were not only welcomed but also
needed. In late 2000, the Nigerian state-funded and created the Nigerians in Diaspora
Organization (NIDO), a non-profit that draws resources from the synergy of all Nigerian
Professionals in the diaspora (Lampert, 2009). The creation of NIDO was the first in
North America, and subsequent chapters would later be chartered in several African,
Asian, and Australasian countries.
Lampert describes that the Nigerian state recognized that effective networks
would facilitate the transnational transfer of human capital. However, in order to be
effective, the state would need to facilitate investment capital into the country. The
Nigerian state would promote the Nigerian Stock Exchange and the King’s Town
property development in Abuja as institutions that could facilitate diaspora investment.
Perceptions of Host Country
Lampert’s case did not focus on the diaspora host country relationship, and
consequently, there was not a great deal of material to note.
Ways to Improve Engagement
One of the more successful methods that the Nigerian diaspora has been able to
exercise has been through the celebration of cultural awareness weeks. In the late 1980s,
the Nigerian diaspora began celebrating cultural weeks with carnival. Today, the wellestablished cultural week is celebrated with week-long events that commemorate a
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distinct and proud Ayege identity (Lampert, 2009). These events are targeted ways to
strengthen ties of the diaspora to their ancestral kingdom.
In 2004 the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS) began its operation as
an organization created to serve as an intermediary between the diaspora and the
apparatus of the state. The NNVS’s first significant program was the annual conference
in Abuja, which brought diasporic scientists, medical and technology experts together
with some of their Nigerian based counterparts. This partnering of professionals led to
tremendous knowledge sharing and, in some cases, a way for some members of the
diaspora to take permanent positions in government ministries and agencies (Lampert,
2009).
Case Summary
The early and lasting efforts of former President Obasanjo made the engagement
of the Nigerian diaspora a top priority. The Obasanjo administration created special
envoys to act as an intermediary between the diaspora and the homeland. These
organizations focused on communicating to the diaspora that they were welcome to
participate in the national development of Nigeria. The collective efforts to
constructively engage the diaspora were unmitigated and decisive.
Case 3: The diffusion of diaspora engagement policies: A Latin American agenda
Objective of Engagement
The primary objective of this case study (Délano, 2014) was to examine the
diffusion of diaspora engagement policies amongst Latin American countries. The case
referred to the similarities amongst Latin American countries’ diaspora engagement
policies to the successful engagement model of Mexico. The Mexican model is
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essentially the strategy of providing critical programs such as health services to the
diaspora while simultaneously using these occasions as an opportunity for the diaspora to
reconnect with homeland country. A secondary objective of this case was to explore the
emergence of Latin American regional solidarity as it relates to engagement in the United
States. These Latin American countries are using consulates as an apparatus to
coordinate outreach programs. One of the most successful elements of this program is
the health fair, where participation and reach have grown over the years. In 2011,
organizers reported 3,641 activities in the U.S. that directly aided just over 499,000
people. In order to execute and support these events, 7,500 agencies, and 12,905
volunteers headed by 150 consulates were required (Associated Press, 2008). The case
(Délano, 2014) examines both of these concepts to provide evidence that the diffusion of
diaspora engagement practices is a result of this formal and informal collaboration.
Diaspora Perceptions
The collaboration of many countries in Latin America pooling resources together
provides a very explicit and implicit benefit to the diaspora. The health fair provides
access to healthcare that many diaspora members may not have had otherwise. This
strategy has also led to the provisioning of services and institutions that support
education, financial literacy, and leadership development. In addition, collaboration
amongst the Latin American countries has allowed better advocacy for migrants’ rights in
the host country. One of the more inherent benefits to the diaspora is that these services
allow for more successful integration of migrants into the country of residence (Delano,
2010).
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Perceptions of Homeland Country
The focus of Delano’s case is not necessarily the perceptions of one country;
instead, it is about how and why the Mexican diaspora engagement model is perceived
and adopted by other Latin American countries. Latin American countries, with little
modifications, have widely adopted the Mexican model. The Latin American countries
that did not adopt all aspects of the Mexican model did not do so because of the
characteristics of their populations, the limited resources of the country, and the bilateral
relationship with the host country (United States). Latin American countries have felt
pressures from their diaspora, the media, and other migrant serving countries to adopt the
Mexican model. The challenge for these Latin American countries is gaining a deep
understanding of diaspora interests and deciding the homeland’s responsibilities to the
diaspora. In addition, the difficulty for the homeland country is the ability to assess what
programs should be replicated and which programs should be left for other countries to
adopt.
Delano’s observations in this case (Délano, 2014) study suggest that states, like
many other policy areas, tend to copy what they consider to be successful programs. The
downside to this carbon copy policy agenda is that the copied policies do not necessarily
result from conscious modeling (Volden, 2006; Cook-Martin & FitzGerald, 2010).
Mimicking the Mexican model has the potential to have wide-ranging results in each
country. The circulation of these policies was assisted by the representatives from
homeland countries attending organized events. If the representatives had a similar
regional identity, or the diaspora shared experiences in the host country, then the ideas
and policies were more likely to be replicated. The diffusion of the Mexican model is
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grounded in two of the four main policy diffusion theories presented by Dobbin,
Simmons, and Garrett (2007); the constructivist and learning hypotheses versus the
coercion and competition hypotheses. The constructivist approach emphasizes the
importance of ideology norms and expert knowledge of the communities being examined.
The shared ideologies, similarities between countries, and any sociocultural linkages
explain why specific policies are emulated or transferred. Delano (2014) continues to
explain that diffusion is best explained by the learning hypothesis, which suggests that
countries learn from their own experiences as well as from the policy experiments of their
peers. These theories explain why Latin American countries continue to refer to Mexico
as a model and guide to diaspora engagement policy. One of the obstacles to the rapid
diffusion of this engagement policy is the financial limitations of these Latin American
countries. Smaller economies that have fewer resources are more likely to do less than
those Latin American countries with more considerable resources (Délano, 2014). In
2018, the average GDP of Latin America was $9,244, and Mexican GDP was slightly
better than $9,673. The gross domestic product of Mexico is in stark contrast to countries
like Nicaragua and Haiti, where the per capita GDP is $2,029 and $868 respectively (The
World Bank, 2018).
Perceptions of Host Country
Delano (2014) highlights that there is limited formal research on policy diffusion
and how engagement policies affect both the homeland and host country. However, the
observations communicated in the article suggest that these types of efforts help with the
bilateral relations of the homeland country and the sending state (Delano, 2011;
Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). While there is not much information presented in this case
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about the perceptions of the host country, there is a more extensive network of non-state
host actors that participate in engagement initiatives. The case highlights that the nonstate actors of the host country are critical because non-state actors subsequently
collaborate with many Latin American countries helping to promote and support their
diaspora.
Ways to Improve Engagement
An alternative to the Mexican model is the Plazas Communitras program, a
signature education initiative from the Institute of Mexicans Abroad and the National
Institute for Adult Education (INEA) (Délano, 2014). The goal of this program is to
provide continuing education programs in elementary, middle school, high school, and
sometimes university-level courses to Mexican adults. This program supports the wellbeing of the Mexican diaspora and promotes the Spanish language and Mexican culture
among younger generations.
Case Summary
The Mexican model has shown positive results that lead to increased diaspora
engagement. These results have motivated other countries in Latin America to emulate
the Mexican model for their outreach programs. The case (Délano, 2014) highlighted
that as the success of Mexico’s programs grew, participation by representatives of Latin
American countries aided in the diffusion of such engagement policies. The Mexican
government welcomes the collaboration of Latin American countries so that the
leveraged and collective voice can have a more significant impact on diaspora living in
host countries. Delano went on to highlight two schools of thought for why the Mexican
model is spreading so rapidly amongst Latin American countries, the constructivist and
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the learning hypothesis. Mexico sees tremendous potential in the collaboration
established with other states, and the Mexican government looks forward to increasing
the collective voice of diaspora from Latin America.
Case 4: Formalizing Diaspora – State Relations: Processes and Tensions in the
Jamaican Case
Objective of Engagement
In 2004 the Jamaican state launched a coordinated effort to engage the diaspora.
The primary objective of the research presented by Amanda Sives (2012) is to examine
these efforts using the distinction of narrow and broad formations first presented by
Itzigsohn (1999). The belief, in this case, is that the effectiveness of diaspora-homeland
relations is only meaningful using narrow formations. The secondary objective of this
case is to provide background information of the 2004 initiative and highlight the
progression of concern from the Jamaican state. The final and third objective of the case
is to present the organizational mechanisms created by the Jamaican government and
offer critiques by the author.
Diaspora Perceptions
The first is the internal politics of the host country; as an example, the prevalence
of discriminatory legislation. The prevalence of such discrimination causes the diaspora
to be in communication with embassy representatives and will expect that the homeland
would offer assistance. The second issue that motivates the diaspora to engage can arise
from a changing political situation in the homeland. Diaspora engagement has been
especially frequent when there is political turmoil or demands for an opening of the
political space. Lastly, engagement increases when the initiatives of the homeland,
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seeking to strengthen links with diaspora, are enacted for their developmental purposes.
This case stresses that the deepening or expansion of these initiatives largely depends on
which partner initiates the process and on what basis.
The engagement initiative by Jamaica emerged because of the motivations of the
state. Unfortunately, the agenda has not deviated much from the needs of the state; Sives
states that this has caused tension in the diaspora-homeland relationship. The diaspora
initiative is organized into three key stakeholders, the Jamaican government, the diaspora
representatives (advisory board members), and the communities overseas. One of the
major causes of discourse amongst the diaspora emerges from the varying demographics
that exist between them. The Jamaican diaspora consists of different ages, genders, and
classes, and each of the communities they live in provides a different level of experience.
Also, there are increased tensions within the diaspora that are between the “official”
diaspora organizations and pre-existing diaspora groups.
The diaspora has long engaged with the homeland with diaspora organizations
long before the 2004 initiative, and it was unclear how this new structure would play into
the transnational activities that existed for decades prior. According to a former foreign
minister, “there were fears that their autonomy and independence were being threatened
and their organization as they have known it over the years” (Sives, 2012).
Whether it is the diaspora that has been participating in initiatives over the years
or those that are willing participants of the new diaspora initiatives, there are some
genuine barriers to active participation. There are volunteerism costs that inhibit those
that are willing to participate but cannot afford to do so. These barriers particularly exist
for young people, a constituency that is important to Jamaican development. There also
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remains confusion about the actual role of the Diaspora Advisory Board members. Some
perceive the board members as leaders responsible for engagement in the host country
and, therefore, responsible for forming the agenda and executing it. Some perceive that
the diaspora board should serve as a medium for information for the Jamaican
government during the biannual meetings. While there is quite a bit of political
incompatibility that potentially exists between Jamaica’s diaspora and formal diaspora
organizations, where they have congruency is the need to expand the traditional core of
individuals engaged in diaspora activity. Critics agree that this new engagement strategy
needs to be one that is more robust and comprehensive.
Perceptions of Homeland Country
The Jamaican government, compared to other countries like the Dominican
Republic and Haiti, has been late to recognize the diaspora beyond a source of
remittances. Sives states that for several reasons, the Jamaican case is unique. First,
there has not been political upheaval in Jamaica that motivated migrants to develop the
political linkages for change. Secondly, there was not any pressure coming from outside
the country to have deeper or formal engagements with the diaspora. Lastly, Jamaica has
had substantial migration, which has led to significant diaspora populations in North
America and the United Kingdom. There is an inherent complexity that exists in being
able to manage a diverse population and institute an apparatus that would improve
diaspora-homeland relations.
Perceptions of Host Country
The article primarily argues that host countries are part of a triadic relationship
between the host country, the diaspora, and the homeland. The dynamic highlights that
39

diaspora groups relate to both the homeland and the host state to which they reside.
Basch, Schiller and Blanc (2000) state that the homeland, “claim their dispersed
populations as citizens” in order to further their development and establish the diaspora
as “part of” their home state. Simultaneously, the host society also makes “claims” on
these new population groups within its borders. Depending on sentiments of the host
country toward a specific diaspora group, there may be significant efforts made by the
host country to harness the value of their immigrant populations, leaving the diaspora
“torn” between host and homeland.
Ways to Improve Engagement
Sives (2012) makes an argument that there are two types of organizational
frameworks, narrow and broad formations with narrow formations being deemed the
most effective for diaspora engagement. Narrow formations include regular movement,
high institutionalization, and constant personal involvement. In contrast, the broad
formations relate to limited movement, lower institutionalization, and minimal personal
involvement. Besides, if homeland governments want to engage their diaspora, they need
to target those that are transnational diaspora versus traditional diaspora. Sives defines
traditional diaspora as those who give their remittances but choose to express their
connection to home by financially supporting friends and family. Traditional diaspora is
in contrast to the transnational diaspora who encompasses all those who “feel” part of the
wider nation, regardless of their current level of engagement with homeland. Martiniello
and Lafleur (2008) suggest that the key is to be a part of the transnational diasporic
community so that there is active, collective transnational engagement.
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To help improve engagement, the Jamaican government recognized an official
Diaspora Day and established a biennial diaspora conference. These were simple
proposals initiated by the Jamaican government aimed at facilitating communication and
awareness amongst the diaspora to achieve several development objectives.
Case Summary
The case (Sives, 2012) sought to establish that narrow formations versus broad
ones are more effective when it comes to diaspora engagement. While both the
traditional diaspora and transnational diaspora share a common identity, only
transnational diaspora, and those in transnational diasporic communities, work towards
having more impactful engagement. Sives highlighted the need for additional research
that would help determine why some members of the diaspora become active members of
the transnational community and others do not. The case went on to highlight the areas
of contention between the diaspora, the diaspora advisory boards, and the Jamaican
government. Sives argued that unclear roles have contributed to the conflict and that
more open and public dialogue could resolve these issues. The dialogue should address
three main points; first, the actual initiative needs clarification. The homeland must ask
what does increased engagement mean for the diaspora? The diaspora already partakes
in remittances, how will they begin to approach enhanced investment, increased business
links, and support government-led projects. The second issue is that the Jamaican
government needs to recognize the diversity that exists among the diaspora. Not only are
there demographic and socio-economic differences between the groups, what also exists
is that they have interacted with Jamaica in very different ways. Any initiative must
respect the pre-existing experiences of current and engaged diaspora, all while creating
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paths for new and innovative ways to connect to the homeland. Lastly, the rules that
apply to the advisory board members need to be more inclusive of those who have
limited resources. Currently, board members are expected to attract private sector
investment and attend the diaspora conferences. These requirements within the diaspora
are potential barriers for those with lower incomes, particularly the youth, which is a
critical demographic that the government must successfully employ.
Case 5: Homeland Perception and Recognition of the Diaspora Engagement: The Case
of the Somali Diaspora
Objective of Engagement
The primary purpose of this case (Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011) is to analyze the
interactions between the diaspora and the locals of Somalia. By understanding the
perceptions of the Somali diaspora and the local community, this case seeks to establish
the importance of mutual recognition within the development process. The authors
recognize that the extant literature found two opposing views of the diaspora. The first is
that the diaspora possess the necessary education, experience, and knowledge to
contribute towards stability and national development. The alternative view is that the
diaspora is seen as a group that can fuel or instigate conflicts in the homeland. Abdile
and Paivi Pirkkalainen used empirical data from a total of 144 interviews, 7 group
discussions, and participant observations in different parts of Somalia, the U.K., and
Finland.
Diaspora Perceptions
The Somali diaspora can be categorized into three groups. The first are those
members who have maintained historical relationships through constant contact.
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Engagement is regular and typically done through a form of social or financial
remittances. The second group is characterized by indifference and non-engagement.
These members are not eager or pressed to have a relationship with the homeland.
Despite possibly having family members in Somalia, they do not participate in the
remittance process. The primary focus of this second group is to improve their lives in
the host country. The case study suggests that this is often the case for second-generation
Somalis and women in particular. The third group is usually those who behave
somewhere between the first and second groups. These are the members who are
engaged with the homeland but are doing so in limited ways. For example, this group
will show concern for the famines and droughts in the homeland, but their remittance
patterns are irregular and not sustained (Hoehne, Feyissa, & Abidle, 2011; Schlee &
Schlee, 2010).
For the participants interviewed in this research, the study found that the Somali
believed it was essential to maintain a close relationship with those in the homeland.
Traditionally, Somalis stayed in touch by exchanging letters, but today, the diaspora have
turned to establish contact through emails, phone calls, Skype, and Facebook, just to
name a few. One quote from the Somali diaspora captures the importance of diaspora
engagement:
“If we do not send [money] they die. We try to help them. Diaspora is the
resource, one of the most important resources in the whole of Somalia” (Abdile &
Pirkkalainen, 2011).
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The challenge for the diaspora is to maintain connection despite the lack of
security in the homeland. They cite that the environment does not make it conducive for
diaspora engagement. A diaspora member was quoted as saying:
[diaspora can contribute a lot], but in the South [Somalia,] there are warlords who
have troops and guns, and they are stopping anyone who is trying to make improvements.
In this context the civil society intellectual level will not have a lot of effect (Abdile &
Pirkkalainen, 2011).
It is implied in this context that the Somali diaspora is willing to do more should
the security in the homeland improve.
Perceptions of Homeland Country
The Somali case offers insight into the perceptions of the local population as well
as those of the state. One viewpoint, said to be held by many in the Somali government,
is captured by a traditional elder statesman quote:
There is no doubt that diaspora members are in a position to do many good things
here, but our observation about them is that they are too weak and disorganized to help us
to their full capacity. There is a Somali proverb that says: ‘far keliya fool ma dhaqdo’,
meaning a single finger cannot wash a face. I feel obliged to say that without them
collectively getting together, the few that are here will not be able to do much. Their
strength and power lie in their collectiveness, their togetherness, but this is not
happening. Clan loyalties and tribalism pose a major challenge for the diaspora. They
have to overcome this clannish mentality and be a good example to others (Abdile &
Pirkkalainen, 2011).
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An impediment to the utilization of diasporic knowledge and expertise is the
belief that the Somali diaspora lacks the strategic vision to engage with Somalia. The
homeland population believes the diaspora are too fragmented to incite sustained
collective change.
Some of the locals believe that the influence of the Somali diaspora is not always
positive. Some critics argue that conflict has escalated in the homeland because the
diaspora injects large sums of money into the economy resulting in significant inflation.
Some locals perceive the diaspora returnees as a strain to local resources. They believe
that the increased number of diaspora returnees makes it more difficult for locals to
compete for jobs and other services. A local high school teacher responded as follows:
I think it’s better if the diaspora stay where there are. Those who have saved
enough money and want to come back to invest are more than welcome because they will
create jobs and other opportunities. Also, doctors, nurses, and teachers can come back
because they will contribute to much-needed services. But it’s a bad idea for others to
return, because when they are here they will not send remittances as they used to do when
they were in the West. Here they want jobs and schools for their children. All of these
they can get from where they are in the diaspora. Our resources are limited here (Abdile
& Pirkkalainen, 2011).
The research, in this case, showed that resource sharing between locals and
members of the diaspora became an issue. Locals stated that school tuition and rental
fees have already gone up since the diaspora started returning to Somalia. Research
findings suggest that large diaspora communities in Somalia have exacerbated the belief
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that diaspora can pay more for rent, tuition, and other items. One government-employee
put it like this:
Their presence is making everything very expensive. There are empty houses all
around Hargeisa but local people cannot afford them because landlords want to rent to
those from the diaspora or to international organizations. In the summer it is even worse.
You will not be able to rent a place in the summer because they [diaspora members]
come here in large numbers. (Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011).
The conflict between diaspora members and the homeland was not limited to
economic grievances; cultural friction was also a point of contention for the two groups.
This conflict was especially damaging for diaspora women who adopted western
ideologies. One diaspora member put it this way:
Women from the diaspora may face more challenges [than men]. They have to
play a role here, they have to respect the local culture and behave in certain ways.
We are all brainwashed when we are in the West, we change our culture. For
women in particular, this may be problematic in terms of adjusting to life here. They
should be taught at the reorientation that here they are Somali women, not Finnish
(Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011).
An interesting element of the perceptions of the homeland regarding diaspora
engagement is the view that the diaspora’s approach to engagement matters. The article
cites that a superior attitude displayed by some diaspora towards locals is often
problematic. One local hotel manager referred to the cultural conflict and stated:
The other day I was having coffee with a friend at the Ambassador Hotel and next
to us sat a group of diaspora having drinks. Their discussion was about how local Somalis
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were ignorant (reer miyi) and backward. We were shocked about their attitudes and their
lack of local understanding. These young people are ignorant about their culture and
think because they lived in the West and learned few skills they are better than us (Abdile
& Pirkkalainen, 2011).
Throughout the case there was evidence that the locals viewed the diaspora as
having indispensable resources that benefited Somaliland. What was also apparent, more
so in this case than the others, is that at the local level, the diaspora had a great deal of
skepticism towards the idea of diaspora returning to the homeland country. The root of
the distrust is presumed to be the cultural differences between local Somalis and the
diaspora. As the diaspora becomes influenced by other cultures and begins to adopt
habits from Western countries, potential ideological emerges in the homeland. Many
locals believe that the diaspora requires cultural reorientation, known as dhaqan celis,
upon returning to the homeland.
The Somali government has a slightly more optimistic view compared to the local
population on ways that the diaspora should be involved. Some believe that direct
participation in political parties is particularly beneficial. This is expressed in a quote
from a member of the Somaliland House of Representatives:
Many of my colleagues in the House of Representatives are from the diaspora.
Having studied and worked in different parts of the world they have now come back and
are making their skills and experience gained from years of working in the West and the
Middle East accessible to their homeland. This I see as a positive thing because other
African governments are complaining about brain drain but on the contrary, we are
experiencing the reversal of such trends (Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011).
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The political prowess of the diaspora is seen as valuable and therefore welcomed.
The diaspora has learned strategies and approaches that could help with bringing about
political reform. The perceptions of locals and the state seem to vary depending on the
diaspora group, more specifically those that return home versus those that are engaged at
a distance and limit their engagement to financial remittances.
Perceptions of Host Country
The Abdile & Pirkkalainen case primarily focused on the relationship dynamic of
homeland locals and the diaspora that live abroad. Perceptions of the host country were
not emphasized in this case study; therefore, there is limited information to note.
Ways to Improve Engagement
Since some of the local population have contention surrounding the return of the
diaspora to the homeland, but not the vital remittances sent back to the homeland, it may
make sense to focus on the engagement infrastructure. The case cites that high-speed
internet would help increase diaspora engagement with those in the homeland. The
various modes of communication could be enhanced with better internet connectivity.
Platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, and email are some of the communication
mechanisms used by the diaspora that could better enhance their connections.
Another alternative to improving diaspora engagement could be the consistent
flow of emissaries from the homeland government to diaspora centers around the world.
The case cites that there are representatives of the government, members of civil
societies, and clan elders that embark on journeys that are focused on strengthening ties
between the homeland and the diaspora. The objective as representatives is to promote
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cooperation amongst all actors in the development process so that the better alignment
and effective use of resources can be realized.
Case Summary
The case presented by Abdile and Pirkkalainen holds a unique distinction from
the other cases examined in this dissertation because the case examines the perceptions of
the locals in the homeland. The research subjects, in this case, is important because the
ultimate beneficiaries of any engagement initiative are the local populations of
developing countries. It is therefore beneficial to the process that actors in development
understand the local population’s views, concerns, and beliefs surrounding engagement.
A recurring concern of the local population is that cultural differences exist
between the Somali diaspora and the local population. Some locals see the returning
diaspora as outsiders that are going to cause competition for the limited resources that
exist in Somalia. They also see the diaspora as those who are bringing about contending
ideologies learned in western societies. To resolve these issues, they believe that the
returning diaspora should undergo a cultural reorientation, known as dhagan celis, to help
with the potential disruption to local societies.
Despite the perceptions of the local population, the diaspora sees a moral
obligation to continue to be engaged and send remittances back to the homeland. The
case highlights that the Somali diaspora believes that they affect life or death back at
home, citing “if we don’t send money they die.” The research presented contends that
the support of the diaspora can be simultaneously recognized and rejected by the
homeland locals. Ideally, to maximize commitment, diaspora engagement would be
recognized and accepted by locals in Somalia. Abdile and Pirkkalainen (2011)
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emphasize that the recognition and acceptance of the locals are primarily dependent on
the interests of locals and the diaspora.
Case 6: Cape Verde: Rethinking Diaspora in Development Policy
Objective of Engagement
Resende-Santos (2015) intends to provide some insight into the Cape Verdean
policy because of its unique characteristics as a microstate and developing country. Cape
Verde is a relatively small country both in population and territory, and this ultimately
results in a comparatively poor resource endowment. Due to the changing development
status, Cape Verde is faced with declining foreign aid and increasing global
competitiveness, reducing the country’s opportunities in the world economy. In reaction
to the changing economic landscape, Cape Verde is forced to rethink their long-term
engagement policy. The case’s objective is to demonstrate how small countries with low
resource stocks use the diaspora as a long-term socio-economic growth development
strategy.
Diaspora Perceptions
Cape Verdeans have been migrating for centuries, and, over the past decade,
perceptions from the homeland have shifted from the view of migration as
unconditionally harmful to development. As a microstate, Cape Verdeans know that their
options are limited in a globalized economy, and many have accepted that the diaspora is
a necessary commodity that the homeland must involve. The majority of Cape Verdean
diaspora primarily reside in the United States and within the European Union. Having
gained their independence in 1975, the Cape Verdean government wasted no time in
connecting with their diaspora. Today, the diaspora provides sizeable amounts of foreign
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direct investments. The case (Resende-Santos, 2015) suggests that the diaspora is not
dormant, and they are very much willing to get involved. Additionally, unlike some
developing countries, the Cape Verdean diaspora did not experience a history of trauma,
forced migration, disrespect or rejection from the homeland; the absence of these
experiences that make for a positive diaspora-homeland relationship
The Cape Verdean diaspora faces a list of challenges in their host countries. Cape
Verdean communities abroad usually consist of both migrant workers, the newly arrived,
and long-established migrants. Overall, the socio-economic condition of the diaspora is
varied with significant portions of the diaspora on the fringe of social, economic, and
political lines. In these host countries, the diaspora struggle with unemployment,
inadequate housing, crime, youth delinquency, family breakdown, and inadequate
healthcare (Resende-Santos, 2015).
Perceptions of Homeland
The Cape Verdean government is concerned with what the country will look like
after graduating from an LDC to a Middle-Income country. Cape Verde’s two primary
sources of external financing for the economy comes from donor assistance and monetary
remittances. Unfortunately for Cape Verde, improving their development status means
less international donor assistance and worrisome decline in monetary remittances. This
fragility equates to a potential funding crisis in the homeland. According to the ResendeSantos , these realities create a paradox in a microstate like Cape Verde. This problem
will cause the state to become more dependent on migration because of the need to
support the homeland with populations outside of the country. In short, the overall
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perception of the homeland is that the diaspora is critical to the country’s long-term
economic viability.
The homeland cannot solely rely on monetary remittances; in efforts to create a
more robust economic policy, the homeland seeks to incorporate the diaspora in their
economy. As part of that grand policy, the government has adopted a broad definition of
what they consider their diaspora. The case) cites that the government defines their
diaspora as all Cape Verdeans and their descendants living abroad permanently or
temporarily, independent of the place of birth or nationality, and those sharing a common
identity. This broad definition is helpful in establishing a relationship and building ties
with those abroad. The challenge for the government will be to translate those
connections into economic gains for Cape Verde. The case suggests six roles for the
diaspora that help to secure an economically stable Cape Verde. These roles will be
discussed later in the Ways to Improve section.
Perceptions of Host Country
Most of the host countries that receive emigrants are advanced economic societies
and therefore benefit from low and high skilled labor from across the globe. Host
countries are beginning to adopt anti-immigration policies that are limiting opportunities
for emigration (Galbreath, 2017). If these migratory flows change for low-income
countries, the economic effect could have noticeable impacts on the homeland through
changes in remittances.
Historically, the Cape Verdean diaspora is poorly integrated into the politics of
the host country. The United States and Europe report that there are low levels of voter
registration and electoral participation. The Cape Verdean diaspora has been
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unsuccessful in self-advocating in the host countries, and they have been unable to lobby
or promote on behalf of the homeland. The lack of well-organized collective efforts of a
Cape Verdean diaspora has not moved the needle of interests within the host country
(Resende-Santos, 2015).
Ways to Improve Engagement
The case makes a concerted effort to highlight that defining economic roles for
the diaspora will help with harnessing their economic power. These six roles are as
follows (Patterson, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2012):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Source of monetary remittances
A source of direct investment
A consumer market for homeland exports
A tourism demand market
As a source of brain gain
A transnational political lobby
The diaspora as a source of remittances is not a new strategy, rather an

affirmation that this traditional mode must continue, and it is a cornerstone to
development. Cape Verdeans need to continue to make capital investments in the home
country, which would help the state pull away from debt-led growth strategies. The case
(Resende-Santos, 2015) emphasizes that the Cape Verdean diaspora has an appetite for
homeland exports. The diaspora’s consumption of homeland products presents an
opportunity for Cape Verde to effectively because the demand from the diaspora
effectively doubles the size of the ‘domestic’ market. Tourism in Cape Verde has always
been popular, and promoting its geography and climate as a premier destination to its
diaspora provide economic returns. Research and development agencies suggest that
encouraging circular migration for brain gain helps improve human capital stock in the
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home country (Bhagwati, 2003). Finally, by engaging as a transnational political lobby,
the homeland can benefit by encouraging and lobbying host countries and donor agencies
to enact favorable international policies with the homeland (Resende-Santos, 2015).
Resende-Santos suggests that by focusing on these roles, a state can
simultaneously adjust to the declining role of the diaspora monetary remittances while
broadening the scope and modes of their economic role. Engaging the diaspora in this
manner provides the diaspora various ways to contribute to the homeland according to
their strengths and preferences. Selling desirable homeland products to the diaspora is an
approach that transforms those who are known as passive contributors to the homeland
into active consumers. Some diaspora members are more likely to be proactive as
tourists, investors, or knowledge transmitters. These avenues of diaspora participation
may assist with the unification of the Cape Verdean diaspora (Dufoix, 2011; Sives,
2012).
Case Summary
Resende-Santos highlights a unique challenge for Cape Verde as being a country
that is both a microstate and one that is moving into middle-income status. Since Cape
Verdean independence in 1975, the country has been able to maximize external sources
of financing to move the country from a least developed country to middle income.
However, to avoid the ‘middle-income trap,’ the government must address the declining
foreign aid and diminishing remittances to create an economically stable Cape Verde.
More than ever, the Cape Verdean government is relying on the diaspora in the various
population communities around the world to not only connect but support the Cape
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Verdean economy. The case highlights that this can be accomplished through six modes
or roles that the diaspora can adopt to achieve economic sustainability.
Furthermore, the case refers to having favorable macro and micro-level conditions
to attract the diaspora to interact and participate in more meaningful engagement. Dual
nationality and the right to vote in national elections have deepened the diaspora
participation in public Cape Verdean life. The case suggests that empowerment and
strong material ties of the diaspora, established directly or through inheritance, have
supported the country’s policy for reengagement.
The homeland-diaspora engagement must be configured to meet the demands of
the 21st century. The reality is that harnessing the full power of the Cape Verdean
diaspora is not the panacea of state development, but it is the next step that should occur.
Cape Verde must continue to diversify its economy, foster and find new sources of
external funding and increase the capacities of the homeland. These goals are all the
more difficult for a microstate such as Cape Verde.
Case 7: Engaging the Haitian Diaspora
Objective of Engagement
The case presented by Tatiana Wah (2013) highlights the imbalance that exists
over the last 50 years between Haiti and the rest of the world. Wah emphasizes that the
efforts of development programs have not had success in Haiti because of the failure to
recognize the uniqueness of Haiti within the broader development framework. Wah
states that nationalistic appeals and diasporic consciousness may be sufficient, in most
cases, to entice members to return. However, any efforts involving Haiti should begin
with a complete understanding of the Haitian diaspora population. For programs
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engaging the Haitian diaspora, in order to be successful, they must understand the reasons
they emigrated, the activities they are most willing to participate in, and a solid
understanding of their competencies and resources.
Diaspora Perceptions
Between 1900 and 1950, Haiti, known as the pearl of the Caribbean, experienced
stable and legal emigration from the country. It was not until the 1950s when the reign
of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier began, did Haiti begin to experience a great deal of
emigration of the upper and middle class. Papa Doc’s successor, Jean-Claude Duvalier,
continued the era of mistreatment and disenfranchisement, leading to continued
emigration from the homeland. Even after the Duvalier regime, civil unrest and violence
continued to persist under the direction of failed state leadership. For each wave of
emigration, those that emigrated under forced conditions were left with negative
impressions about the homeland.
Upon arriving in the United States, the diaspora experienced a great deal of
racism and prejudice. Wah states that the Haitian diaspora was portrayed as “boat
people” and not welcomed as political asylum seekers like their Caribbean counterparts
from Cuba. There were rumors that tuberculosis was endemic among Haitians living in
South Florida. In addition, there was wholesale labeling of Haitians as a group that had
HIV or AIDS. This narrative was unwarranted labeling by the U.S. Center for Disease
Control (CDC) and was removed only after the consistent protest of Haitian expatriate
communities.
Despite having strong views about the political happenings of Haiti, the Haitian
diaspora have resilient loyalties for their heritage and community. The Haitian diaspora
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frequent restaurants, clubs, clinics, and stores that provide specific products and services
to Haitian clientele. The Haitian diaspora has volunteered their free time to visit and work
in their local communities. They sometimes volunteer with organizations based on their
core competencies and familial ties to the communities being served. It is more
important for the Haitian diaspora to give back to their locals or ancestral birthplaces than
the nation of Haiti (Wah, 2013). Wah believes that development initiatives that
recognize that the diaspora is motivated by social and cultural gratification are more
likely to be successful in harnessing the power of the diaspora. Wah goes on to further
emphasize that programs must also be cognizant that while the Haitian diaspora is willing
to volunteer their time, not all are enticed by leaving their work to participate in
development. Some of the diaspora members have real concerns about the unclean
conditions, political instability, and few amenities that exist in their homeland. These
circumstances limit potential members of the Haitian diaspora from participating in any
organized efforts that benefit the homeland.
Perceptions of Homeland Country
The Haitian state was one of the first governments in the western hemisphere to
create a ministry that would engage and be immersed with the needs of immigrants living
abroad. Remittances to the homeland are the most often recognized contribution from the
diaspora, and according to the case, remittances from the diaspora are estimated to be
roughly $2 billion a year, which is nearly triple the actual international aid disbursements.
There is no question, in terms of economic importance, that the Haitian state believes the
diaspora is vital to Haiti’s economic stability. Remittances are just one piece of the
puzzle; the Haitian diaspora also makes contributions to various sectors of the Haitian
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economy. The tourism sector is one that benefits from Haitians visiting the homeland.
The Banque de la Republique d’Haiti reported that in 1999 Haiti earned roughly $124
million from Haitian diaspora tourism, which is a sizeable portion of overall their GDP
(Wah, 2013).
Wah shares that some of the immediate needs of the homeland government are to
create a detailed engagement plan that has clear and defined roles for the diaspora to
engage the homeland. There is a national will that needs to exist to achieve economic
and social goals, but the Haitian state must set those priorities in stages for locations
across the country. In order to achieve sustained development, a comprehensive plan will
require coordination and coalition of donors, the diaspora, and the Haitian government.
Perceptions of Host Country
There is a broad acknowledgment from host actors and organizations that
diaspora engagement programs can affect remittances, knowledge transfer, donations,
tourism, and capital market investments for their respective homelands. A fundamental
understanding of the international community is that there is a low-cost transfer of skills
from the diaspora back to the homeland due to the shared customs and language that
exists. The international community is also aware that there is less risk of cultural and
social conflict when utilizing skilled foreign workers as opposed to the more familiar
diaspora. With this knowledge, combined with decades of development focus, the
international community has yielded little to no results for sustained Haitian
development. The case (Wah, 2013) primarily cites that donor countries and
organizations have primarily missed the mark for engagement programs because of the
inability to understand who and what motivates the Haitian diaspora.
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Wah does give credit to host actors by highlighting the formalized engagement
organizations created to utilize the diaspora in development. For example, United
Nations’ has the TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals)
program that began in 1977, which seeks to recruit potential sources of high-skilled
professionals with technical know-how to participate in development initiatives for their
homeland. Similarly, the United States, under the authority of the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), has a program that aims to engage the Haitian
diaspora in their own agricultural and watershed management projects. Following the
earthquake in 2010, USAID sought the diaspora to engage with the agencies in
Washington, D.C., and contractors in Haiti. While this was a good signal to the diaspora,
the effort was seemingly misguided. Wah shares that short-term (two or three weeks)
consultancy periods are not an effective way to engage highly-skilled professionals in the
development of a country. Wah states that development work is a full-time occupation,
and perhaps the flaw in the strategy is that development agencies are more inclined to
engage goodwill ambassadors as opposed to development experts.
Ways to Improve Engagement
Wah states that in order to improve diaspora engagement, one must first assume
that diasporic consciousness is high enough to move the Haitian diaspora from passive
engagement to active development. The way to approach the diaspora is first to
understand the diaspora’s demographic and recognize that the persecution and history
have influenced the Haitian diaspora. The ties to the homeland are more substantial for
their native regions of birth than overall synergy with a national homeland initiative.
Wah states that actualizing an effective diaspora engagement strategy requires a process59

oriented strategy with a collection of actions, well-conceived plans, appropriate
conditions, prosperous activities, and analyses that support economic growth and
development goals. The diaspora’s engagement must move from short-term social and
charitable activities to full-time concern and occupation.
In order for the diaspora to remain engaged, their needs must be met during the
development process. More importantly, there needs to be economic rationality that must
be taken into account that entices the diaspora to work or invest in Haiti. Economic
incentives can be directed to the diaspora through preferential treatment in joint ventures
or contracts/subcontracts with the private and public sectors.
Case Summary
Wah’s (2013) research highlights that the shortcomings of diaspora engagement
programs are primarily attributable to a deficient understanding of the Haitian diaspora.
The case makes an argument that diasporic consciousness is not enough to achieve the
successful engagement of the Haitian diaspora. Wah states that despite the poor history
with the Haitian state, the diaspora remains fiercely loyal to the localities of birth and
ancestral towns. With these realities, Wah suggests that engagement programs would be
improved by building on those ties, enticing the diaspora with economic benefits such as
long-term contracts, and improving in-country conditions. These would be a few
immediate approaches that would help with wholesale engagement. Institutional
strategies of host actors and organizations must also shift and recognize that the
approaches to engagement need to be based on the mutual needs of the diaspora and
Haitian government. The skills and talents of the diaspora cannot be adequately
harnessed on two to three-week stints in Haiti; instead, there needs to be a long-term
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commitment to the necessary time and utilization of the Haitian diaspora. Wah does not
diminish the complexity of Haitian development; instead, Wah makes a concerted effort
to redirect the engagement strategy of all the actors involved. The goal is to bring
diaspora, host, and homeland governments to the table so that a comprehensive and
mutually beneficial strategy can be applied to Haitian development.
Conclusion
This chapter of the dissertation sought to establish two primary considerations,
first, are the host and homeland actor perceptions important in the successful engagement
of the diaspora. Secondly, what variables should be evaluated and what approaches
should be considered to improve diaspora engagement initiatives.
Research question 1: What variables allow for successful engagement of a diaspora
•
•
•
•
•

Hypothesis 1: Positive host actor perceptions and attitudes are important to
improved engagement of the diaspora
Hypothesis 2: Positive homeland actor perceptions and attitudes are important to
improved engagement of the diaspora
Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved
In all of the cases that were sampled, the perceptions and attitudes of homeland

and host actors played a significant role in the diaspora engagement initiatives of the
various developing countries. The case studies suggest that both host and homeland actor
perceptions are both significant, but they are not necessarily equal. Homeland actors have
the distinction of being responsible for initiating the formal engagement of the diaspora.
In the Caribbean Engagement Case, Minto-Coy. (2016) states that existing benefits from
the diaspora have primarily been under the “silent partnership,” an informal and
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inconsistent engagement towards the diaspora. Minto-Coy goes on to state that any
increased diaspora engagement will not originate from the diaspora. One potential first
step, as evident in the Nigerian Case, is for the homeland to make clear and bold
prioritization to reconnect with the diaspora. President Obasanjo of Nigeria made
explicit calls to engage the diaspora on trips to host countries early in his administration.
The Nigerian case communicated that the diaspora benefits from symbolic gestures of
unity as well as more formal actions from the homeland that welcomes and entices them
to return to the homeland. Despite the limitations that exist for each developing country
(size and resources), homeland governments should establish entities that are focused on
diaspora engagement and investment. These policies, as in the Latin American case,
should be cognizant of the development policies they adopt from other countries or create
themselves. These policies should have a cultural foundation and leverage the strengths
of the homeland. In addition, the Jamaican case highlights that as homeland governments
are thinking of new and innovative ways to engage their diaspora, they should be
cognizant of the existing roles played by the diaspora to ensure that existing formations
are not compromised or aggravated.
On the other hand, host actors can impede or encourage the diasporic engagement
process by merely affecting the communities in which the diaspora reside. Host
governments that work to improve the well-being of the diaspora communities and
employ ways to create legal and economic equality simultaneously improve the
diaspora's ability to help their homeland country. An analysis of the Latin American case
suggests that host governments and their organizations should collaborate with the
consulates and embassies to participate in cultural events and educational programs that
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will benefit the diaspora. In addition, the Haitian Diaspora case by Wah specifically
mentions that host actors must further entice the diaspora to engage by offering them
long-term contracts in development of their homeland countries. They also must revisit
host actor engagement strategies and look to address the mutual needs of the diaspora and
homeland.
The cases that were analyzed offered several ways and variables that should be
considered to improve Haitian diaspora engagement. In the case study of Caribbean
engagement, Minto-Coy adds that homeland governments will need to improve their
information, communication, and technological capabilities (ICT) to improve diaspora
engagement. The author adds that Orozco’s private sector engagement model (Five Ts)
is a useful strategy for homeland countries to adopt to engage their diaspora. The
Nigerian Case Lampert describes the diaspora as having strong geo-ethnic ties to the
villages and towns of their ancestral homelands. Thus, an engagement strategy aligned to
localities versus national ties may help motivate the diaspora. Delano, in the Latin
America case, offered that cultural events centered around the homeland’s culture and
affairs proved to be a successful mechanism of diaspora reengagement. In addition to
cultural events, programs that gave second and third generations of the diaspora lessons
in the homeland’s language was also popular. The Cape Verdean case by Santos focused
on creating economic ties and a domestic market that catered to the diaspora market.
Making businesses easier to start and operate, favorable investment rates, and purchasing
local Cape Verdean goods were just some of the ways that incentivized the diaspora to
reengage.
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In summary, the key finding that has come from this comparative case study
analysis is that the host and homeland efforts affect engagement of the diaspora. Each
country or region examined in this chapter utilized varying approaches to reconnect with
their diaspora. While each engagement produced varying results, the research
demonstrated that the diaspora consistently responded to the host and homeland initial
efforts. In some countries, the diaspora has existing and strong connections to their
friends and families in the homeland. To expound on the existing engagement of the
diaspora, these findings demonstrate that homeland actors must make overt and
welcoming gestures that the express to the diaspora that they are part of the development
solution. While this chapter provided in-depth accounts of multiple countries, each
engagement approach should be tailored to the needs and requirements of the homeland’s
diaspora.
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CHAPTER IV – ASSESSING THE PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF
TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS REGARDING THE HAITIAN
DIASPORA THROUGH INTERVIEWS
Overview
This chapter of the dissertation seeks to explore traditional development actors’
attitudes and perceptions of the Haitian diaspora as a third development actor. This
exploration is achieved through semi-structured interviews of host and homeland actors.
This dissertation will provide firsthand accounts from political, business, academic, and
organizational elites about what it means to invite the Haitian diaspora to the
development table. The importance of host and homeland actor positioning is essential to
the success of many non-traditional actors, including the Haitian diaspora (Baser &
Swain, 2008). This chapter also explores the views of elites in regard to the allocation of
development aid, a hotly debated but necessary matter in development. The decision to
interview elites stems from the researcher’s desire to satisfy two key objectives. The first
objective is to bring awareness to the posture held by these elites concerning the
integration of the Haitian diaspora in their programs and initiatives. Understanding the
positions of elites helps to establish the strategic direction that elites are taking their
organizations. Secondly, the interview is intended to stimulate dialogue about the United
Nations’ strategy with the very individuals who are responsible for executing
international doctrines at the national or local level in Haiti (Hertz & Imber, 1995).
Maguire (2009) suggests that development responsibility has completely fallen to a
dizzying number of host actors in Haiti and that they have usurped the role of the Haitian

65

state to provide for their citizenry. Due to this entrenchment, the researcher has an
express desire to understand if host actors would welcome a Haitian perspective and an
assertion of shared responsibility from the diaspora. Lastly, as an additional benefit,
these interviews provide a framework for a future survey instrument used to understand
the self-perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian diaspora regarding their effectiveness and
influence on Haiti.
•

Research question 3: What are the perceptions and attitudes of traditional
development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora’s potential as an integral
Haitian development actor

•

Hypothesis 1: Homeland Actors perceive the Haitian diaspora as an integral actor
to Haitian development

•

Hypothesis 2: Homeland Actors are willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a seat at
the table

•

Hypothesis 3: Homeland Actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)

•

Hypothesis 4: Host country actors perceive the Haitian diaspora as an integral
actor to development

•

Hypothesis 5: Host country actors are not willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a
seat at the table

•

Hypothesis 6: Host country actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)

•

Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved
Literature Review
For decades the traditional model of development has exclusively been between

host and homeland actors. Arguably, this development model has had mixed outcomes
where some nations experience elevated development statuses, while others remained
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low-developed. The lack of sustained results in Haiti has forced international bodies to
evaluate existing strategies and doctrines that create an ineffective development
environment. In that evaluation, fitting questions have emerged about aid effectiveness
as a contributing factor to the failure of broader development strategies. One explanation
of development ineffectiveness in Haiti comes from Maguire (2017), who suggests that
the problem could be a matter of who controls development. Maguire states that U.S.
officials are willing to work with the Haitian government to set priorities and find
alignment in programs. However, they are less willing to give direct control of
development aid to Haiti. Maguire goes on to further state that this sentiment has led to
the reliance of U.S. based contractors to execute foreign aid programs and projects.
Traditional development actors have a deep mistrust stemming from the inability of the
Haitian government to shape their development paths. This existing friction may make a
new entrant, such as the Haitian diaspora, an attractive solution to Haiti’s dormant
development.
Despite these potential barriers and existing conflicts, the international
community has seen a movement of new entrants entering the development arena.
Today, the participants engaging in development have expanded into several sub-agents
and clusters working towards their organizational objectives. According to Fejerskov,
Lundsgaarde, and Cold-Ravnkilde (2016), these groups can now be categorized into state
and non-state actors where the new entrants of state actors have included new global
powers, industrializing countries, and post-socialist states. Non-state actors are those that
are similar to private foundations, celebrity organizations, religious organizations,
corporations and social enterprises, and novel forms of grassroots development
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endeavors. The authors highlight that since each of these actors brings with them their
particular histories, institutional setups, and organizational cultures, the patterns of
interaction with other actors challenge the legitimacy and authority of the dominant
North-South cooperation model. The heterogeneity of these actors questions whether or
not development cooperation will exist between new and old actors. More specifically,
does the old guard view new actors as potential competitors or alternatives? Are new
actors socialized to the dominant norms and established practices, or are their intentions
and approach counterproductive to global strategies and regional norms? These inquiries
are critical to the successful implementation of the diaspora as an effective actor.
In this dissertation, “a peer-level actor” refers to one who has equal influence,
decision making authority, and resources in comparison to other development actors.
This dissertation believes that in order for the United Nation’s strategy to be effective, the
Haitian diaspora must be viewed as a peer to the other development actors. This concept
is supported in a case study by Nijhuis, Voogt, and Pieter (2012), where the authors
examined the implementation of a professional development program in Ghana. Their
case suggested that effective program management required partners to adopt a Low
Power Distance Approach. Power Distance is the extent to which less powerful members
of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally,
therefore in the Ghanian case partners, expect equal and level shares of power (Hofstede
2011). In a study evaluating the role of diaspora in security development, Baser and
Swain (2008) state that the diaspora’s power, as measured by size, motivation, and
effectiveness, is primarily determined by the political environment of both the homeland
and the host. The rules and regulations of the host actor are vital in determining the
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diaspora’s potential to act internationally. Both of these authors share similar
interpretations of the positioning of homeland and host actors as it relates to the power of
the diaspora. Therefore, it is essential to explore the views of the elites, who represent
homeland and host actors, regarding the Haitian diaspora as peer-level actors.
Methodology & Data
Methodology
This chapter, composed of semi-structured interviews, aims to explore the current
perception of Haitian diaspora engagement among traditional Haitian development
actors. The researcher conducted interviews with elites from the two of the traditional
actor groups (host and homeland) using a semi-structured, one on one interview
approach. Potential interviewees were selected based on the inclusion criteria found in
Appendix B of the dissertation.
The goal of this chapter was to collect sentiments from at least nine interviewees;
however, the dissertation encountered some challenges achieving this goal. The
researcher’s original strategy was to target known and unknown contacts from Haitian
professional and academic networks. More specifically, contacts from the Haiti Tech
Summit, which was an annual tech entrepreneurship conference held annually in Haiti.
In the past, this event would bring a number of traditional and non-traditional actors
interested in Haiti’s development to one location for three filled days of events.
Unfortunately, when it was time to start contacting elites to schedule meeting times
during the conference, Haiti was in the midst of severe rioting and protests. These
tensions began February 2019 after an audit report revealed that development resources
were misused and embezzled by Haitian leaders. Haitian citizens protested for months
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and travel to the country was strongly discouraged. When the conference was cancelled
the researcher was relegated to using email communication to establish contact with
prospective interviewees. However, many of these elites did not respond to electronic
communication. This resulted in fewer than expected the 10-12 interviewees that the
researcher planned to secure in-person at the summit.
The mix of interviews that were conducted included three Haitian government
officials, representing the homeland actor group, and a mix of three development
professionals from the host actor group. The host actors included one individual from
academia, one NGO leader, and one IGO leader. All members of the host group
previously worked in Haiti. The interviews averaged roughly 51 minutes and had a range
of 30 minutes to one hour and 28 min. Interview questions can be found in Appendix C
of this dissertation.
Data
The interviewee responses will be measured for consensus on questions directly
related to the hypotheses. Should the consensus support this chapter’s hypotheses, then
the determination will be to reject the null hypothesis. If the responses lack consensus,
then the researcher will fail to reject the null hypothesis, and no determination will be
made from the interviewee's responses. A textual analysis of the transcripts was
completed to summarize recurring themes about the Haitian diaspora as actors in
development. For clarity, the interviewees are coded by the sequential order of the
interviews and the actor group they represented. For example, the first interview was a
professor who belonged to the host group, and they were coded as HOST-1, the second
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interview conducted was with a Haitian senator who was part of the homeland group.
That individual was coded as HOME-2.
Conduct of Interviews
Most of the interviews took place using Google Meet, an online platform where
the researcher and interviewee had visual contact with one another. Internet connection
became unsatisfactory during one of the interviews, and the visual contact had to be
suspended. The researcher utilized a semi-structured interview guide to help facilitate the
exchange.
Interview questions primarily focused on the participant’s views of Haitian
diaspora engagement and the benefits and disadvantages associated with this
development approach. Interviewees were asked about ways to improve Haitian diaspora
engagement with international development actors using experiences from their particular
industry or organization.
Results & Analysis
The headings within this section coincide with the questions asked in the
interviews.
Interviewee Demographic
The selected interviewees in this dissertation consisted of a diverse group of
individuals with varying knowledge, experiences, and backgrounds related to Haitian
development. While the total number of interviewees was 33% below target, the quality
of the interviews helped to compensate for the lack of volume. A total of seventeen
individuals were contacted; 16.7% diaspora elite, 16.7% Haitian government officials,
and 66.6% NGO or IGO member. Of the individuals that were contacted, there was an
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initial response rate of 50%. However, the individuals who secured an interview date
settled at 33%, or six out of the eighteen total individuals contacted. More specific
demographic information is as follows:
Table 4 Interviewee Demographic
Interviewee #

Group

Race

Gender

1: HOST-1

Host

White

Female

2: HOME-2

Homeland Black

Male

3: HOME-3

Homeland Black

Male

4: HOST-4

Host

Black

Female

5: HOME-5

Homeland Black

Female

6: HOST-6

Host

Male

White

Education Specialty
Agricultural Dev.
Doctorate
(Professor, Program Leader)
Masters
Economic Dev. (Ministry Leader)
(U.S.)
Unknown Political Dev. (Senator)
Masters
Economic Dev. (Former U.S. Gov’t
(U.S.)
Official, Entrepreneur)
Masters
Economic Dev. (Ministry Leader)
(U.S.)
Social/Economic Dev. (Former IGO
Masters
Leader, Researcher, Member of
Academia)

Development Experience and Prior Theory Knowledge
Three of the individuals interviewed were part of the Haitian government or
worked in a sanctioned ministerial capacity. In contrast, the other three individuals
worked for a host government or international organization. Most of the individuals, five
of the six, managed or oversaw programs directly related to economic or social
development. There was one individual, HOME-3, who had indirect programs under his
authority but did not directly manage or oversee those initiatives, as he was a member of
the Haitian Senate. One of the more interesting details that should be noted is that
HOST-4, happened to be both a former presidentially appointed United States official
and a member of the Haitian diaspora. HOST-4 was able to provide very ardent “insider”
information from their experience within the political sphere of Washington, D.C.
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The programs that were actively managed by the interviewee group were wellfunded and collectively affected tens of thousands of people. The majority of the
interviewees had a wealth of experience in matters of economics (micro and macro),
trade, or social development. All but one member of the interview group confirmed they
received educational training outside of Haiti.
Familiarity with the primary theory of this dissertation, the belief from
international organizations that the diaspora can help advance international initiatives,
was generally known by each individual. The reason that the formal literature or
publications were not as familiar to the interview group seemed to be attributed to the
lack of specialization around diaspora or matters of the United Nations’ development
goals. Responses from HOST-4 and HOST-6 demonstrated broad knowledge of the
United Nations’ strategy and publications surrounding the diaspora as integral actors:
Well, that strategy has been around since Secretary Clinton … was Secretary of
State, and they created that. That diaspora organization[s] were intended to work with
diaspora communities, including the Haitian diaspora, because there was a sense that they
weren't being leveraged enough. Secretary Clinton … it was a big focus on it…. to
promote this whole narrative that has emerged about leveraging diaspora for communities
to play a bigger role in the development of the country back home (HOST-4, Personal
Communication, February 19, 2020).
So, I haven't, I haven't seen any of the publications...it was definitely something
that's on my mind, not necessarily with regards to Haiti, but just in general how to
harness more diaspora engagement, and then [I]was quite surprised at how different it
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seems that and [how] much more robust the diaspora engagement in Haiti was… (HOST6, Personal Communication, March 20, 2020).
Working with the Haitian diaspora in their programs
When asked if they incorporated or had active Haitian diaspora in their programs
or activities, their responses were reasonably aligned with the expectation that homeland
actors had more interaction with the diaspora then host actors. For HOME-3, their
interaction with the diaspora was apparent and essential and followed the theme of
frequent interaction between the homeland and the diaspora. For HOME-3, the Haitian
diaspora was not separate from local Haitians, and any business or interactions in daily
activities were necessary. For HOME-2 and HOME-5, both of whom serve in the
economic or investment capacity, interactions with the diaspora was frequent. These
interactions were necessary for the respective actors’ daily functions. HOME-5
mentioned that there is a great deal of interest from the diaspora to participate in
investment activity, both as a facilitator and an active investor. HOME-2 expressed that
the diaspora was not present in the public sector, and interactions with the diaspora were
more prevalent in the private sector. HOME-2 went on to note that due to existing laws
in Haiti, there was no opportunity for the diaspora to serve in a public capacity as a civil
servant. Therefore, most of the programs or activities where he finds active members of
the diaspora are in consulting capacities or advisory roles. Also, HOME-2, in an
unofficial capacity, works to match active diaspora with department and ministry leaders
that could utilize their skill sets. For all three homeland actors, there was undoubtedly a
clear recognition of the diaspora and an acceptance of moderate to high willingness to
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utilize the diaspora in their daily programs or activities. The subsequent responses from
HOME-2 and HOME-5 describing their interactions with the Haitian diaspora:
.… I find a lot of people from the diaspora working as consultant… you can be a
consultant you, can be an advisor. You see what I mean… you cannot be civil servant
per se, you know, to have a long-term career in Haiti; you [have] to be Haitian born. As I
mentioned, I work with a lot of Haitian diaspora (HOME-2, Personal Communication,
January 30, 2020
There's definitely a lot of interest from the diaspora in our specific capacity…. So,
[they] are definitely interested in investing in Haiti. And they do it. I can see that when
you travel and you meet diaspora associations, you always meet at least ten people that
tell you that they've invested in Haiti, most of them have lost their money, unfortunately,
just because they don't do it, institutionally speaking, but there's definitely interest and
involvement from the diaspora (HOME-5, Personal Communication, March 3, 2020).
In a bit of a contrast to the homeland group, the host group, when asked about
how active the Haitian diaspora are in their programs, had the responses were more
mixed and less definitive overall. HOST-1 acknowledged that the diaspora was not
active in their programs but did acknowledge their usefulness in achieving the goals and
objectives of the organization. Any interactions that did occur with diaspora seemed to
be indirect and informal. HOST-1 referenced that there would sometimes be help from
family members of the peripheral teams who were members of the diaspora. However,
core members of the organization were certainly not part of the Haitian diaspora and most
likely non-Haitian. Later in the interview, HOST-1 noted that finding individuals with
the requisite expertise and skills (agricultural development) was difficult to find in the
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network they had; thus, any specialist that was active in their organization was often from
a country foreign to Haiti.
I don't work directly with Haitian diaspora people, but in the movement, which
has relatively few core members, some of these are family members … live in [the]
diaspora. And so that would include like the children of the former director of the
movement (HOST-1, Personal Communication, January 29, 2020).
HOST-6 worked on multiple efforts in Haiti and worked as both an overseer of
Haiti earthquake relief efforts as well as a researcher in academia and executor of
research grants. In his capacity following the earthquake in 2010, HOST-6 incorporated
a great deal of Haitian diaspora in his management. These individuals were located both
on the ground in Haiti as well as in support capacities in the states. In some of the more
recent research efforts of HOST-6, there was an absence of diaspora in his programs.
This could be due to a difference in the size and scope since the relief effort led by
HOST-6 was a global response to the major earthquake in Haiti.
We were at our high point we were employing, like 350 full-time employees and
then like another 1,200 part-time or day laboring people. And so, you know, we had quite
a vast network, but a large number of my upper management were members of the
diaspora, in one way or another. I ended up engaging with quite a few different diasporas,
like diaspora led organizations or even diaspora organizations that were focused from the
U.S. looking into Haiti and how they could be helpful from a distance, whether it was
bringing in supplies or providing fundraising support or technical assistance (HOST-6,
Personal Communication, March 20, 2020).
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Characterization of the Haitian diaspora
Interviewees were asked to provide a broad characterization of the Haitian
diaspora and their role in development. The responses from the homeland group
overwhelmingly described the diaspora as vital to the economic stability of Haiti through
contributory remittances. Remittances sent by the diaspora to their family members and
friends served as a “pillar” to the Haitian economy. The diaspora characterization was
mostly positive, being described as an “asset” and a vital member of the “community.”
The second recurring theme that emerged centered around being social contributors even
in short-term capacities. For example, a lot of the experiences from the host regarding
the Haitian diaspora came from witnessing the diaspora partner with churches/religious
affiliations and volunteering with non-profit organizations. Characterizations from the
host group were also positive but not as definitive. The less definitive characterizations
could be due to the host group not being a direct beneficiary of Haitian development and
less frequent interactions with the diaspora. Therefore, the lack the direct experience led
to less concrete statements about the characterization of the diaspora. Below are a few
examples of their sentiments:
I mean, I think that a lot of it is financial. Because of a major role that
remittances play in the Haitian economy. There are a lot of people from diaspora who
come with their churches to engage in sort of short-term development projects, especially
in the summer. Those often have very concrete goals like building certain structures.
Establishing certain institutions, schools, churches, gardens, stuff like that. And so well,
they're not specifically diasporic organizations, they involve the participation of a lot of
diasporic people(HOST-1, Personal Communication, January 29, 2020).
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How can I characterize them? I can categorize them as the untapped asset, you
know, it’s a valuable asset to exploit. And these assets, what I call the Haitian diaspora, a
lot of them, especially the second generation, they want to add value in Haiti, they want
to make change, they want to feel like useful in a low-income environment. So yes, I say
… the most unexplored asset that Haiti has to work with (HOME-2, Personal
Communication, January 30, 2020).
I think well, I mean, when it comes to the Haitian diaspora, they're definitely a
pillar for the county. So, just this country thrives on Haitian diaspora remittances. So,
could we maximize and if instead of being money that goes simply into … consumption,
it could be turned into something that's a lot more sustainable and better development.
That would be great. But I see I see them as essential(HOME-5, Personal
Communication, March 3, 2020).
These statements underlie the general acceptance that the diaspora could be
integral actors in Haitian development. However, most general characterizations seemed
to lean towards the traditional roles that the diaspora has played, one of which is a
supporter of the economy.
The Biggest Strengths and Weaknesses of the Haitian Diaspora
The interviewees were asked to describe what were the most significant strengths
and weaknesses of the Haitian diaspora. For strengths, most respondents reemphasized
the financial contributions of the diaspora. When asked for further elaboration into the
strengths, HOME-2 and HOST-6, who were part of the homeland and host groups,
emphasized the networks of the diaspora as their biggest strength. Both interviewees
eluded to the vast knowledge that exists within the diaspora and referred to their ability to
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mobilize support in times of need or crisis. One reference by HOST-6 made mention of
language as being the most significant strength. The ability to speak Kreyol and
effectively communicate ideas, knowledge, and technicalities was an attribute of the
diaspora. Interestingly, for the overall group, the perceived strengths were distinct
enough to create broader characterizations that the Haitian diaspora is an essential
contributor to the Haitian economy. HOST-1 had some hesitation talking about the
strengths and weaknesses of the diaspora as an outsider of the Haitian community. In
addition, her perception was that any assessment that she made would be circumstantial
and that the actual effectiveness of the Haitian diaspora would need to be more
thoroughly researched or supported in her view, by evidence and facts. Some supporting
sentiments can be found below:
I think the biggest trend is the networking. So, their international networking that
is extremely important. They have to know how to best practice know how especially in
management in finance and business in governance that we need Haiti... Yes, the third
thing is capital, like finances, they have quite amount of assets and capital to invest. The
… most important [things] about the diaspora is the talent, the human capital, and the
network, international network they can bring(HOME-2, Personal Communication,
January 30, 2020).
The diaspora played a very interesting role because they, they generally sit in
between in terms of being culturally engaged, like most of them speak Kreyol really well,
or at least most that I've encountered, right? So, it's obviously a selected sample.
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...yeah, so they've … got connections, but they also have a certain amount of
distance, which can be helpful. They generally have a lot higher technical skills, than the
national population.
I mean, I think they're uniquely positioned to mobilize support and … resources
abroad to support efforts in the country. (HOST-6, Personal Communication, March 20,
2020).
I mean, not being directly involved in development endeavors myself and being
neither an actor nor beneficiary of any development endeavors, I don't feel capable …
that I can judge the most important role and the most effective role in that, I think that is
something that could be assessed on like a micro level. Certain projects have been
successful or not successful and I think church-based projects in general, have pretty
decent staying power. But I can't speak to their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness
(HOST-1, Personal Communication, January 29, 2020).
Interestingly, when asked about the most significant weakness, interviewees
discussed the lack of a collective effort by the diaspora. They perceived the lack of
cohesion as a hindrance to the scale and power the diaspora is assumed to possess.
HOME-5 mentioned that there are “too many diaspora associations,” which have their
agenda and approaches on how to help Haiti. Potential incongruence is a notion that is in
line with some of the literature, as mentioned earlier, particularly Wah (2013) and Sives
(2012), who spoke to the numerous diaspora organizations that exist and potential
conflicts that arise from having too many voices and misalignment.
I think there are too many diaspora associations instead of actually linking,
instead of becoming stronger in regrouping. All these institutions are not duplicating.

80

What do you do? I think they, they appear to be a lot weaker because they create too
many different associations … it's hard to actually have a single voice that would be
strong enough for the diaspora. So, I think it's a little bit too disorganized. Your [the
diaspora] involvement is a little bit too disorganized (HOME-5, Personal
Communication, March 3, 2020).
One of the more interesting responses came from HOST-4who cast the diaspora
as “divided.” HOST-4 goes on to elaborate that the root cause of division stems from
colonialism and the institutions that have socially and psychologically separated the
diaspora. HOST-4 stated that these thoughts are embedded in the culture and that the
Haitian diaspora suffers from PTSD that creates obstacles to working together. HOST-4
went on to describe how, in the early history of Haiti, the French empowered some social
groups and ostracized others. One of the references made to support this notion came
from the experience of coordinating Haiti earthquake relief efforts at the embassy in
Washington, D.C. HOST-4was one of the federal leaders responsible for coordinating
efforts amongst the Haitian diaspora.
We are divided. So, so within, within two weeks that embassy fell apart,
everybody decided that they hated [working together] and nothing happened. We missed
an opportunity… we had the resources … when everybody wants to be chief… I think it
is truly PTSD. And that's counterproductive. So I would say that … our biggest minus
[being] divided …it’s very hard for us to get on the same page…but our biggest
weakness is that…colonialism worked. We are divided. We don't trust each other and
given a choice. …. if we have to build a team, of bringing people to the table, we [prefer]
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people who don't look like us at that table (HOST-4, Personal Communication, February
19, 2020).
The Haitian diaspora as a Source of Knowledge or Human Capital for Haiti
Most of the respondents were not familiar with specific publications about the
Haitian diaspora; instead, the experiences they shared seem to fall within the “Brain
Drain” phenomena explained by Bhagwati (2003). These notions stated by Bhagwati
highlights the problem faced by developing countries when high skilled labor emigrate
and remain abroad. The skills of the highly trained tend to remain in developed countries
after graduation (70%). HOME-2 seemed to be the most knowledgeable of the formal
and informal dynamics of the brain drain phenomena. HOME-2 first acknowledged that
the brain drain is a real problem, for a state like Haiti, in fact, any developing country.
HOME-2 mentions that high educational attainment is not attainable in Haiti and that
education in Haiti is not comparable to the robust education system found in the
universities abroad. HOME-2foremost concern was transferring the abundance of
education that existed in the Haitian diaspora to knowledge share opportunities in Haiti.
More specifically, HOME-2 was not interested in transferring knowledge from someone
who was a lifelong learner without real-world experience. He believed that valuable
human capital came from individuals whose experience and academic degrees were
highly correlated with one another. For HOME-2, human capital that connects both of
these elements and teaches the Haitian population how to run or build something in Haiti
is what is most needed. International experience was also a highly sought-after
characteristic as well as the ability to be adaptable.
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Um, what can I say is I'd like to [think of] human capital in two ways like they are
complimentary…83% of Haitian professionals with higher degree, live outside [the
country] ...So what will happen is, in one hand, we're talking about human capital. Of
course, also the Haitian diaspora who are highly qualified, went to university to do the
bachelors, masters, the Ph.D., which is not possible in Haiti... you can't do a Ph.D. per se
in Haiti. I think one program or two provide Ph.D. but that's it (HOME-2, Personal
Communication, January 30, 2020).
A response by HOME-5, who happens to be part of the Haitian government, was
communicated more as a surprise and novel idea. The idea that the diaspora could help
in capacity building within the authority of Interviewee 5 did not seem to be a thought
that existed before the interview.
Oh wow, I think it would be monumental if we had more diaspora involvement in
training ... many problems of Haiti is the brain... So I do think that if the diaspora … if
you look at the [diaspora] there's a pretty good, diverse group of good professionals of
Haitian descent, that all in North America, Europe and even in Asia, so I definitely think
that if there would be some programs or linkages, I don't know exactly what type of
programs we could build, but to have the diaspora involved in training and transfers of
transfer of knowledge, capacity building, it'd be great. I think it would make a huge
difference (HOME-5, Personal Communication, March 3, 2020).
Lastly, the response from HOST-1 expressed some reservations that Haitians
from her programs might have about human capital transfer from the diaspora. One
consideration that was shared is that the Haitian diaspora is considered an outsider, and
the knowledge that they bring could potentially be an oddity to the way things are done in
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Haiti. At the same time, she suggested that perhaps on a case by case basis that the
diasporic human capital could be beneficial, and made a point to note that this was based
on her own experience having witnessed some successful programs that were led by the
diaspora.
I have heard critiques that I am sympathetic of Haitian[s] who live in Haiti,
wondering why people who left Haiti in childhood or have never lived there at all, are
seeking to solve the country's problems. And so, as an outsider, I'm sympathetic to that,
because I think it points out to some extent diasporic Haitians have an outsider role in
Haitian society. And so, I think there's valid critiques to be made about the level of
familiarity that these diasporic people have with their communities they're seeking to
help and I'm sure that varies a lot on a case by case basis. But from what I can see, I think
that I have seen individual projects that are pretty successful that are diaspora led, again,
like specifically church oriented projects that are through a religious institution (HOST-1,
Personal Communication, January 29, 2020).
Training in Haitian Kreyol
While not a primary research question in this section of the dissertation, it is
important to know what the implementers and beneficiaries of development initiatives
think about the importance of Kreyol in training. The expectation would be that both of
these groups would value the importance of speaking Kreyol in training sessions as
opposed to French or English. For HOME-3, Kreyol is part of the national identity, and
it is possibly one of the unifying elements of the diaspora and Haitian people.
The best way for Haitian people to connect is Kreyol ... (HOME-3, Personal
Communication, January 31, 2020). HOME-5 also expressed that speaking Kreyol would
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be very important for any knowledge transfer or capacity building initiatives. She cited
that Kreyol has a much broader reach across the country than any other language. She
goes on to expound that there is an emotional attachment, possibly a sense of pride that is
aroused when ideas or concepts are communicated in the Kreyol language.
I think so. I mean, obviously, I think it's, it's a matter of perception and depends
on who you're speaking to. Um, but I do think …as far as training programs … I do think
it would be very important to have Kreyol as one of the languages, just because I think
we would be able to touch a greater number of people that would be able to receive the
information that's being transferred (HOME-5, Personal Communication, March 3,
2020).
For two of the interviewees that represented the host group, speaking Kreyol was
“necessary” and extremely valuable in their line of work. The general position of HOST1 was that in her program, it was challenging to find Haitian diaspora with enough
agricultural expertise to participate in their program. Wah (2013) eluded to this when she
stated that it might be easier to find agricultural skill sets on the Haitian -Dominican
border as opposed to finding agricultural proficiency among the diaspora in the states.
HOST-1 stated that when there are organizations that have professionals from different
backgrounds, the lingua franca would be English or French. According to HOST-1,
foreign organizations that present in their native English or French, have noticeably lower
comprehension. When asked to expound, HOST-1 stated that comprehension is based on
who the audience was and what type of event they hosted. For example, if a speaker is
training the local population in French, there may be roughly 20% of the audience that
might understand. There was also an important mention of possible resentment by the
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locals when they are not presented in Kreyol. HOST-1 believes that there is a negative
perception that forms for those who are not highly educated when they receive
presentations that are meant to benefit them in any language that is not Kreyol.
I think it varies a lot based on the type of event and so... for example, if it's an
agronomist giving a training to peasants, there are majority monolingual Kreyol speakers,
and if the trainer is speaking French, it will be probably less than 20% comprehension by
the audience and I think that there's also like an emotional component and people …
often expressed resentment being presented to in French, especially if they've not had
university training at all. And so if say, a foreign, … a disparate person, but like a white
Anglo European comes to give a talk and gives it in French, then there's also a
component of resentment (HOST-1, Personal Communication, January 29, 2020).
The response from HOST-6 echoed some of these same sentiments regarding the
value of Kreyol. He suggests that Kreyol is essential in-country and stated that there is a
great deal of value in a volunteer or trainer with important skills to train the local
population in Kreyol. HOST-6 explained that individual language proficiency becomes
less valuable the higher the technical skills are. A person, for example, is still valuable if
they can show doctors how to perform intricate medical procedures but cannot speak any
Kreyol. HOST-6 does state that the long-term benefit of engagement and training would
need to include Kreyol to be effective.
I think you have to you have to speak Kreyol. If you're working for any, any
length of time. I mean, there … are, of course, some exceptions…if you're going down
and your job is setting up like a prefab plant for transitional shelters or if you're like
going down and coaching, like open heart surgeons, you know that the emphasis on your
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technical skills obviously outweighs your ability to effectively communicate with the
broad population…but if you're doing anything that's going to engage in the long term, I
just don't I frankly, I don't see how you could do it effectively (HOST-6, Personal
Communication, March 20, 2020).
The two views that had somewhat contrasting positions came from HOME-2 and
HOME-5. They both agreed that the most effective way to communicate with the mass
population would be to speak Kreyol. However, this came with quite a big caveat,
because they both communicated that the demand for information and knowledge transfer
is greater than the need for said knowledge to be translated in Kreyol. Their view is that
the youth is learning to adapt and speak English through both formal and informal
mechanisms. Both eluded to the fact that being able to speak French in official meetings
was an archaic way of doing things, but, unfortunately, it is a part of the Haitian culture.
Today’s youth have defied that ideology, according to some of the interviewees.
Of course, you have the old time elite, who praise French. But if you make a
survey today in Haiti, today the youth prefer to speak English. Because they are way
[more] connected to social media. They want to like what people are watching and
laughing [at]. They want to understand why they're laughing.
I mentioned the youth I'm talking about people from 15 years old, until 40 years
old. I'm not talking about 40 to 50 years old. Because remember, remember, what I would
say is very deep. French was a language to differentiate social classes in Haiti.
Something that's very interesting, less than 20 - 25% …really speak French
[efficiently]. French was never [a] language to unite Haitian people, French unite people
in Ivory Coast in Africa, that happened because several tribes who speak different
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languages, also dialects. So first [Kreyol] was the only language that united Haiti …it’s
different. In Haiti Kreyol unites people (HOME-2, Personal Communication, January 30,
2020).
The demand for knowledge, information, and social media have moved the youth
to adapt and learn English to be connected. HOST-4 states, “they don’t give a damn what
language they have to speak, the youth are going to do whatever needs to be done in
whatever language that has to be.” The interviewer asked HOST-4 to elaborate a bit
more on this because a majority of the feedback collected in the interviews was that
Kreyol was the only language that could be broadly communicated to the masses.
HOST-4 challenged that notion and asked, “Well who are you asking that question to?”.
HOST-went on to say that the youth are not waiting around to connect with people
through Kreyol; instead, they are finding ways to talk to each other and communicate.
She went on to say that anyone who is responding that Kreyol or French is the only way
to communicate is “bullshit” and must be over 45 years of age. HOST-4 went on to cite
the resiliency of the Haitian people and discussed the movements that are happening in
Africa, the Dominican Republic, Europe, and other areas of the world. The youth are not
letting language barriers inhibit their progress; in actuality, “they’re communicating.”
So, I say it's irrelevant it is another barrier to our progress. Yeah. Yeah, but also
at the deeper level … dive a little deeper. Who's answering that question? When you look
at the average [age] in Haiti [it] is 21, 65% of the country [is] under 35 years old. You're
hard pressed to find somebody who was 60 and 70 and 80… in large numbers for those
people who only interact or people in their 50s and 40s. They like to [call them] ... the
walking dead… because… I'm sorry, but it's true.
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So, anybody who's over 45 by what they believe in terms of what connect Haiti to
their roots is bullshit. I can tell you that because the diaspora of Haiti, the people under
30, they don't care…in Africa, in the Dominican Republic, in Europe and the U.S., and
Canada, they're communicating.
They're not, they're not saying what connects me to my culture because what it's
done to their culture is their families, their lineage. It's no longer this construct of then I'm
going to be sitting there. If you're under 30. You're not thinking about oh, what language
do we speak (HOST-4, Personal Communication, January 30, 2020).
The Haitian Diaspora as a Third Actor in Development
Participants were asked if they would welcome the Haitian diaspora as an equal
partner in development. The question noted that the diaspora would have equal authority,
decision-making power, and resources as traditional development actors (homeland and
host actors). The hypotheses were as follows:
•

Research question 3: What are the perceptions and attitudes of traditional
development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora’s potential as an integral
Haitian development actor

•

Hypothesis 2: Homeland Actors are willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a seat at
the table

•

Hypothesis 5: Host country actors are not willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a
seat at the table
The expectation was that there would be a dichotomy that exists between the

homeland and host actors. The difference in perception between the traditional actors
would be attributed to the existing power dynamic between the international community
and the Haitian state. By allowing the Haitian diaspora into the development model, the
expectation is that the development community gives more of a voice to the “Haitian”

89

perspective. This dissertation surmised that the elevation of the “Haitian” voice would be
met with some resistance from entrenched host actors because it gives them less
influence on the development focus of Haiti.
After posing the question about having a ‘voice’ and ‘seat at the table’ to the
interviewees in the host group, the responses were mixed. As a reminder, HOST-4 was
categorized in the host group, but she is also a part of the Haitian diaspora. Her response
was impassioned indicated that she both “loved” the idea, but also it would almost be
unattainable because of the existing structures in the North-South development model.
She also added that the Haitian diaspora’s inability to come together and practice
collective development created even more barriers to making this idea come to fruition.
HOST-4 associated the current structure of funding and the free reign of NGOs/IGOs and
to organizations like the Red Cross. These organizations receive vast sums of
development aid only to produce minimal and sometimes laughable progress on the
ground in Haiti. According toHOST-4, in order to truly change the structure, the U.S.
Congress must act to limit the number of NGOs in-country and empower the diaspora as
a third-party actor. HOST-4 made it clear that the structure is all about money, stating,
“we need to get past this whole oh my god, they're focusing on Haiti, yea mofo they are
making millions we're [the Haitian diaspora] not getting shit.”
I love that idea. It's an idea that's been around for decades that yes, if I'm
understanding you, right. Yes, I agree that Haitians should be at the, at the leadership of
development for the homeland in terms of diaspora, whether you're in Canada, France,
the U.S., you should be leading what and how development is funded and led in Haiti.
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We should be at the table more. I totally agree. The problem is, it's not going to happen
because of something we talked about. We don't practice it.
And yes, Congress, we need you to dismantle the Red Cross when it comes to
Haiti, and… we need you to put limitations on duplication of NGOs in Haiti, because
you've empowered them. It's not because you are the U.S. and you're all powerful
because the funding comes from them, from you [tax payer] (HOST-4, Personal
Communication, February 19, 2020).
The responses from the other members of the host group demonstrated a
reservation about any changing the status quo. HOST-1 pointed out that in Latin
America, the diaspora was already participating through church organizations and other
religious affiliations, and the structure of having a voice, albeit through religious
institutions, was nothing new. HOST-6 stated that he could see the value of having the
diaspora serve as a third actor but was concerned that additional voices could take away
from the voice of the people in Haiti. Interviewee 6 (HOST-6) was more in favor of
shifting the power structure more to the Southern actor, the Haitian state, or using the
diaspora to amplify the voice of the Haitian state in the international community.
I'm reticent to say that they … should be given some sort of formal position in
part because any voice that's given to them explicitly for their own aims, is I think
necessarily taking away from the voice of people inside the country. And so the place
that, that I would, I feel like is more the natural position is to be one of amplifying the
voices and advocating on behalf of the voices of the people within the country. And …
insofar … I can see that as being a very valuable third role.
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If we're speaking just about the international people, so non-Haitian, non-Haitian
diaspora people engaged in Haiti, there seems to be like a gigantic gap between what
people who live and work in Haiti see as the situation in Haiti, and people who live and
work outside of Haiti and are engaged in sort of advocacy and …following the politics of
the day in Haiti. And I think the diaspora could also could be really helpful in bridging
those two ...gaps as well (HOST-6, Personal Communication, March 20, 2020).
Individuals who were part of the homeland were more positive about the
introduction of the Haitian diaspora as a third peer-level actor. However, they were
equally skeptical that the attainment would come to fruition. HOME-2) stated that the
Haitian diaspora would be “welcoming” and would provide an opportunity to get out of
the Haitian “poverty trap.” HOME-2 also prefaced that the way the diaspora chose to
assert themselves and the specifics of funding should also matter to the diaspora. His
view was that if the funding came internally from the diaspora, then they would, in turn,
be more empowered to help and align with Haiti. If the Haitian diaspora, as a third peerlevel actor, received funding from the U.S. federal government, then the impact would be
something different. Either approach to empowering the Haitian diaspora would be
welcomed by HOME-2, but the impact depends on how the structure was funded.
Yes, for me, it is welcoming. And for me, personally, I think any government has
to take that as an opportunity, opportunity to get rid of the poverty trap, get rid of the bad
governance…However, on the other hand that depends how the diaspora want to assert
themselves. Do they want to say, as a third party, where the USAID has funding and they
say, no, I am the diaspora and this is my country so you have to give me this funding? I
don't know (HOME-2, Personal Communication, January 30, 2020).
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HOME-5 stated that empowering the diaspora could force more decisions to be
made that were for the “true betterment of the country.” She acknowledges that this
would happen because the diaspora would be motivated by emotional attachments that
would focus decision making for the long term. In the same instance, she has observed
that the approach of the diaspora would need to be modified. In her experience, HOME5 noticed that the diaspora tends to think that they know best, and do not have respect for
practices that are currently in place and have worked. She believes that the current
system only needs modification and does not need to be “rebuilt from scratch.” HOME-5
cautions that the diaspora cannot come in and be “abrasive.” HOME-5 firmly believes
that any suggestions to innovate and progress should have the appropriate sensitivities to
the current resources and technology of Haiti.
I do think it would be, it would be a good contribution. Just because I think that
the diaspora involvement definitely would carry emotional attachment to the country.
Therefore, I think that most of them if they were to be able to give to be given equal,
respect and access, I think … the type of decisions they would make would definitely be
towards the true betterment of the country.
Because I think traditionally speaking, there's always some form of riff between
Haitians living abroad, and Haitians living in Haiti.
And I think … it's wrong and it's right at the same time, there's like real reasons
why it exists and wrong reasons why it exists. Just because the diaspora…[wants] to get
involved back in Haiti, they tend to think they know it all just because they've been away
and been exposed to a lot of different things. And I've learned, you know, from
experience and when they come back its [like] they have absolutely no regard for …. for
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the actual system that's running in the country and they think everything needs to
change…. Yes, there's a lot of things that are not going right. But it doesn't mean that
we…. we need to rebuild from scratch, you know, we can fix certain things.
…it's like their snubbing you know, it's like they come back. Oh my gosh, how
could you guys do this? Or how come you're still at this archaic time? You know where
it's digital days? Well, yeah Haiti is not at the digital days yet so don't … there is a
system that works even if it's still a paper [system] so sometimes it's that type of approach
that might seem that might make the relationship a little bit more abrasive if I can say it
like that. So, I think that's what would cause a lot, that's one of the things that would
cause a lot of controversy (HOME-5, Personal Communication, March 3, 2020).
View of existing resource distribution and opportunities to change
The next question has to do with the allocation of aid and the views of the host
and homeland actors. The literature establishes that there is a severe disparity between
host and homeland in regards to receipt of funds to implement development projects. It is
estimated that 99% of development resources go to host actors and organizations, while
only 1% of the funds go to the homeland for implementation (Ramachandran & Walz,
2015). Given that control of aid belongs to the host actor, this question was of particular
interest to the researcher because, as a new entrant in development, the diaspora would
require funding to execute any agenda. The hypotheses for both the homeland and host
actors was that they both would be unwilling to shift resources from the status quo to a
new development order.
•

Research question 3: Research question 3: What are the perceptions and attitudes
of traditional development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora’s potential as an
integral Haitian development actor
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•

Hypothesis 3: Homeland Actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)

•

Hypothesis 6: Host country actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)
Generally speaking, four of the six interviewees did not look upon the distribution

of aid in a particularly favorable way. Despite expressing that the aid system itself is less
than ideal, these four interviewees seemed reticent and conciliatory to the way the current
system functions. HOME-2 shared his indifference to how funding is spent by
responding, “To be honest, it’s not my money, so I don’t care.” The sentiment from the
homeland actors is that the institutions or nation-states that donate toward international
development can and should spend their funding the way they see fit. The homeland
actors also believed that any funding that Haiti generates should be spent independently
and sovereignly. The belief of HOME-2 is that the problem is not how the funds are
allocated; instead, the issue is that Haiti has not raised domestic revenues to invest in the
homeland. Generally, homeland actors suggested that the reliance on international aid is
the cause of the problem, and the distribution allocation is merely a symptom.
So if I want to resolve my issues, I have to work with the …tax administration,
[toward] better governance, a better public financial management strategy to raise more
domestic revenue… by rationally spending this revenue it's easier for me to sit down with
any NGO international community to say look, if you want to help Haiti this is my
priority and this is the way to do it. If you want to do it like this, you want to put $100
million fine, we will work together. If you can't do it like this, keep your money. That’s
me (HOME-2, Personal Communication, January 30, 2020).
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HOST-1 felt that host development programs justifiably would want to keep the
money as close to the project as possible. HOST-1shared that in her experience, the most
successful programs were ones that had the least involvement from the Haitian
government. HOST-1 also went on to say that the Petro Caribe scandal was a recent
example of the misallocation of development funds in Haiti. HOST-1 expressed that
these examples are indicative of why the funds remain allocated the way they are.
And well, it might not be an ideal system of allocation of funds. I don't
necessarily find fault with a lack of bilateral account. I'll say that, again. It's not my area
of expertise and I haven't [studied] in great depth about sort of the financial arrangements
of how development works. But anecdotally, I see that a lot of money goes into pockets
(HOST-1, Personal Communication, January 29, 2020).
This question was an especially charged one for HOST-4 and HOST-6 as they
both have direct and deep experiences with donor funding. HOST-4, in her prior roles,
was part of the legislation and funding process in Washington, D.C. HOST-6 was
charged with managing earthquake relief efforts in Haiti and received sizeable
international funding to operate in Haiti. On one side of the argument, HOST-4 insists
there is pervasive cronyism that exists in the awarding of development contracts. She
also mentioned that the Haitian people and the Haitian diaspora need to hold both the
donor government and the Haitian government accountable for spending. HOST-4 took
offense to the number of organizations that inundated Haiti looking for contracts and
awards following the earthquake. She perceived that many of the organizations did not
have genuine regard for Haiti’s long-term interest.
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One of the things I learned about the earthquake was [that] all of these people
flooded Haiti. Haiti didn't even [know] what they were doing, they [contractors] had to
get paid.
Look at the Clintons and their money, you know, regardless of what you think
about them, … they gave [funds to] who they gave it to ….it was white boys from… Ivy
League schools. They love the Ivy League. Again. I like my white boys, they’re my
friends. But I know one of them, they got $3 million to do a …. recycling program in
Haiti, from the Clinton Foundation. You know what? I have tons of Haitian friends who
have been in recycling forever and know about conservation in Haiti, they would have
done it for $1.5 million (HOST-4, Personal Communication, February 19, 2020).
The argument that HOST-6 made is that the aid system is flawed, and the
implementers of the contracts are unfairly targeted. There are a couple of items to note
related to his argument. According to HOST-6, the USAID’s system origination was not
founded on “helping” those abroad; instead, the system was founded on finding ways to
deal with excess capacity in the domestic market. Instead of letting food go to waste in
warehouses, the idea was to give it to countries where there was a need. Secondly, the
way the distribution of funds is counted (99% to 1%) is also skewed. For example,
HOST-6 explained that some of the international awards given to NGOs and IGOs were
given to them after they were awarded to the Haitian government. The Haitian
government could not execute the award, and the staff hired to implement it frequently
belonged to host actor groups. Lastly, HOST-6acknowledged that there were too many
organizations operating in Haiti stemming from the earthquake. He stated that Rene
Preval, the President of Haiti when the earthquake hit, was “afraid to say yes to the wrong
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thing so [he] said no to everything,” and that caused the relief to be paralyzed. HOST6further stated that Michel Martelly, the immediate past President of Haiti, adopted the
opposite strategy in that “Martelly was afraid to say no to the wrong thing, so he said yes
to everything.” HOST-6 respectfully critiqued the distribution stats and thought it did not
tell the full story.
The primary critique I have is that … the money doesn't actually get divided up in
that way. Right. Which is to say that like, it's not that like there's a bucket … like the aid
industry gets a bucket, and then the government gets a bucket. And then like in this case,
the diaspora get a bucket. It's much more like we're…we're all doing different work
together (HOST-6, Personal Communication, March 20, 2020).
The interviewees were also asked if they were able to hypothetically reallocate the
funds, what would be the new distribution. None of the individuals classified as host
actors directly answered this question, and the others in the homeland group were
reluctant to do so. It can be surmised that based on their real-world experience, the
question was challenging to answer. HOST-1 stated there would be “significant
structural barriers” to any shift in development resources. Some of the barriers would be
disbursement of large quantities of funds, banking, transparency, and accounting, to name
a few. After being pressed further, two of the three host actors stated that any shift in aid
allocation should go directly into the hands of the population that the organization is
meant to serve. The responses from the homeland actor group were all varied. One
interviewee suggested that they would allocate the aid between the diaspora and donor
country, the other gave a majority to the Haitian government, and the other stated that
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international assistance was a root problem; therefore, the preference would be to not
allocate funds at all.
How do you improve Haitian diaspora engagement
To conclude the interview, an open-ended question was posed to each interviewee
about how to improve Haitian diaspora engagement. Three distinct themes emerged. The
first, and more dominant theme, was that there needs to a better effort to align incentives
with the diaspora from both traditional actors (to include the international community).
Homeland actors could create more suitable macroeconomic conditions that make the
ease of investing and doing business less complicated. Haiti needs to improve practices
that allow transparency and accountability to ensure that investors can track and direct
their funding. Their needs to be more of an effort made to establish diasporic tourism
that provides safe and meaningful cultural experiences for the diaspora. For host and
international actors, more effort can be made to encourage and invite the diaspora to
participate in international initiatives. One way to do this is through “preferential hiring”
of the diaspora and expanding networks to make sure the diaspora is involved.
…like having preferential hiring for people who are members of the diaspora on
both in-country teams and also on your, your external fundraising teams, I think that
could… go a long way as well. Just actively looking for people, expanding your networks
(HOST-6, Personal Communication, March 20, 2020).
The second theme that emerged is that there needs to be a period of active
listening between the diaspora and the local Haitian population, as well as a period of
listening between the diaspora and traditional development actors. The session between
the diaspora and the local population is so that the diaspora can establish a knowledge
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base of the day to day obstacles experienced by an average Haitian citizen. It was
recommended that this process be used as an opportunity to create more equitable and
effective overall programs. By having this dialogue, the diaspora would ultimately create
more inclusive projects that serve the needs of the Haitian population. Active listening
would also help establish the proper “channels” as both HOST-1, and HOME-5
mentioned.
I think the best way to facilitate that would be to create more channels for people
who are the intended beneficiaries to communicate there needs to people in the diaspora.
And I think it would be more effective and more equitable overall if more
diaspora … listen first to the needs of whatever community they wish to engage with, and
then to be sort of in a slower but deeper process; more involved in developing projects
that try to meet those needs.
But I would like to see the cause being elaborated in dialogue with beneficiaries
(HOST-1, Personal Communication, January 29, 2020).
The other idea surrounding active listening is that traditional actors can also
benefit from listening to the diaspora. With the unique history of the diaspora and the
potential power within them, traditional actors need to understand who they are and the
best way to apply their strengths to existing and future development projects. HOME5says, “it is hard to speak of diaspora involvement when you don’t know who the
diaspora is,” indicating a need to understand them further. HOME-5 believes that
knowing what they “represent in numbers,” knowing “where they are located,” and “what
type of professionals” they lend themselves to effective engagement strategies.

100

So, to me and you need to ensure or you need to ensure proper channels for them
to be able to voice what they want voice their opinion...have some form of some form of
legal rights. So, but before you get to all of that, I think you need to identify… who,
where and how big your diaspora is. So, I think that to me is the first step to improving
their involvement. Because once you have that, then you have better tool to create all the
other type of mechanisms or channels or whichever that you want to do for them
(HOME-5, Personal Communication, March 3, 2020).
Some of the interviewees suggested that to improve engagement, the international
community should focus on the youth. The youth of Haiti is perceived as a capable,
adaptable, and determined stakeholder for Haiti. The youth in Haiti outnumber the older
population by a great deal. HOST-4 stated that “if you look at the people that are
protesting, they don’t look like me or you,” she further explains that those who are
dissatisfied are the youth and “young leaders.” The idea is that in the 21st century,
development has an opportunity to leapfrog growth on several fronts. Rapid
advancement can be done by investing and focusing on new and innovative projects.
These projects, however, must be accessible to as many people as possible. For example,
several technological projects are happening in Haiti. However, the average Haitian does
not have access to computers, excluding Haitians from the knowledge that is being
shared. Traditional actors have focused on the “usual suspects,” as explained by HOME5, and they need to break out of that mold and bring new perspectives to the table.
The third theme that emerged is one that creates a symbolic unification of the
diaspora and people in Haiti. The intent is for Haiti to make clear and grand efforts to
acknowledge that the diaspora, no matter where they are located, is part of Haiti.
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HOME-3, who happens to be a Senator in Haiti, suggests that there should be a
constitutional change that “eliminates differences between the diaspora and native
Haitians” He goes on further to explain that dual citizenship could help with that effort.
Other individuals from the homeland actor group suggested that there should be
sponsored formal mentorship or partnership programs that pair the leaders of the diaspora
to members in the civil service. The goal of unification is to leverage the emotional
attachments that exist within the diaspora and encourage more diaspora to participate in
active and transnational engagement (HOME-3, Personal Communication, January 31,
2020).
Conclusion
The research questions posed in this chapter of the dissertation were designed to
understand the perceptions and attitudes of Haitian development actors regarding the
Haitian diaspora’s potential as development actors. More specifically, do homeland and
host actors perceive the Haitian diaspora as integral actors:
•

Research question 3: What are the perceptions and attitudes of traditional
development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora’s potential as an integral
Haitian development actor

•

Hypothesis 1: Homeland Actors perceive the Haitian diaspora as an integral actor
to Haitian development

•

Hypothesis 2: Homeland Actors are willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a seat at
the table
The findings from the interviews indicate that there is an overwhelming

perception that the Haitian diaspora is essential to Haiti’s development goals. The
characterization that was most often referenced was the diaspora’s existing economic
contributions and their potential as an investor. Beyond the economic contributions, the
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diaspora is known to be essential to helping the facilitation of development initiatives.
Not all of the host actors actively recruited and utilized the diaspora, but those who did,
found the diaspora to be highly beneficial and acute to completing their goals. There
were some critiques mentioned about the diaspora by the host and homeland actors that
raised concerns about the diaspora’s approach to engaging in international development.
The main concern was the attitude of the diaspora and how sensitive the diaspora would
be to the day to day experiences of the local Haitian population. Both actor groups
expressed concerns about potential overconfidence from the diaspora and felt that a
“diaspora knows best” would be problematic.
When asked if the host and homeland actors would allow the diaspora into the
traditional North-South development model as a third actor, it was expected that the
homeland and host actors would differ in this attitude for varying reasons. The primary
thought that actors would be keen on protecting the existing power dynamic in the NorthSouth relationship and the resources that come with that power.
•

Research question 3: What are the perceptions and attitudes of traditional
development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora’s potential as an integral
Haitian development actor

•

Hypothesis 2: Homeland Actors are willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a seat at
the table

•

Hypothesis 5: Host country actors are not willing to allow the Haitian diaspora a
seat at the table
The findings from the interviews indicate that homeland actors have a strong

willingness to allow the diaspora a seat at the table. Homeland actors thought that
inviting the diaspora into the development process as an equal partner would provide a
voice that was concerned with the “true betterment of the country” as HOME-5 stated.
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Additionally, the sentiments that were shared indicated that the diaspora could serve as
the bridge between homeland and host actors.
For host actors, the results were more mixed about allowing the diaspora at the
table. Overall, the sentiments indicated that there was a slight willingness to allow the
diaspora a seat at the table. The perceptions from the host actor group are that generally,
they see the diaspora’s potential in adding more value to the existing efforts but are
sensitive to some criticisms form the local population. The primary concern mentioned
by host actors was that any introduction of an actor ultimately diminishes the voice of
another. For them, this could worsen a system that is already crowded and could move
development in the wrong direction. The host actors did certainly acknowledge, that with
the right approach, the diaspora is well-equipped to take on that challenge. HOST-4, who
is also part of the Haitian diaspora, specifically mentioned that the execution of
introducing the diaspora as a third actor would be complicated because of the political
dynamics associated with this effort. HOST-4 stated that the diaspora would need the
United States Congress to take legislative action to limit the powers and number of NGOs
and IGOs. Only through congressional oversight and action would there be enough space
to allow the diaspora to be a major disruptor of the North-South model. HOST-4 went on
to further state that the international development community is very protective of whom
they let in because what is affectionately considered “development” is a multibilliondollar industry with entrenched entities that are looking to defend their shares.
One of the objectives in this chapter was to understand if traditional actors were
willing to dramatically shift resources amongst actors so that more control of aid and an
inclusive Haitian perspective would be found in Haiti’s development. This shift in
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control would subsequently require a change from the current aid distribution where 99%
of resources go to host actor organizations and 1% to the Haitian government to more an
80%/10%/10% split between host, homeland and diaspora actors respectively.
•

Research question 3: What are the perceptions and attitudes of traditional
development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora’s potential as an integral
Haitian development actor

•

Hypothesis 3: Homeland Actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)

•

Hypothesis 6: Host country actors are unwilling to dramatically shift resources to
actors to achieve a more inclusive Haitian perspective (80% Host, 10% Diaspora,
10% Homeland Country)
The interviews found that the homeland actors were more indifferent to shifting

resources around between the actors. While some felt that it “maybe” a good idea to shift
resources around, most of the sentiment conveyed, as a beneficiary of development, is
that they do not care how the money is used because it is not “our money.” Some of the
homeland actors shared that Haiti’s issue is the dependency on international assistance
and the welfare mindset that it creates in Haiti. For host actors, they were unwilling to
shift the money to the diaspora or homeland actors, and instead offered alternatives that
they felt would have a more significant impact. For host actors, achieving the greatest
development impact means direct payments to the local population for their needs. This
sentiment is consistent with the previous responses about inviting a third actor to the
table; for them, if things had to change, it should be more direct channels to the Haitian
population. The sentiment shared from the host actors is in clear alignment with the
previously mentioned literature. The question about who “owns” U.S.’ aid to Haiti is
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demonstrated by responses to the interview question and the lack of explicit allocation to
a “Haitian” actor, referring to the diaspora or Haitian government.
Finally, there was an attempt to understand what can be done to improve diaspora
engagement in development initiatives. The responses centered around three key points.
The first point is to incentivize participation for the diaspora better. Incentivizing can be
done by making it more straightforward and rewarding to invest and participate in
Haitian development. The diaspora is typically providing remittances to friends and
families; to align the diaspora with national goals, the diaspora will need more economic
incentives that are not currently available. Furthermore, host actors and their
organizations need to offer preferential hiring to the diaspora as a way to help increase
engagement and reduce opportunity cost to participating in initiatives.
Another key point is that the diaspora must engage in active listening to
understand the needs of those they wish to help. Listening will allow the diaspora to
connect to the mission, build upon the emotional ties they have with their ancestral
communities, and increase their cultural sensitivities as they support others in Haiti.
Active listening can lead to establishing better connections and relationships with the
young Haitian population, which are thought to be critical stakeholders of the future.
Finally, Haitian diaspora engagement can be improved by a symbolic and overt gesture
from the homeland actor. The interview responses of the homeland actors indicated
citizenship, as a unification method, could be an effective mechanism to engage the
diaspora. For the homeland actors, it is more important that both parties are understood
and that goals for Haiti are aligned under one grand mission.
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This chapter provided a much-needed examination of the perceptions and
attitudes of the very executors of development in Haiti. At the core of the findings is the
notion that disruption of the North -South model will not be as easily modified for the
diaspora. Despite international organizations like the United Nations setting a more
inclusive strategy for other host actors, those that are there to execute development
strategy are not definitively on board. This dissertation has shown that one of the reasons
host actors may resist inviting the diaspora is because of the risk of drowning out the
voice of the citizens of Haiti. Secondly, based on the vigorous responses from the host
actors, development resources are a complex and foundational component affecting
sentiment of this new development strategy.

107

CHAPTER V – ASSESSING THE SELF-PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF
HAITIAN DIASPORA THROUGH SURVEYS
Overview
In this chapter, a cross-sectional self-administered survey was used to collect
primary data from the Haitian diaspora. The dissertation aimed to explore the current
self-perceptions and attitudes of Haitian diaspora regarding international considerations
of them being integral actors in Haitian development. The survey was distributed to the
Haitian population living in the United States and Canada until an estimated 482 sample
size was ultimately reached. The survey data was then analyzed to establish statistically
significant predictors of diaspora engagement. The research question and subsequent
hypotheses are as follows:
•

Research question 4: What are the self-perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian
diaspora as integral development actors

•

Hypothesis 1: The Haitian diaspora has positive self-perceptions and accepts they
are integral development actors.

•

Hypothesis 2: Positive self-perceptions lead to greater willingness to participate
in systematic programs

•

Hypothesis 3: There are generational differences between those who perceive
themselves as integral actors to Haitian development

•
•
•

Older (65+) – Do not believe they are integral actors
Middle-aged (35 to 64) – Inconclusive belief they are integral actors
Younger (18 to 34) – Do believe they are integral actors

•

Hypothesis 4: Kreyol language proficiency is a determinant of the willingness to
participate in knowledge transfer initiatives

•

Hypothesis 5: Younger and middle-aged diaspora are less likely to participate in
remittance transfer than older diaspora
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•

Hypothesis 6: There are variables which help predict levels of engagement
amongst the Haitian diaspora

•

Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved
Literature Review
To move more diaspora into active engagement, development actors must

understand the determinants that influence the Haitian diaspora to engage in development
with the homeland. In a study of the Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands, Kuschminder
and Siegel (2016) identified that out of five categories, socio-demographic, transnational
ties, integration, trust, and migration experience, trust that was the most significant
variable in determining levels of awareness and participation of the diaspora in
government-sponsored policies and programs. A study regarding diaspora
entrepreneurship by Nkonglolo-Bakenda and Chrysostome (2013) acknowledges that
engagement is linked to altruistic motivation, the need for social recognition,
entrepreneurial opportunities, and the friendliness of the home country. The survey
instrument used in this dissertation is constructed using extant literature and transcripts of
interviews with Haitian development elites. The survey questions were structured to
understand levels of trust, motivation, and other determinants of participation.
Haitian Diaspora
The diaspora is defined as a group of people with a similar heritage or homeland
who have since moved all over the world, and maintain a connection to the country of
origin (Vocubulary.com, 2020). Over the last ten years, there has been an emphasis on
highlighting the value of diaspora and their global networks. More importantly, the
appropriate level of attention is now being given to the diaspora by IGOs, homeland, and
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host country actors as possible solutions to sustained development. The Haitian diaspora,
in particular, is undoubtedly a valuable resource of human capital when compared to the
human capital that exists in Haiti (Barro & Lee, 2013). The American Community
Survey (ACS) conducts nationwide surveys designed to provide communities with
reliable and timely demographic, social, and economic housing data. According to the
American Community Survey (2009), the Haitian population is a relatively small yet
growing ancestry group in the United States. In 1990, there were an estimated 249,000
people with Haitian ancestry living in the United States, today that estimate is roughly 1
million people. The ACS reports that educational attainment, identified as being 25 years
or older and having obtained a bachelor's degree or higher, for men and women, was
approximately 18% of those who have declared a Haitian ancestry. Median family
income stands at an estimated $45,626. It is estimated that roughly 81% of individuals
who identified with Haitian ancestry grew up speaking a language other than English in
their households. These characteristics are particularly encouraging for Haiti because it
demonstrates that the diaspora is a comparatively affluent resource that could efficiently
serve as a link towards sustained development. The Haitian diaspora in the United States
has the exceptionality of being both from the poorest country in the western hemisphere
while living in one of the wealthiest countries in the world. The proximity of Haitian
diaspora living in Florida, the state with the highest population of Haitians, puts them in a
position to be physically present in development efforts. Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006)
regard the diaspora as bridges capable of providing access to markets, sources of
investment, and expertise. The authors noted that between 1985 and 2000, China, which
has the world’s second-largest economy, had 70% of its foreign direct investment come
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from their diaspora. China is now the second-largest economy in the world, and it
continues to invest in its human capital, domestically and abroad. For the Chinese
diaspora studying in foreign countries, there is an expectation that they repatriate
knowledge and expertise back to their home country. It is in this type of system that the
Haitian diaspora has a more significant role as partners of development.
Institutional Influence
According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2011), the economic hegemony
of the United States is attributed to the historical institutions that encourage economic
growth. Countries with better institutions do a better job of securing the property rights
of individuals. Countries that have laws to protect assets tend to invest more in physical
and human capital. Historically, the French and Spanish colonies failed to create a set of
property rights that promote economic efficiency. In principle, these differing colonial
strategies have had lasting effects on the culture of former colonies. (North & Thomas,
1973). The Haitian diaspora living in the United States has the benefit of being
influenced by a country with superior economic institutions. For diaspora returning to
the homeland to assist with development projects, the knowledge and experience they
have garnered could influence officials to adopt much-needed reforms.
Haitian Kreyol – The Language of the People
The exclusivity of Haitian Kreyol is one reason that makes Kreyol such an
enduring symbol of Haitian identity. Haitian Kreyol emerged during the 17th and 18th
centuries from contact among regional and colloquial varieties of French and various
Niger-Congo languages spoken by Africans. As the number of Africans grew from 2,000
in 1681 (a third of the total population) to 700,000 by 1792 (92% of the total population),
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Haitian Kreyol would go from a simple form to communicate to a critical medium for
blacks in their fight for independence (Degraff, 2007). These historical details are
generally a point of pride for most Haitians today. Contrary to common knowledge, 90%
of the population is monolingual, where Haitian Kreyol, not French, is the only language
spoken for Haitians. Albert Valdman (1984) wrote “no domain of use and no
communicative situation is exempt from the encroachment of Creole.” In rural Haiti and
among the urban masses, all intellectual, psychological, and social needs are served by
Creole” (Lang, 2004). While Haitian Kreyol was embedded in much of working-class
and rural society, it was not until 1983 under the Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier
constitutional reforms that Haitian Kreyol was formally recognized as an official
language of Haiti. The ratification of Haitian Kreyol as an official language had several
highly complex socio-economic and psychological implications. First, this maneuver
signaled to the working class and rural Haiti that their literal and figurative voice would
be heard amongst the political ruling elites. The middle class, a critical bloc of the Papa
Doc’s supporters, did not view Kreyol with the same powerful animosity as the upper
class did. The middle-class acceptance of Haitian Kreyol assisted with the ratification in
the constitution. Second, by acknowledging French as a second official language, it
reflects the dichotomous class divisions of the Haitian society. French is officially used
in political, diplomatic, and international settings, and is considered the language of
power and prestige (Bellegarde-Smith, 2004).
To further support that the utilization of Haitian Kreyol is of particular importance
to the Haitian diaspora, the dissertation draws upon the seminal work of Le Page and
Tabouret-Keller (1985), who posits that the use of language can be viewed as ‘acts of
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identity.’ These acts create a sense of social and ethnic solidarity and difference (Nero,
2005).
For most local Haitians, French is seen as a foreign language alien to everyday
life and transactions. Often, Haitian diaspora who do not have fluency in Kreyol is
immediately, consciously or subconsciously, categorized as an outsider by local Haitians
upon hearing a Kreyol dialect outside of local norms. Even those native to Haiti are
sometimes called “blanc,” translated means “white” in Haitian Kreyol. The calling of
Haitian descendants as white is a local referendum to being an outsider or foreigner.
More importantly, it characterizes an individual as one who is ‘not like us.’ This
dissertation explored how much of an impact this informal sub-culture has on Haitian
diaspora wishing to engage in systematic programs in Haiti. Given the identity links to
the proficiency levels of Haitian Kreyol, it is expected that there is a significant impact on
the Haitian diaspora and their willingness to engage in programs in Haiti.
Methodology & Data
The survey design is based on literary findings and themes from prior interviews
with Haitian development elites. The primary objective of the survey is to understand
respondent perceptions about engaging as an international development actor, willingness
to participate in programs, and ways to improve engagement. By combining this data
with demographic information, the dissertation intended to establish statistically
significant predictors of engagement. The survey, in its entirety, can be found in
Appendix D of the dissertation.
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Methodology
The target population for the survey was individuals living in the United States or
Canada who have Haitian ancestry, or individuals who identify as having a connection
with Haiti (those who have lived in Haiti and may identify as being Haitian). The survey
instrument was placed on the Survey Monkey platform, and it was open from March 29th
2020, until May 8th 2020.

Respondents were targeted primarily through the use of

social platforms and targeted ads via Facebook and Instagram. Two recruitment
instruments were created and served as marketing material in the social media campaign.
The first was a static ad that briefly described the overall research and encouraged
targeted populations to click a link. The link redirected the individual to
www.HaitiResearch.com, where the survey was embedded. This ad was launched on
April 3rd and concluded on April 26th, a sample of the add is provided below.
Figure 3. Static Recruitment Ad
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The second recruitment instrument used was a 30-second video ad that provided
non-static material, including music from a Haitian artist (J. Perry). Similar to the static
ad, the targeted population could click a link that would direct them to
www.HaitiResearch.com to complete the survey. This method was launched on April 8th
2020 and concluded on April 26th 2020; a sample of the recruitment is provided below:
Figure 4. Video Recruitment Ad

The survey objectives were to collect no less than 385 surveys (n>=385) from the
Haitian population living in the United States and Canada to achieve a 95% confidence
level and +/- 5% margin of error.
Data
Most of the data used in this chapter of the dissertation will be primary data from
the surveys. However, secondary data from the ACS will be used to compare and
contrast the sample of respondents from the target population. Data such as the median

115

age, male to female ratios, household income, educational attainment, and language
capabilities were used as indicators that establish if a normative sample was collected.
Multivariate regression was added to the analyses to identify any statistically
significant predictors that established a respondent’s willingness to participate in a
program and the likelihood to send remittances to family or friends in Haiti. Lastly, to
provide further descriptive analysis, additional statistical techniques were used to
establish the mean, median, and mode of the responses to the survey questions. Below,
are the dependent and independent variables and the estimated equations:
Dependent Variables
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Willingness to participate in international programs (Participation) – Question 21
Likelihood to send remittance (Sending Cash) – Question 31
Independent Variables
Age (Age) – Question 6
Young Adult (Young Adult) – Derived from question 6
Middle Aged Adult (Middle Aged Adult)– Derived from question 6
Older Adult (Old Adult)– Derived from question 6
Educational attainment (Education) – Question 7
Income (Income) – Question 10
Haitian Kreyol language proficiency (Language Fluency) – Question 15
Haitian birth (Haitian Born) – Question 13
Years since last visit to Haiti (Time since Last Visit) – Question 33
Satisfaction with Haitian efforts (Effort Satisfaction) – Question 19
Respect from homeland government (Respect from Homeland) – Question 24
Respect from host organization (Respect from Host) – Question 25
Criterion to travel (Necessities to Engage) – Question 36
Distance in miles from residence to Haiti (Distance to Haiti)- Question 5
Haitian government ability – (HTN Gov’t Ability) – Question 28
Perception of the Haitian diaspora as a solution in development (Diaspora
Solution) – Question 16
Connection to Haitian Diaspora (Diaspora Connection) – Question 17
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Predicted Equations
•

Equation 1: Y-hat Participation = Bo + B1(Young Adults) – B2 (Old Adult)
+B3(Age) + B4(Income) + B5(Education) + B6(Language Fluency) + B7(Haitian
Born) - B8(Time since Last Visit) - B9(Effort Satisfaction)+ B10(Respect from
Homeland) + B11(Respect from Host)- B12(Necessities to Engage) B13(Distance) - B14(HTN Gov’t Ability) + B15(Diaspora Solution) + B16
(Diaspora Connection)

•

Equation 2: Y-hat Sending Cash = Bo - B1(Young Adults) + B2 (Old Adult)
+B3(Age) + B4(Income) + B5(Education) + B6(Language Fluency) + B7(Haitian
Born) - B8(Time since Last Visit) - B9(Effort Satisfaction)+ B10(Respect from
Homeland) + B11(Respect from Host)+ B12(Necessities to Engage) B13(Distance) - B14(HTN Gov’t Ability) + B15(Diaspora Solution) + B16
(Diaspora Connection)
Results & Analysis
The outcomes of this chapter are presented in a systematic way to help

communicate the narrative of respondents who participated in this survey. In order to
have a complete understanding of the motivations and perceptions of the diaspora, it is
important first to identify who the diaspora is and what they represent. Following an indepth cross-sectional analysis of the demographic data, results where then compared and
benchmarked to data from the ACS, World Bank Data, USAID, and other sources. The
results and analysis section are organized as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Recruitment Assessment
Survey Result Responses
Survey Results – Demographics
Survey Results – Perceptions
Survey Results – How to Improve Engagement
Regression Analysis – Independent and Dependent Variables

Recruitment Assessment
The engagement of respondents using social media and a targeted recruitment
campaign was highly successful and surpassed expectations. The two campaigns had a
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total “reach” of 30,624 individuals and a total of 46,009 “impressions.” Reach, and
impressions can be respectively defined as those who saw any content from a page, and
the number of times any content from the page entered a person’s screen (Facebook,
2020). The static article in Figure 5.1 had over twice as much in reach and impressions
despite starting only five days before the second advertisement. The static ad was 71.8%
of total reach and 69.8 % of impressions. The 30-second video’s total reach and
impressions were respectively, 29.2% and 30.2%. Both ads combined produced 438
unique link clicks, where the static ad captured 53% of total unique link clicks, and the
video ad captured 46%. The static ad had link clicks that reached a comparatively
balanced mix of men and women with respective figures of 54% and 46%. The link
clicks for the static ad was significantly more popular for women aged 65 or older. In
contrast, the men who clicked the static ad were equally distributed between younger
adults (18 to 34) and older adults (65+). The video ad’s clicks were skewed more towards
men than women, with a corresponding difference of 70% and 30%. The video ad
captured more clicks from those between the ages of 55 to 64 for both men and women.
The secondary method of recruitment was to post the static ad in the “rooms” of Haitian
Facebook groups. Though the responses to this method were not tracked, it is believed
that this was an effective method of recruitment. The observations collected from users
once the post was made, revealed excitement about being part of the survey. This
excitement was measured by the content and number of replies of the post. The tertiary
method of recruitment asked members of the diaspora community to share messaging on
WhatsApp and text messages. With each post and message, it was encouraged that
respondents take the survey and share it with family and friends of the Haitian diaspora.
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Survey Results – Responses
There was a total of 714 respondents that began the survey, but only 67.5% of
respondents completed the survey. The completion rate was favorable compared to the
anticipated completion rate of 52% calculated by the Survey Monkey platform. The
average survey took an estimated 7 minutes and 12 seconds, which is faster than the
researcher anticipated. Figure 5.3 highlights the duration of the survey and indicates that
an overwhelming number of the responses were collected in the first and second
weekends of the survey. The data shows that 213 and 318 responses were respectively
collected at that time. It should be noted that these peaks coincided with the release of
the static ad on April 3rd and the video ad on April 8th. It should also be noted that a
total of 68 respondents were excluded from participating because they primarily lived in
Haiti (62 exclusions) or because they were younger than 18 years old (6 exclusions).
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Figure 5. Survey Duration and Respondents by Day

The geographic locations of the respondents were very much in line with the 2009
data from the ACS. The survey showed out of 474 respondents that entered a zip code,
the majority resided in Florida (183), followed by Massachusetts (66), New York (63)
and New Jersey (20), (See figure 5.4). The geographic analysis of zip code data further
revealed that the majority of the Florida respondents were from the state’s southern
region. There were high densities from Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and Palm Beach areas.
The ACS identified that two-thirds of the Haitian population lived in Florida and New
York. Comparatively, the top two states where the respondents were from were Florida
(53% of respondents) and Massachusetts (13% of respondents).
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Figure 6. Respondents by State

Survey Results – Demographics
Gender. One surprising element of the survey demographic was the number of
respondents identified as female versus male. Of the 486 respondents who identified
their gender, 79.6% were female, and 19.4% were male, see figure 5.5 below. The
recruitment statistics suggested that this figure would be much different as the data
showed the traffic from Facebook as disproportionately male. In one instance, males
equated to 70% of persons clicking on the video advertisement. The dissertation assumes
that the bounce rate, the percentage of visitors that enter a website but leave before
continuing to other pages, was high for males who were directed to
www.HaitiResearch.com.
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Figure 7. Respondents by Gender

Age. The average age of respondents who shared their birth year (n=479) was
40.3 years old. Females had an average age of 39.2 years, while males averaged 44.7
years. Respondents were classified using age categorizations from the National Institute
of Health (NIH) whereby young adults are aged 18 to 35, middle-aged adults were aged
36 to 55, and older adults are 56 years and older. The data showed that 37.3% of
respondents were young adults, and middle-aged and older adults comprised 48.9% and
13.8%, respectively. In 2015, the median age in Haiti was 23 years old, while the median
age of the diaspora respondents is 39 (Ritchie & Roser, 2020). The median age in the
ACS (2009) study was 29.7 years old. These measures establish that the diaspora
population in the United States is much older than the population in Haiti.
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Figure 8. Respondents by Age

Education. The diaspora population is not only much older but also, they have
much higher educational attainment than the local population of Haiti. The respondents
surveyed were also more educated than the demographic of individuals in the United
States. The survey data indicated that 69.1% of the respondents had attained a bachelor’s
degree or higher; see Figure 5.7. The ACS (2009) reported that the percentages of males
and females who were 25 years or older and have attained a bachelor’s degree was18.3%
for males ad 18.2% for females.
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Figure 9. Respondents by Educational Attainment and Gender

Since census data reports educational attainment for populations that are 25 years
or older, this dissertation added age as a layer in the analysis (United States Census,
2020). When the age variable is controlled, educational attainment improves for
respondents aged 25 years or older with attainment of a bachelor’s degree or higher at
72.7%. The largest group of respondents, when categorized by age group and educational
attainment, are middle-aged diaspora, aged 36 to 54, with advanced degrees, followed by
middle-aged diaspora with bachelor’s degrees.
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Figure 10. Respondents by Educational Attainment and Age Category

Industry. If development aid from the international community is an indicator of
where the immediate needs are in Haiti, then this dissertation assumed that as a proxy, the
USAID disbursements to specific sectors serve as a guide. In 2019, USAID
disbursements totaled $211 million and the three largest sectors to receive funds, as
categorized by the “dac sector code,” where HIV/AIDS programs ($36.1 million),
Maternal and Child Health/Family Planning ($28.5 million), and Agriculture ($25
million) (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2020). The two largest funded
programs are in the health sector, which requires satisfactory levels of healthcare
professionals and staff to run their respective programs. Interestingly, when evaluating
the industries that respondents were employed in, 31% of respondents (n=479) work in
the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry. The fact that nearly a majority of Haitian
diaspora work in healthcare is a crucial statistic for NGOs, faith-based organizations,
private enterprises, and other organizations operating in Haiti. Not only was there a
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significant number of respondents in healthcare, but their educational attainment also
suggests that there are experts in their field. This data establishes that the diaspora can
serve as a supply of qualified labor for the major programs that are receiving aid in Haiti.
Figure 11. Respondents by Industry Worked
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Figure 12. Respondent Healthcare Workers by Educational Attainment

Income. Respondents were asked to indicate their 2019 earned income. The
average income and median income of respondents (n=479) was $64,516 and $56,000,
respectively. In the sample, male respondents had less average income and had lower
median incomes than their female counterparts. The dissertation examined differences
between the diaspora born in Haiti and those born in the United States. The findings
indicated that respondents born in Haiti had average incomes of $71,934 versus $55,892
for those born outside of Haiti. It should be noted that the diaspora born in Haiti were, on
average, nine years older than those born outside of Haiti, resulting in higher average and
median income. When age is controlled, the income of those born outside of Haiti, all
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things being equal, trended towards being 20 to 30% higher than Haitian born diaspora
approximately nine years later.
Figure 13. Respondents Income by Age and Gender
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Figure 14. Respondent Income by Age, Gender and Haitian Birth

Survey Results – Perceptions
The perceptions and attitudes identified in this section of the dissertation were
collected to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the Haitian diaspora.
Acquiring a more profound understanding is particularly important in the potential
recruitment, utilization, and introduction of the Haitian diaspora to the Haitian
development field. Most of the perceptions were cross-sectionally measured against the
young adult, middle-aged, and older adults age categories. Since the dissertation
assumed that generational differences existed between the diaspora due to the varying
experiences of the authoritarian Duvalier regimes (pre and post-Duvalier), the researcher
found it appropriate to measure against this variable consistently. For greater context, the
dissertation made comparisons between those who were born in Haiti and those who
were not. The results of the central questions in the survey can be found below:
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How well do you speak Haitian Kreyol? The extant literature in the preceding
chapters of this dissertation has established that Haitian Kreyol is more than just a
language. It is more likely to serve as a cultural representation of Haitian society and
connection, regardless of where an individual resides. These notions were made clear by
a representative response by one of the interviewees who said that “Kreyol was the best
way to connect the people of Haiti and the diaspora” (Interviewee 3, 2020). In order to
further evaluate this notion, the survey asked respondents to share self-perceptions about
their fluency in Haitian Kreyol. On a scale of zero to four, with native fluency as a four,
respondents average a fluency of 2.98, which is slightly lower than above-average
fluency. Over two-thirds (67.8%) of respondents reported an above-average or native
fluency. An estimated 77% of older adults, followed by 47% of middle-aged adults and
38.3% of young adults, have native or bilingual fluency. Approximately 13% of adults
described themselves as having limited to no ability to speak Kreyol. The results also
showed that the diaspora born in Haiti have greater perceived fluency even after living
away from the homeland.
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Figure 15. Respondent Language Fluency by Age Category

Do you consider yourself part of the Haitian diaspora? The dissertation
hypothesized that the stronger the respondent’s connection to the diaspora, the more
likely they are to participate in international development initiatives. Respondents were
asked to identify if they considered themselves to be a part of the diaspora and their level
of connection. On average, respondents (n=482) have a strong to moderate selfperception of connection to the homeland. Older adults, who were all been born in Haiti,
had the highest percentage of respondents (63%) who have a strong connection to the
diaspora. Roughly 39.8% of middle-aged adults and 38,9% of young adults reported a
strong connection. The results also show that each generation perceives themselves to
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have less of a connection to their older predecessors. A future generation that perceives
to be less connected could mean fewer remittances to the homeland and less participation
in development initiatives. This is particularly true if the dissertation’s hypothesis, a
direct relationship with connection or participation, is demonstrated to be statistically
significant.
Figure 16. Respondent Connection by Age Category

Agree or Disagree - I believe that the Haitian diaspora is a key factor to Haiti's
sustained and long-term development? The survey asked respondents if they believed that
the diaspora was a potential solution to achieving sustained development in Haiti. On
average, respondents indicated that they agreed with that premise. Most respondents
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(83%) agreed that the diaspora serves as a potential solution to achieving sustained
development, with a striking 51.2% strongly agreeing to this notion. There were very
view respondents (3.7%) who disagreed with this premise, and less than one percent
strongly disagree.
Figure 17. Respondent Perceptions of Haitian Diaspora as Solution by Age Category

Agree or Disagree - I am generally satisfied with organizational efforts that are
directed towards helping Haiti? When asked their level of satisfaction with current
development efforts, overall, most respondents were not satisfied with the efforts of aid
in Haiti. Interestingly, although the strength of diaspora connection is lower for middleaged and young adults, more respondents from these age groups were less satisfied with
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development efforts of Haiti. Older adults are dispersed more evenly among the levels of
satisfaction resulting in a neutral position on development efforts.
Figure 18. Respondent Satisfaction with Development Efforts by Age Category

Agree or Disagree - I feel that the Haitian government respects me and the
knowledge I bring to develop Haiti? In the literature by Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson
(2011), the hierarchical prevalence of some Caribbean states can be traced back to the
institutions of each country’s colonial origin (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2011).
In addition to the hierarchical culture, the dissertation has highlighted that under the
Duvalier regimes, Haiti developed a history of authoritarian suppression with the use of
violence, jailing, and other disturbing mechanisms. With these resolutions, the researcher
was motivated to ask respondents if they would feel respected by the Haitian government.
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Mutual respect is a key factor of successful collaboration between Haiti’s development
actors. Overall, respondents were neutral, with a leaning towards feeling that the Haitian
government would not respect them. Young adults had a stronger sentiment that they
would feel disrespected than any of the other age groups, but middle-aged adults were
least affected. Since the question referenced both respect of the individual and respect of
the knowledge that the individual would bring, one possible explanation could be around
the high educational attainment of middle-aged respondents. The dissertation presumes
that high educational attainment may neutralize some of the perceived negative respect
that middle-aged respondents could experience from the Haitian government.
Essentially, the confidence in one’s knowledge may have created a perception of more
favorable respect from the Haitian government.
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Figure 19. Respondent Perception of Haitian Government Respect by Age Category

Agree or Disagree - I would like to participate in a Haitian development initiative
benefiting local Haitians? A key question of this dissertation is determining if the
diaspora would like to participate in development efforts to benefit Haiti. Overall, most
respondents strongly agreed that they would like to participate in development initiatives.
Intriguingly, young adults have a stronger desire to participate than any other age group
even though they have less of a connection to the homeland (figure mentioned above
5.14). For homeland actors, this motivation from the young adults can be leveraged to
make a connection to the young Haitian diaspora who serve as the next generation to
support Haiti.
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Figure 20. Respondent Desire to Participate by Age Category

Figure 21. Respondent Desire to Participate by Haitian Birth
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Do you believe that it is important for the Haitian diaspora, who train local
Haitians, to be able to speak Haitian Kreyol as opposed to French or English? The
dissertation was interested in the perceptions of the diaspora about whether or not Kreyol
is important in training or capacity building initiatives. Given the fact that most of the
population in Haiti speak Haitian Kreyol and not French, the reach of any program is
broadened when trainers and those sharing information can speak Kreyol. An
overwhelming 90% of respondents believe that training should be done in Kreyol. This
support includes 54.8% who strongly agreed with this notion and 35.4% who agreed.
Figure 22. Respondent Perception of Haitian Kreyol Training by Age Category
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Have you sent cash or cash equivalents to family or friends in Haiti? Given that
remittances from the diaspora are a cornerstone of any developing economy, this
dissertation sought to discover the percent of respondents who have given cash or cash
equivalents to family or friends in Haiti. Fifty-three percent of respondents reported that
they had sent cash or cash equivalents to Haiti. The trend that Haitian leaders should be
concerned with is the declining rate between generations that have sent cash. The data
shows that nearly 50% of Haitian born middle-aged adults and 32% of Haitian born
young adults have sent cash to someone in Haiti. Comparatively, 80% of older Haitian
born adults have sent cash, and this is a respective decline of 30% and 48% between
older adults and the respective middle-aged and young adults. It is anticipated that the
youth participate in cash remittances will increase over time as they become more
established in their income and educational attainment. However, there is still a
significant decline between older and middle-aged adults.
Figure 23. Respondent Sending Cash or Cash Equivalents by Age Category

How would you characterize the Haitian government’s ability to provide the basic
needs for their people? In Stewart Patrick’s (2006) assessment of weak and failed states,
Patrick classifies Haiti as a failed state due to its low will and low capacity
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categorization. This dissertation was interested in the perceptions of diaspora regarding
this framework. Most diaspora (46%) responded that Haiti has Low Will and Low
Capacity, which is described as weak and not willing. The remaining majority (38%)
indicated that Haiti had Low Will and High Capacity, which can be described as
unresponsive, corrupt, or repressive. Fundamentally, for 84% of the respondents, the
perception is that the Haitian government has a low will in regards to their ability to
provide for the basic needs of their people. In addition, Haitian born diaspora was more
likely to describe Haiti as a failed state with a Low Will and Low Capacity classification.
Very few respondents, only 1.7%, indicated Haiti exhibited Strong Will and High
Capacity to provide for their people. Middle-aged and young adults born in Haiti were
more likely to believe that the Haitian government had Low Will and Low Capacity
compared to those born outside of Haiti.
Figure 24. Respondent Perception of Will and Capacity by Age Category and Haitian
Birth

When was the last time you were in Haiti? Please enter the year. One of the
independent variables (Years since Last Visit) assumes that there is an inverse
relationship between the amount of time between a visit to Haiti and the connection to the
diaspora. Respondents were asked to provide the year or the last time they were in Haiti.
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Overall, respondents in the survey last visited Haiti 9.7 years ago. Those who were born
in Haiti had more frequent travel than those who were not, a difference of 1.7 years.
Young adults had the least number of years since the last visit to Haiti of all groups. The
recency of their visits serves as an additional indicator that the youth exhibit perceptions
or motivations that are more favorable for engagement than their older counterparts.
Figure 25. Respondent Years since Last Visit by Age Category

In order for me to spend an extended period of time in Haiti I would absolutely
need access to the following (Select all that apply)? Before one can invite the diaspora
back to the homeland, Tatiana Wah’s (2013) research suggests there are absolute
necessities that the diaspora must have in order to spend an extended time in Haiti. The
premise of this assumption is that Haiti does not have the same living standard that the
diaspora has come to enjoy. Respondents were asked to select from a list of necessities
they would need to spend an extended time in Haiti. The respondents were offered an
“other” option if they wanted to include options that were not listed. The results indicate
that those who were born in Haiti required fewer accommodations than those born
outside of Haiti. Middle-aged adults required the least amount of necessities than young
and older adults, who were equal.

141

Figure 26. Number of Respondent Necessities by Age Category

Survey Results – How to Improve Engagement
The survey included one open-ended question intended to allow the respondent to
have a completely free opportunity to express their thoughts about how to improve
engagement. This question is the intersection of respondent perceptions and practical
application of an international engagement initiative. All 271 responses from this openended question were coded into 17 themes. The top 5 themes calculated by the
percentage of respondents whose responses fell into the respective categories are as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Education – 14.5%
Better strategic cooperation – 11.2%
Communication/Networking – 9.3%
Improve Safety – 8.2%
More positive narrative – 7.8%
The recurring theme for young adults was that education was a motivator to

participate in programs; 22% of young adults made this suggestion. Roughly 12.4% of
middle-aged respondents and 18.4% of older respondents shared that the way to improve
engagement was to respectively improve communication/networking and improve safety,
see Figure 5.24 below. The top five themes are examined for additional context as to
provide insight into what these themes entail.
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Figure 27. Respondent Themes to Improve Engagement by Age Category

Education. Respondents that suggested that education was needed to improve
engagement were referring to attaining a full understanding of Haiti, its culture, and
history. Respondents proposed that a much deeper understanding of Haiti would increase
the desire to be involved. The sentiments emphasized that there has been some loss of
awareness and understanding of Haiti between generations. As a result, respondents,
particularly the youth, indicated that they are not connected to Haiti’s past and the day to
day lives of the Haitian people. Respondents implied that the knowledge they have
received about Haiti had been biased due to animosities their parents have maintained.
The respondents were keenly interested in both the informal and formal knowledge about
Haiti. They recognize the richness of stories (both negative and positive) that were
passed down from prior generations. However, they would welcome more structured
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programs dedicated to positive learnings about Haiti, including the role Haiti played in
the international community as the first black republic. There were specific mentions
about learning Kreyol and erasing the misconceptions that Haiti is a poor despot country
with no hope or future. The youth suggested that there should be programs and forums
that share detailed information through videos and social media. The youth desires a
central repository to obtain information regarding volunteer opportunities and project
effectiveness in Haiti.
Better Strategic Cooperation. As the second most mentioned theme, respondents
in this group were particularly interested in creating efficiencies with existing programs
and initiatives. The sentiment shared by the diaspora suggests that current efforts are
perceived as fragmented and hindered by competition amongst host government
organizations such as non-profits. The diaspora makes mention of the lack of core
strategies for Haiti and how that disengages the diaspora, causing them to disagree over
strategic priorities amongst each other. One respondent stated, “We must come to terms
with one agenda! There are too many chiefs with their hands in the pots, they all have
hidden agendas”.
There were suggestions that the United States should have more structured
opportunities to engage with Haiti. Respondents proposed that there should be
formalized discussions and planning where the diaspora is invited to the table and that
both the United States, the Haitian government, churches, and non-profits come together
and agree. There were suggestions that current programs and initiatives need to be
evaluated, and those that are determined to be ineffective should cease in their effort.
Resources can be reallocated to those that have been proven effective. Along those lines,
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there was an idea that engagement of the Haitian diaspora should be modeled after the
successful initiatives occurring in Africa, in particular, engagement should be modeled
after the 2019 “Year of Return” in Ghana. This engagement initiative is a Ghanaian
effort, supported by the African Union, that encouraged black people all over the world to
return to Africa to settle, invest, and connect with their African roots. The Ghana
Tourism Authority reported that the initiative helped realize a 45% increase in tourist
visitors between January and September of 2019. In addition, officials stated that the
initiative injected roughly $1.9 billion in their economy (BBC News, 2020).
Communication/Networking. Improving engagement by having better
communication and networking was the highest suggestion of diaspora who are middleaged adults. The premise is that creating forums where individuals can share ideas, news,
and knowledge about how to improve Haiti will result in increased engagement. The
respondents suggested that this can be done through sponsored round tables, forums, and
community town halls. Respondents in this group suggested that professional
associations like the National Alliance for the Advancement of Haitian Professionals
(NAAHP) and the Haitian Chambers of Commerce could lead efforts to organize the
forums and gather information about the best practices to improve Haiti and distribute the
information to the Haitian communities.
Improve Safety. The respondents surveyed suggested that improving safety in the
homeland would dramatically improve engagement among all groups. For them, the
tenuous situations in Haiti, such as violence, protests, and kidnappings, make it very
difficult for the diaspora to engage in development projects. Some respondents shared
that during visits to Haiti they encountered roadblocks due to riots and unsafe
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environments from protests in the streets. At the time that this survey was being
conducted, there were massive protests regarding the Petro Caribe scandal in Haiti. As
one respondent put it, “Fear paralyzes the diaspora, it doesn’t reassure,” safety must be a
priority on the ground for engagement to occur.
More Positive Narrative. This suggestion is similar to the education theme but has
one key difference. The idea purported by respondents suggests that since there is an
international narrative that regularly depicts Haiti in a negative light, then a reeducation
and rebranding is needed so the international community can adopt Haiti in a more
positive light. Respondents shared that changing the narrative of Haiti as a “dangerous
and dirty country,” could have a positive ripple effect in tourism and impact the
perceptions of the diaspora and the international community. Respondents suggested that
when “you google Haiti,” pictures of the earthquake and hungry children flood the
screen. From the diaspora perspective, there must be a better persona of Haiti in this
space.
Regression Analysis – Independent and Dependent Variables
This dissertation sought to go beyond descriptive trends and pursue the
identification of predictive variables that were both valuable and statistically significant
to the engagement of the Haitian diaspora. While there is a wealth of data that could be
analyzed, the dissertation chose to focus on two dependent variables, the willingness to
participate, and the likelihood of sending cash remittances. The regression includes 15
independent variables collected from the survey and used for regression analysis. These
variables are listed below:
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Dependent Variables
•
•

Willingness to participate in international programs (Participation) – Question 21
Likelihood to send remittance (Sending Cash) – Question 31
Independent Variables

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Age (Age) – Question 6
Young Adult (Young Adult) – Derived from question 6
Middle Aged Adult (Middle Aged Adult)– Derived from question 6
Older Adult (Old Adult)– Derived from question 6
Educational attainment (Education) – Question 7
Income (Income) – Question 10
Haitian Kreyol language proficiency (Language Fluency) – Question 15
Haitian birth (Haitian Born) – Question 13
Years since last visit to Haiti (Time since Last Visit) – Question 33
Satisfaction with Haitian efforts (Effort Satisfaction) – Question 19
Respect from homeland government (Respect from Homeland) – Question 24
Respect from host organization (Respect from Host) – Question 25
Criterion to travel (Necessities to Engage) – Question 36
Distance in miles from residence to Haiti (Distance to Haiti)- Question 5
Haitian government ability – (HTN Gov’t Ability) – Question 28
Perception of the Haitian diaspora as a solution in development (Diaspora
Solution) – Question 16
Connection to Haitian Diaspora (Diaspora Connection) – Question 17
Predicting Participation in Development Programs. The first regression completed

sought to predict the desire of the diaspora to participate in an international program. Of
the 16 independent variables used in the regression, only two of the variables (Diaspora
Solution and Diaspora Connection) proved to be statistically significant at the 95%
confidence interval. Only two variables were significant at the 90% level. The first
variable, ‘Diaspora Solution,’ is the indicator that captures how integral the diaspora
believe they are to Haitian development. The regression results can be interpreted as
follows:
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With all things being equal, for every unit increase in perception of the diaspora
as a solution to development, the desire to participate in development initiatives in Haiti
increases by 0.224 units. The ‘Diaspora Solution’ had a p-value of 0.000, indicating that
it is significant at the 95% confidence interval.
The second variable, ‘Diaspora Connection,’ estimates how connected does an
individual feel to the diaspora. The results of the regression show that ‘Diaspora
Connection’ has a direct relationship with the desire to participate in development
initiatives. The regression results can be interpreted as follows:
With all things being equal, for every unit increase in the Diaspora Connection,
the desire to participate in development initiatives in Haiti decreases by 0.126 units. The
‘Diaspora Connection’ had a p-value of 0.005, indicating that it is significant at the 95%
confidence interval.
The next two variables were not significant at the 95% confidence interval and
below the standard of our dissertation. The ‘Time since Last Visit’ and ‘Old Adult’
variables are notable because they fall within the 90% confidence interval, and the survey
data support that these variables play a role in the decision to participate in initiatives.
The regression results can be interpreted as follows:
With all things being equal, at the 90% confidence interval, for every unit
increase in the years since last visit, the desire to participate in development initiatives in
Haiti decreases by 0.007 units.
With all things being equal, at the 90% confidence interval, for every categorical
increase in older adults, the desire to participate in development initiatives in Haiti
decreases by 0.258 units.
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Table 5 Regression Equation for Participation
Equation 1 –Participation

VARIABLES
Young Adult
Old Adult
Age
Income
Education
Language Fluency
Haitian Born
Time since Last Visit
Effort Satisfaction
Respect from Homeland
Respect from Host
Necessities to Engage
Distance to Haiti
HTN Gov't Ability
Diaspora Solution
Diaspora Connection

(1)
Participatio
n
0.066
(0.182)
-0.529**
(0.256)
0.005
(0.011)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.057
(0.053)
0.103*
(0.053)
-0.008
(0.129)
-0.013**
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.050)
0.027
(0.066)
0.040
(0.062)
-0.000
(0.041)
0.000
(0.000)
0.007
(0.102)
0.189***
(0.061)
0.091*
(0.050)
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(2)
Participatio
n

(3)
Participatio
n

(4)
Participatio
n

-0.424***
(0.160)

-0.424***
(0.160)

-0.258*
(0.145)

0.082*
(0.046)

0.082*
(0.046)

-0.011**
(0.005)

-0.011**
(0.005)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.204***
(0.057)
0.081*
(0.047)

0.204***
(0.057)
0.081*
(0.047)

-0.008*
(0.005)

0.224***
(0.055)
0.126***
(0.045)

Table 5 (continued)
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.160
(0.540)

250
0.155

0.514**
(0.249)

0.514**
(0.249)

259
0.136

259
0.136

0.778***
(0.125)

293
0.131

Predicting the Likelihood to Send Cash or Cash Equivalents to Friends or
Family.The second equation was constructed to predict the likelihood of sending cash
remittances to Haiti. Out of the 16 independent variables, the analysis found only three
variables (Haitian Born, Time since Last Visit, and Language Fluency) that helped
predict whether or not the diaspora would send cash remittances. The first variable,
‘Haitian Born,’ is an indicator that identifies if the individual was born in Haiti. The
regression results can be interpreted as follows:
With all things being equal, being born in Haiti increases the likelihood of
sending cash or cash equivalents to friends and family by 0.147 units. The ‘Haitian
Born’ had a p-value of 0.006, indicating that it is significant at the 95% confidence
interval.
The second variable, ‘Language Fluency,’ is an indicator of the perceived
language fluency of the diaspora. The regression results can be interpreted as follows:
With all things being equal, for every unit increase in the perceived language
fluency, the desire to participate in development initiatives in Haiti increases by 0.075
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units. The ‘Language Fluency’ had a p-value of 0.001, indicating that it is significant at
the 95% confidence interval.
The third variable, ‘Time since Last Visit,’ estimates the years that have passed
since the last visit to Haiti. The variable has an inverse relationship to the likelihood of
sending remittances to Haiti. The regression results can be interpreted as follows:
With all things being equal, for every unit increase in the years since the last visit,
the desire to participate in development initiatives in Haiti decreases by 0.007 units. The
‘Time since Last Visit’ had a p-value of 0.001, indicating that it is significant at the 95%
confidence interval. The full equation is below.
Table 6 Regression Equation for Cash Remittances
Equation 2 –Sending Cash

VARIABLES
Young Adult
Old Adult
Age
Income
Education
Language Fluency
Haitian Born
Time since Last Visit
Effort Satisfaction
Respect from Homeland

(1)
Sending
Cash
-0.043
(0.084)
-0.185
(0.118)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.024)
0.090***
(0.024)
0.126**
(0.059)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.016
(0.023)
0.042
(0.030)

(2)
Sending
Cash

(3)
Sending
Cash

-0.140*
(0.074)

-0.142*
(0.074)

0.077***
(0.023)
0.145***
(0.053)
-0.007***
(0.002)

0.075***
(0.023)
0.147***
(0.053)
-0.007***
(0.002)

0.024
(0.023)
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Table 6 (continued)
Respect from Host
Necessities to Engage

Distance to Haiti
HTN Gov't Ability
Diaspora Solution
Diaspora Connection
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1

-0.019
(0.029)
-0.003
(0.019)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.024
(0.047)
-0.018
(0.028)
0.002
(0.023)
0.650***
(0.249)

0.566***
(0.073)

0.552***
(0.072)

250
0.195

293
0.135

293
0.132

Conclusion
The survey used in this dissertation captured a wealth of information from the
Haitian diaspora, with a total of 714 respondents who began the survey and 482
respondents that completed all of the key questions. Additionally, the Haitian diaspora
responded well to targeted advertising campaigns on Facebook, with a total of 438 unique
clicks that helped acquire the respondents. To test the sample for normality, the
respondents in this dissertation were compared to a study by the ACS. In the ACS
survey, demographic information was collected on individuals living in the United States
who identified as having Haitian ancestry. The locations where the diaspora respondents
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in this survey resided was comparable to the ACS survey. Unfortunately, there was a
stark gender bias in this survey as female diaspora overwhelmed male participants with a
4:1 ratio.
The remaining demographic information demonstrated that the Haitian diaspora is
a principal resource for Haiti as they have high educational and economic attainment
compared to both their homeland and the United States. The diaspora represented in this
survey had an average and median income of $64,516 and $56,000, respectively. Also,
77% of the respondents aged 25 years or older had attained a bachelor’s degree or higher,
whereas Haiti has less than 1% of its population completing tertiary school. Nearly 46%
of the respondents indicated that they work in the Education, Healthcare, and
Pharmaceutical industries. The data shows that the Haitian diaspora is a keen match for
the development initiatives in Haiti. In 2019, the United States distributed 40% of its
international aid to programs in Education, and Healthcare-Population sectors in Haiti
(U.S. Agency for International Development, 2020). The data shows that the diaspora
possesses the language and technical ability to assist in these efforts. Host government
actors, non-profits, and other entities can leverage the talent and human capital resting in
the diaspora for their multimillion-dollar development projects in order to achieve better
efficacy and effectiveness.
•

Research question 4: What are the self-perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian
diaspora as integral development actors

•

Hypothesis 1: The Haitian diaspora has positive self-perceptions and accepts they
are integral development actors.
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One of the primary benefits of conducting the survey was to capture the
perceptions of the respondents through a mixture of categorical, numerical, and ordinal
styled responses. Through the respondent feedback, the dissertation built a narrative
around the perceptions of the diaspora as an international development actor so that
traditional actors can better respond to and engage with this group. The survey captured
a robust response, with 83% of respondents (n=482) having positive self-perceptions as
an international actor, with just over 50% recorded as having strong positive feelings.
Less than 4% of respondents had perceptions that they were not integral actors in Haiti’s
development.
•

Research question 4: What are the self-perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian
diaspora as integral development actors

•

Hypothesis 2: Positive self-perceptions lead to greater willingness to participate
in systematic programs
The second benefit of the survey came from opportunities to run a multivariate

regression against participation in development initiatives and the likelihood to send cash
remittances. The multivariate regression analysis substantiated that positive selfperceptions of being critical actors of Haitian development led to an increased
willingness to participate.
•

Research question 4: What are the self-perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian
diaspora as integral development actors

•

Hypothesis 3: There are generational differences between those who perceive
themselves as integral actors to Haitian development

•
•
•

Older (65+) – Do not believe they are integral actors
Middle-aged (35 to 64) – Inconclusive belief they are integral actors
Younger (18 to 34) – Do believe they are integral actors
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As a part of the analysis, the dissertation looked to identify generational
differences between the younger, middle-aged, and older populations. The results of the
regression showed that older Haitian diaspora was less likely to participate in
international development initiatives. If these results are cross-referenced with the
verbatims from the survey, older adults have a serious concern about the safety and
security in Haiti. In regards to the hypothesis, there are no generational differences
between those who perceive themselves as integral actors to Haitian development.
However, regression analysis proves there are generational differences between the three
age groups where older adults are less likely to participate in development initiatives and
more likely to have sent cash or cash equivalents to Haiti.
•

Research question 4: What are the self-perceptions and attitudes of the Haitian
diaspora as integral development actors

•

Hypothesis 4: Kreyol language proficiency is a determinant of the willingness to
participate in knowledge transfer initiatives

•

Hypothesis 5: Younger and middle-aged diaspora are less likely to participate in
remittance transfer than older diaspora

•

Hypothesis 6: There are variables which help predict levels of engagement
amongst the Haitian diaspora
While there were several variables analyzed to predict the desire to participate,

there were only three that had statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval, and
two had significance at the 90% confidence interval. These variables were, respectively,
the perception of the diaspora as an integral actor (Diaspora Solution) and the perceived
connection to the diaspora (Diaspora Connection). The two variables significant at the
90% level were the years since the last visit to Haiti and the Kreyol language fluency.
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The regression showed that as the perceived ‘Diaspora Connection’ and ‘Diaspora
Solution’ increased, so did the desire to participate in development initiatives. Secondly,
the time between visits to Haiti and being an older adult had an inverse relationship with
the desire to participate in international development initiatives. These facts should
encourage the international community and the Haitian government to promote
reconnecting to the homeland as often and as soon as possible. By doing this, it will help
the diaspora keep Haiti as a focus and encourage participation in many of the
development initiatives in Haiti.
In an attempt to predict the likelihood of sending cash remittances, three variables
were shown to be statistically significant predictors. These variables were whether the
diaspora was born in Haiti, the years since the last visit, and the diaspora’s perceived
Kreyol language fluency. There are several opportunities to make additional calculations
using different dependent variables. It is encouraged that this is explored further to see if
there are any other statistical relationships.
•

Research question 2: How can Haitian diaspora engagement be improved
What remains to be conveyed about the data is how to increase diaspora

engagement in Haitian development initiatives. The survey included an open-ended
question that allowed this dissertation to capture responses from 269 respondents. Their
responses were coded, and the top 5 themes of ways to improve engagement emerged as
education, better strategic cooperation, increasing communication and networking among
the diaspora, improved safety in Haiti, and a more positive narrative adopted by the
international community and its partners. Young adults were motivated by education,
middle-aged adults were motivated by opportunities to network and share ideas, and
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older adults were most motivated to engage with improved safety in Haiti. These focus
areas were captured directly from the Haitian diaspora and can be a cornerstone that
Haitian development actors can build new strategies around.
The findings of this chapter have shown that the diaspora is not just valuable
resources but also very interested in engagement. Any program that wishes to engage the
diaspora won’t have to spend a lot of time convincing the diaspora of their integral and
vital role in Haitian development. The Haitian diaspora has stated their reservations to
full and complete engagement, providing a roadmap for homeland and host actors to
follow. The international community has to not only take this sentiment into
consideration but also take action to reconcile the dissolutions that diaspora integration
will be easy for those receiving them. These insights were very critical to a deeper
understanding of the Haitian diaspora.
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CHAPTER VI – OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
International development professionals and non-profit organizations have long
employed the North-South development model. The idea of non-state actors taking
leading roles in development has recently emerged in literature and strategies within the
international community. What is different about this emerging strategy is that that it
calls on a more familiar, and arguably, more aligned entrant to participate in Haiti’s
development initiatives. Additionally, the strategy is an acknowledgment of the seminal
work of Romer, who highlights the significance of human capital as a component to
macroeconomic growth. The systematic inclusion and elevation of the Haitian diaspora as
a third and integral actor breaks decades of traditional approaches. This disruptive
concept warranted an in-depth and extensive review of how this strategy affects actors
operating in this system.
This dissertation adopted a multifaceted approach to discovering the perceptions
and attitudes of Haitian development actors regarding the Haitian diaspora. To set the
parameters of the dissertation, case studies of countries and regions that participated in
diaspora engagement were reviewed for common themes. The dissertation then
conducted an in-depth one on one semi-structured interviews to get representative
positions of elite development actors. Finally, a vigorous survey was conducted that
provided detailed information of over 475 members of the Haitian diaspora living in the
United States and Canada. The extensive exploration communicated in this document
has uncovered three principal attitudes of each of the Haitian development actors. These
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principle attitudes are followed by recommendations that the host and homeland can
enact in order to improve diaspora engagement.
Homeland Perceptions: Eager and Open
The dissertation has shown that homeland actors, which include the Haitian
government and ministry leaders, are eager to find ways for their diaspora to participate
in development initiatives. The homeland elites interviewed in this dissertation expressed
a keen interest in seeing the diaspora participate in knowledge sharing and capacity
building initiatives, particularly in the fields of business and technology. This openness
to the diaspora is supported by a historical and broad recognition that the diaspora is vital
to the Haitian economy. Although the Haitian government has already begun utilizing
some diaspora in advisory and consultative capacities within the government, this is not
widespread or prevalent in other areas of the public or private sectors. Members of the
Haitian diaspora that are willing to engage in development initiatives are not likely to
resistance from leaders within the Haitian government.
These sentiments are important as extant literature suggests that the support and
acceptance of homeland actors are vital to creating an environment of trust and
cooperation amongst non-state actors, such as the diaspora. Fortunately, the lack of trust
that the Haitian diaspora has for the Haitian government will not dissuade them from
participating in initiatives. Nonetheless, to fully capture the benefits of a transnational
diaspora, homeland actors must improve their engagement efforts. The most successful
engagement initiatives directly addressed the diaspora abroad with formalized open
invitations that welcomed them to participate in the development efforts of the homeland
country. In order for the Haitian government to make meaningful strides in the
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integration of the Haitian diaspora in development initiatives, they must make the call
and do it boldly.
Host Perceptions: Reservation and Inconsistency
The second principle attitude revealed in this dissertation is that host actors
operating in Haiti have reservations at the notion of the Haitian diaspora becoming
integral development actors. Host actors recognize that the Haitian diaspora is one of the
few groups that can traverse the technical, cultural, and language impediments their
initiatives face. Nevertheless, these sentiments have not resulted in the consistent
utilization and prioritization to integrate this group. This dissertation found that host
actors had varying degrees of exposure to the diaspora, and few admitted to concerted
attempts to recruit them as staff in their programs. However, host actors exhibited a
genuine curiosity about the UN strategy. They indicated that they would be willing to
support the strategy if the Haitian diaspora did not supplant the voice of local Haitian
people. While both the host and homeland emphasized that the diaspora should increase
their sensitivities by actively listening to the Haitian people before engaging, it was clear
that this was more of a concern to the host actor than the homeland.
One of the critical failures of the U.N. and other international bodies that support
diaspora engagement in development is not acknowledging that integration of diaspora
would require mandatory structural reforms. Although host actors in Haiti generally
perceive the Haitian diaspora as valuable and effective members of the development
process, the entrenchment of the North-South ideology makes incorporation very
difficult. One barrier to integration is that larger multinational organizations have
procured a significant amount of development aid. These multinational organizations are
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likely to fiercely protect this competitive multibillion-dollar industry affectionately
known as development. For institutions that award the resources and dictate the rules of
engagement, there must be a concerted effort to make development more inclusive and
open to the diaspora.
Haitian Diaspora Perceptions: Enthusiasm, Confidence, and Connection
The third principle attitude found amongst the diaspora is that an overwhelming
majority have a desire to participate in development initiatives. This desire is reinforced
by a healthy self-perception that they are an integral piece to Haiti’s long-term
development. The Haitian diaspora that participated in the survey were highly educated,
had a high level of perceived Kreyol language fluency, and worked in a wide variety of
industries. The majority of respondents worked in healthcare and pharmaceutical fields,
a crucial alignment with the largest development sectors in Haiti. Some of their
characteristics, as previously mentioned, could be contributing to their confident
disposition that they are integral to Haitian development. Despite living abroad, nearly
three-quarters of the respondents reported having at least a moderate connection, and just
over 42% of the respondents considered themselves as having a strong connection. These
attitudes are important because it shows that the diaspora feels a part of the homeland.
Their connection and ties to Haiti create an opportunity to reverse the ‘brain drain’ by
finding ways to incorporate the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the diaspora.
Furthermore, the integration of a willing and multifaceted diaspora has several social and
economic benefits, including but not limited to, the adoption of norms conducive to
development. Even though the Haitian diaspora has a mostly negative perception
towards the Haitian government’s ability to provide for the basic needs of their people,
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the diaspora set aside those feelings for the opportunity to serve in various development
capacities.
Although there is broad enthusiasm to participate in development, the reality is
that a sizeable number of diaspora members are not participating. The evidence points to
several reasons that active participation has not occurred, none more visible than the
security situation in Haiti. The sentiments shared by the diaspora in this survey make a
clear distinction that civil unrest nullifies any positive aspirations to engage in
development with the homeland. Older adults in the diaspora are particularly concerned
with the safety in Haiti, perhaps stirring anxieties from previous regimes and failed
administrations. The diaspora is more likely to lend their efforts towards programs that
have been proven to be effective, where their skills can be leveraged, where there is an
open dialogue, mutual respect amongst all parties, and a characteristically low power
distance environment.
The Haitian government needs to be more attentive to the youth in the diaspora,
as they are less likely to contribute economically and have self-perceptions that they are
less connected than previous generations. Fortunately, the youth remain more motivated
to participate and have less in-country requirements than their older counterparts. If the
Haitian government, with support from the international community, makes rigorous
efforts to engage the diaspora, there is an opportunity to benefit from the next generation
of human capital and recapture the youth of the Haitian diaspora. This dissertation offers
policy recommendations for the traditional actors of Haitian development in the section
below.
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Policy Recommendations to Improve Haitian Diaspora Engagement
National Haitian Culture Engagement Program
A vital policy recommendation that Haitian development actors can enact is the
launching of a national Haitian culture program that seeks to celebrate and educate the
Haitian diaspora about Haitian culture, while simultaneously galvanizing an engagement
movement. It is essential that a national program celebrates the cultural richness of Haiti
and frames the country in a positive light. There is a vast amount of content that portrays
Haiti negatively, which results in discouragement of the diaspora to visit and engage with
their homeland. These inherited negative views of the Haitian government have seemed
to reverberate into the general sentiments of the Haitian diaspora. The narrative needs to
be changed so that the diaspora who lack a strong connection to Haiti, or who over time
have not visited the homeland, do not accept a biased or imbalanced perception that Haiti
is a hopeless country. The Haitian diaspora has conveyed a strong desire for formal and
informal educational opportunities to learn about the true essence of Haiti. A program
that teaches about Haitian history and teaches Kreyol helps the diaspora transform
historically negative perceptions and produces an opportunity to unite the Haitian
diaspora.
Haiti’s affinity for the arts, food, and music is evident in traditions lived out in
their host countries; therefore, modeling engagement efforts after the Mexican model
would be successful for a country like Haiti. The Haitian government could also utilize
these events to recruit potential diaspora to serve as transnational members of
development. These events, if modeled appropriately, can allow the diaspora an
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opportunity to convene and celebrate Haitian culture, network, and leverage assets within
the community.
Begin an International Haitian Diaspora Inclusion Effort
The current structure of the international system makes it difficult for the diaspora
to become active and equitable partners in Haitian development. The Haitian diaspora
can address this in one of two ways. First, the diaspora can collectively pool their
resources together and petition that their investment, remittances, and engagement come
with equal authority and influence in development efforts. They can advocate that any
funds that they raise, or initiatives they design, be directed and led by them. Making
engagement their own could potentially activate more individuals to become
transnational members of the diaspora. One of the driving motivations of a customized
diaspora led agenda comes from the fact that diaspora is more likely to engage in
development activities in regions of their family origin. This path is less collaborative
but does allow the Haitian diaspora, as new entrants, more control over development
efforts.
The other approach for increased inclusion must be agreed to by host actors, and
it includes the preferential hiring and awarding of long-term development contracts to the
Haitian diaspora. One glaring criticism of current programs sponsored by organizations
like the USAID is the length of time that diaspora participants have in these development
programs is not long enough for meaningful or impactful engagement. The Haitian
diaspora has an inherent connection to the homeland and often are willing to work and
engage in situations that non-Haitian actors may outright refuse. If the host and
homeland actors are genuinely committed to the sustained development of Haiti, they
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should categorically include the Haitian diaspora in their strategies and execution of their
programs.
Increase Investment and Knowledge Transfer Opportunities
Most of the diaspora have shown an interest in investing in Haiti and providing
economic alleviation for the homeland. Before the diaspora can participate in such
initiatives, it is vital to the diaspora that they have guarantees that their investment comes
with full transparency and accountability. The most successful countries examined in
this dissertation were able to capitalize on the incomes of the diaspora abroad by creating
attractive domestic markets in the homeland. Tailoring domestic markets to the needs of
the diaspora often involved tourism and a message to reengage with the homeland. To
have a robust tourism market, the Haitian government must address the diasporas’
requirements regarding safety.
Limitations

While the three-pronged approach to understanding the perceptions of traditional
and non-traditional actors regarding the Haitian diaspora was comprehensive, the
dissertation was not without some notable limitations. The most obvious limitation was
the number of interviewees that participated in interviews. A total of six elites provided
their views when the goal was at least nine. Prolonged protests and rioting prevented the
researcher from attending a development conference where there would have been an
abundance of elite actors to recruit for the interview. While sentiments provided insight
into how host and homeland actors are thinking, the quantity of interviewees may not be
enough to generalize the sentiments of Haitian development actors. Secondly, the
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sampling methodology used for the survey was primarily non-probability sampling
(connivence and snow-ball). The dissertation used broad social media marketing and
targeted recruitment of respondents, their groups and clubs were used to get the 485
samples. Some of the groups where the advertisement were placed in were in clubs or
groups that were affiliated with universities and professional associations; therefore the
results could be biased to those who had higher affluence. The dissertation would have
benefited by utilizing various probability sampling.
Final Remark
This dissertation delivered the perceptions of a significant sample of the Haitian
diaspora as well as direct feedback from actors who are intimately involved in Haitian
development. The international community has done well to acknowledge the value of
the Haitian diaspora as valuable human capital. However, the acceptance and ultimate
integration of the Haitian diaspora will require a concerted effort and improvement of the
mechanisms of engagement. Following the outcomes of this dissertation, it is clear that
full implementation of the Haitian diaspora in development initiatives would benefit from
a study of the perceptions and attitudes of Haitians citizens towards the Haitian diaspora.
Since Haitians have mostly interacted with host actor organizations with leaders that do
not look like them, an introduction of the Haitian diaspora could be considered a dramatic
shift to some groups within the Haitian population. As the actual beneficiaries of
development, it is essential that the perceptions of Haitian citizens be understood and that
they accept the Haitian diaspora in their path of development. It is the hope of the
researcher that more profound and more genuine considerations be made for a country
that has long been the spectacle of the international community.
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APPENDIX A – CONSENT FORM

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD

STANDARD (SIGNED) INFORMED CONSENT
STANDARD (SIGNED) INFORMED CONSENT PROCEDURES
This completed document must be signed by each consenting research participant.
• The Project Information and Research Description sections of this form should be completed by the
Principal Investigator before submitting this form for IRB approval.
• Signed copies of the consent form should be provided to all participants.
Last Edited May 13th, 2019

Today’s date:
PROJECT INFORMATION
Project Title: The Haitian Diaspora as Human Capital and Agents of Change: Perceptions and Attitudes of the
Haitian Diaspora as an International Development Actor
Phone: 561 386 6028 Email: Alain.Pompilus@usm.edu
Principal Investigator: Alain Pompilus
College: Arts and Sciences

School and Program: School of Social Science and
Global Studies: International Development Program
RESEARCH DESCRIPTION

1. Purpose:
The purpose of this research is to assess the viability of the strategy purported by the United Nations' and
other international governmental organizations who suggest that non-state actors accelerate international
development initiatives. More specifically, this research examines the perception and attitudes of traditional
and non-traditional actors surrounding the Haitian Diaspora as integral actors of Haitian development. By
understanding the positions of Haitian development actors and the motivations of the Haitian Diaspora, the
research findings can help move Haitian development policy towards one that is more effective, inclusive
and sustainable.
2. Description of Study:

This is a descriptive cross-sectional research study involving concept elicitation interviews. The research
accepts established theories on human capital and aims to explore what the current perception of Haitian
Diaspora engagement is amongst Haitian development actors. The researcher will conduct interviews with
elites from each of the three primary actor groups of international development using a semi-structured, one
on one approach. The international actor groups are as follows:
•
•
•

Haitian Diaspora
Haitian government officials and staff
International organizations - IGOs, NGO, and Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs).

Each interview will last approximately 45 minutes but will have the flexibility of additional time to reach
information saturation within the study
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APPENDIX B - INTERVIEW INCLUSION CRITERIA
All participants will need to meet all the inclusion criteria in order to participate in
the interviews. A set of criteria is listed for each type of participant.
Haitian Diaspora
Inclusion criteria
1. The elite provides written consent to participate in this research
2. The elite has visited Haiti in the last year
3. The elite is leading or participating in a national or international initiative that
greatly contributes to economic, political or social development
4. The elite speaks and understands Haitian-Creole or French or English
5. The elite is willing to participate in 45-minute audio-recorded interview
6. The elite 21 years of age or older
Haitian Government Official
Inclusion criteria
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The official provides written consent to participate in this research
The official’s primary source of income is dependent on government funding
The official speaks and understands Haitian-Creole or French or English
The official is willing to participate in 45-minute audio-recorded interview
The official is 21 years of age or older

United States Government Official
Inclusion criteria
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The official provides written consent to participate in this research
The official is a senior member of a federal agency that has operations in Haiti
The official speaks and understands Haitian-Creole or French or English
The official is willing to participate in 45-minute audio-recorded interview
The official is 21 years of age or older

Academic Elite or Expert
Inclusion criteria
1. The expert provides written consent to participate in this research
2. The expert has considerable knowledge of Haiti’s political, economic or social
happenings
3. The expert holds a doctorate or master’s degree from an accredited university
recognized in the United States
4. The expert speaks and understands Haitian-Creole or French or English
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5. The expert is willing to participate in 45-minute audio-recorded interview
6. The expert is 21 years of age or older
IGO leaders
Inclusion criteria
1. The IGO leader provides written consent to participate in this research
2. The IGO leader holds a senior level position within their organization and has
provided services in Haiti for at least 5 years
3. The IGO leader is part of an organization the primarily specializes in international
development initiatives in Haiti. Those with specializations in economic
development will be given priority.
4. The IGO leader speaks and understands Haitian-Creole or French or English
5. The IGO leader is willing to participate in 45-minute audio-recorded interview
6. The IGO leader is 21 years of age or older

169

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Interviewee Specific Questions:
These questions will be specific to you and the work that you are doing in your field.
What is your occupation?
How does your role contribute to Haitian development?
What development arena would you say that your role fits in the most? Social
Development, Economic Development or Political Development?
Definition of Diaspora: Those have moved all over the world and maintain a connection
to the homeland
Have you heard of or read about recent publications regarding the diaspora as active and
integral participants to development?
How active is the Haitian diaspora in your program or activities?
Interviewee General Questions:
These questions will focus on general perceptions and attitudes.
How would you characterize the Haitian diaspora and their role in development?
What would be the Haitian diaspora’s biggest strength as an active participant in Haitian
development?
What would be the Haitian diaspora’s biggest weakness or obstacle as an active
participant in Haitian development?
What are your thoughts about the Haitian diaspora as a source of knowledge and
expertise for Haiti?
Is it critical for the Haitian diaspora who train local Haitians to be able to speak Haitian
Kreyol as opposed to French or English?
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1) If development is typically between homeland country, host governments, NGOs
and IGOs, what are your thoughts about the diaspora being a third and influential
participant in development? And what I mean by influential I mean one that has
decision making authority and/or resources?
2) Traditionally, development resources in Haiti have been distributed as follows,
99% of funds go to NGOs and Foreign governments and 1% to the Haitian
government. What are your thoughts about this distribution?
3) If you had a chance to reallocate development resources to the following three
groups, what would that percentage be (Host government NGOs and IGOs,
Haitian government and the Haitian diaspora)?
4) If you were to classify the Haitian diaspora regarding their potential as
development participants using the categories below, how would you do so?
A) (Strong Will, High Capacity) Relatively good performers
B) (Strong Will, Low Capacity) Weak but Willing
C) (Low Will, High Capacity) Unresponsive/Corrupt/ Repressive
D) (Low Will, Low Capacity) Weak and Not Willing
5) How important is the Haitian diaspora in development when compared to the
traditional actors such as the Haitian government or other actors?
6) Is it important for the Haitian diaspora to collaborate with governments and
organizations in the countries they live in to benefit Haitian development?
7) Do you feel that it is important for the Haitian diaspora to have dual citizenship
privileges, the ability to vote in elections, and legal recognition in the
constitution?
8) What is the best way to improve Haitian diaspora engagement in international
development initiatives?
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR HAITIAN DIASPORA
I understand that participation in this project is completely voluntary, and I may at any
time withdraw without penalty, prejudice or loss of benefits. All personal information
will be kept strictly confidential, including my name and any other identifying
information. All procedures to be followed and their purposes were explained to
me. Information was given about all benefits, risks, inconveniences, or discomforts that
might be expected. Any new information that develops during the project will be
provided to me if that information may affect my willingness to continue participation in
the project.
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
By clicking the box below, I give my consent to participate in this research project.
Check this box if you consent to this study, and then click "Continue". (If you do not
wish to provide your consent, please click "exit" at the top of this page)
2. Do you primarily live in Haiti?
Yes
No

3. Are you 18 years old or older?
Yes
No

4. What is your gender?
Male
Female

172

5. What U.S. zip code is your home located in (enter 5-digit zip code)? If you are living
outside the U.S. but not in Haiti, please enter 00000

6. In what year were you born? (example, 1976)

*7. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Less than high school degree
High school or equivalent (e.g. GED)
Some College but no degree
Associate Degree
Bachelor Degree
Graduate Degree

8. Which of the following categories best describes your employment status?
Employed, working 40 or more hours per week
Employed, working 1-39 hours per week
Not employed, looking for work
Not employed, NOT looking for work
Retired
Disabled, not able to work

9. What industry do you work in?

*10. What was your total income earned last year?

11. Which of the following best describes your current relationship status?
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
In a domestic partnership or civil union
Single, never married
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12. How many children aged 17 or younger live in your household?
None
1
2
3
4
More than 4

*13. Were you born in Haiti?
Yes
No

14. Was one or more of your parents born in Haiti?
Yes, both parents were born in Haiti
Yes, one parent was born in Haiti
No, neither parent was born in Haiti

*15. How well do you speak Haitian Kreyol?
I do not speak Kreyol
Limited or basic fluency
Moderate fluency
Above average fluency
Native or bilingual fluency
16. What circumstance BEST describes you or your family’s emigration from Haiti?
Emigration is the act of leaving one's country and permanently settling in another.
My family or I left Haiti because of civil or political unrest
My family or I left Haiti because of natural disasters (earthquake, flooding, etc.)
My family or I left Haiti for social advancement (economic or educational opportunities
abroad)
I am unsure
My family or I left for reasons not listed
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*17. Do you consider yourself part of the Haitian diaspora? A diaspora is defined as a
group of people with similar heritage or homeland, who have since moved all over the
world, and maintains a connection to the country of origin.
Yes, I consider myself part of the Haitian diaspora and I have a STRONG connection
Yes, I consider myself part of the Haitian diaspora and I have a MODERATE connection
Yes, I consider myself part of the Haitian diaspora and I have a WEAK connection
No, I do not consider myself part of the Haitian diaspora
I am unsure
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
*18. I believe that the Haitian diaspora is a key factor to Haiti's sustained and long-term
development. (Diaspora- a group that shares a homeland or heritage and maintains a
connection to a country)
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
*19. I am generally satisfied with organizational efforts that are directed towards helping
Haiti.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
*20. I would like to participate in a Haitian development initiative benefiting local
Haitians.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
21. It is important that I participate in a Haitian development initiative led by nonHaitian government entities, organizations and non-profits
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Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
22. It is important that I participate in a Haitian development initiative led by the Haitian
government.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
23. It is important that I participate in a Haitian development initiative led by the Haitian
diaspora. (Diaspora- a group that shares a homeland or heritage and maintains a
connection to a country)
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
*24. I feel that the Haitian government respects me and the knowledge I bring to develop
Haiti.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
*25. I feel that non-Haitian government entities, organizations and non-profits in Haiti
respect me and the knowledge that I bring to develop Haiti.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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26. I feel that effective Haitian development initiatives MUST include a Haitian
perspective even if the funds come from another country.
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
*27. Do you believe that it is important for the Haitian diaspora, who train local
Haitians, to be able to speak Haitian Kreyol as opposed to French or English? (Diaspora
- a group that shares a homeland or heritage and maintains a connection to a country)

Extremely important
Very important
Somewhat important
Not so important
Not at all important
28. How would you characterize the Haitian government’s ability to provide the basic
needs for their people?
Strong Will & High Capacity (Relatively good performers)
Strong Will & Low Capacity (Weak but Willing)
Low Will & High Capacity (Unresponsive/Corrupt/ Repressive)
Low Will & Low Capacity (Weak and Not Willing)
29. Please rank in order of importance, the groups that can MOST help Haitian people:

*30. Have you sent cash or cash equivalents to family or friends in Haiti?
Yes, I have sent cash
No, I have not sent cash
31. What is the primary method you use to send cash or cash equivalents to family or
friends in Haiti?
Money transfer company
Sent over with a family member or friend
Carried cash with you to Haiti
Technological platform using smartphone or computer
I have not sent cash
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32. Please choose the way that you are most willing to support Haiti’s development:
Sending cash or cash equivalents back to family and friends or through investment in
businesses or programs
Volunteering my time in Haiti with an organization, church or non profit
Sharing knowledge and expertise in Haiti with the local Haitian community
Neither, I am not likely to support Haitian development in any way
Other (please specify)
33. When was the last time you were in Haiti, please enter the year? (example, 2006)

34. The next time I travel to Haiti will MOST likely be for:
Family or Friends
Business or Academic purpose
Leisure
Volunteering or Participation in a formalized program
I do not see myself traveling to Haiti in the near future

35. In the last year, have you been to Haiti to volunteer or participate with an
organization dedicated to helping Haiti?
Yes
No

36. In order for me to spend an extended period of time in Haiti I would absolutely need
access to the following (Select all that apply):
Access to healthcare
Access to telecommunications
Guarded living accommodations
At least a MODERATE level living accommodation (e.g. non-rural dwelling,
comfortable bed, air conditioning, hotel, or house)
None of the above
Other (please specify)
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37. How do you improve Haitian diaspora engagement in Haiti? (Diaspora- a group that
shares a homeland or heritage and maintains a connection to a country)
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APPENDIX E: HAITIAN WILL AND CAPACITY MATRIX
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